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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADAMS

IDAHO WOOL GROWERS
ASSOCIA TION, INC., an Idaho corporation,
individually and on behalf of its members;
FRANK SHIRTS, JR., individually and as a
member of the Idaho Wool Growers
Association; RONALD W. SHIRTS,
LESLIE SHIRTS and JOlIN T. SHIRTS,
individually and d/b/a SHIRTS BROTHERS
SHEEP and as members of the Idaho Wool
Growers Association,

Case No.

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND
FOR JURY TRIAL
Filing Fee:
Category:

Plaintiffs,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO; IDAHO FISH &
GAME COMMISSION; IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF FISH & GAME; CAL
GROEN, Director of Idaho Department of
Fish and Game.
Defendants.
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COME NOW the Plaintiffs, Idaho Wool Growers Association, Inc., Frank Shirts, Jr., and
Ronald W. Shirts and Leslie Shirts, husband and wife, and John T. Shirts d/b/a Shirts Brothers
Sheep, by and through their counsel of record, Samuel A. Diddle of the firm Eberle, Berlin,
Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered, and for a cause of action against the Defendants
hereby allege and complain as follows.

I.
PARTIES
1.

Idaho Wool Growers Association, Inc. ("IWGA") is a non-profit association

incorporated in Idaho with its principal place of business in Boise, Ada County, Idaho.
2.

Frank Shirts, Jr. ("Shirts") raises sheep and is a member ofIWGA. He has grazed

sheep in the Payette National Forest since 1977. His principal place of business is in Wilder,
Canyon County, Idaho.
3.

Ronald W. Shirts and Leslie Shirts, husband and wife, and John T. Shirts operate

Shirts Brothers Sheep ("Shirts Brothers") and are members of IWGA. Shirts Brothers raises
sheep. Shirts Brothers' principal place of business is Weiser, Washington County, Idaho. Shirts
Brothers has grazed sheep in the Payette National Forest since 1979.
4.

The Idaho Fish and Game Commission is a duly constituted entity of the State of

Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code § 32-102.
5.

The Idaho Department of Fish and Game is a duly constituted entity under the

supervision, management and control of the Idaho Fish and Game Commission.
6.

Cal Groen is the Director of the Idaho Department of Fish and Game.
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II.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE
7.

Venue is proper in Adams County pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-402.

8.

Jurisdiction is appropriate pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-514 and Article I, Section 8

and Article V, Section 20 of the Idaho Constitution.

III.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
9.

Paragraphs 1 through 8 above are incorporated herein by this reference as though

fully set forth.
10.

Prior to 1997, domestic sheep grazmg was permitted upon National Forest

Systems lands of the Payette National Forest within the Hells Canyon area, and Shirts and Shirts
Brothers were permitted to graze their sheep on certain allotments in the Payette National Forest
at different times during the year.
11.

These grazing permits were and are essential to the success and viability of the

Shirts' and Shirts Brothers' grazing operations.
12.

While Bighorn Sheep were historically abundant in the Hells Canyon area of

Idaho and Oregon, they were extirpated from the area by around 1945.
13.

In approximately 1996/1997, various federal agencies, wildlife agencies of other

states, and the Idaho Department of Fish and Game all reached an understanding regarding
cooperation among the governmental agencies to reintroduce Bighorn Sheep to the Hells Canyon
area.
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14.

In or around 199611997, the federal and state agencies mentioned above

announced their intention to institute the transplant program.
15.

On or about January 1, 1997 the Idaho Department of Fish and Game notified the

IWGA that several dozen head of Bighorn Sheep would be transplanted to the Hells Canyon area
within a few weeks.
16.

The IWGA and several of its members were concerned that this transplant

program would disrupt domestic sheep operations and/or lead to the cancellation or termination
of federal land or state land domestic sheep grazing allotments in or around Hells Canyon.
Among those members who were concerned were Frank Shirts, Jr. and Ronald Shirts and John T.
Shilis d/b/a Shirts Brothers Sheep.
17.

In the late 1996/early 1997 time period, the IWGA on behalf of its members and

the Shirts objected to the Bighorn reintroduction plan and threatened to object to the plan and
seek legislation in the Idaho Legislature opposing the reintroduction.
18.

As a result of the threatened opposition from IWGA and its members, and in an

effort to resolve the dispute and eliminate IWGA' s and its members' objections and resistance to
the reintroduction of the Bighorn Sheep, the member governmental entities of the Hells Canyon
Bighorn Sheep Restoration Committee, including the Idaho Department of Fish and Game,
signed a Letter Agreement and sent it to the IWGA. A true and correct copy of that Letter
Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
19.

The Letter Agreement provided that the state wildlife agenCIes would take

"whatever action is necessary to reduce further losses of Bighorn Sheep without adversely
impacting existing domestic sheep operators" and recognizes "the existing domestic sheep

COMPLAINT - 4
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operations in or adjacent to the Hells Canyon Complex, on both National Forest and private
lands .... "
20.

The intent of the Letter Agreement was that domestic sheep operators not only

would not be held responsible for losses of Bighorn Sheep, but that the state wildlife agencies,
including the Idaho Department of Fish and Game, would take whatever action was necessary so
that Idaho domestic sheep operations and operators would not be harmed as a result of the
reintroduction of Bighorn Sheep in Hells Canyon.
21.

As a result of the agreement with the wildlife agenCIes, and based on the

execution of the Letter Agreement, the IWGA and its members forbore from objecting to the
reintroduction of the Bighorn Sheep in Hells Canyon.
22.

Based on this Agreement, on March 24, 1997 the Idaho Legislature enacted Idaho

Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D), which among other things required that the Department of Fish and
Game give notice of Bighorn sheep transplants to any affected federal grazing permittees stating
that the existing sheep operations in the area of any such Bighorn Sheep transplant "are
recognized and that the potential risk, if any, of disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep
when the same invade domestic livestock or sheep operations is accepted."
23.

For several years all parties to this agreement honored their commitment. The

Idaho Department of Fish and Game sent notices to Frank Shirts, Jf. and Ron and John T. Shirts
d/b/a! Shirts Brothers Sheep regarding reintroduction pursuant to Idaho Code § 36-1 06(e)(5)(D).
24.

In or around April of 2007, however, the Forest Service reneged on its

commitment in the Letter Agreement and began to modify various grazing permits in 2007,
2008, 2009 and 2010, including those of Shirts and Shirts Brothers.
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25.

The Idaho Department of Fish and Game took no action to block the Forest

Service from modifying the grazing allotments for Shirts and Shilis Brothers and took
insufficient action to prevent Shirts and Shirts Brothers from being harmed from these decisions.
26.

As the result of the prior and continuing grazing permit modifications, IWGA,

Shirts and Shirts Brothers have suffered significant economic losses and will continue to suffer
economic losses.

IV.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach Of Contract)

27.

Paragraphs 1 through 26 above are realleged and incorporated herein by this

reference as though fully set forth.
28.

The Letter Agreement constitutes a contract between the Idaho Department of

Fish and Game and the IWGA and its members, specifically Shirts and Shirts Brothers.
29.

The Idaho Department of Fish and Game has breached its contractual

commitments.
30.

As a proximate result of this breach, the IWGA, Shirts and Shirts Brothers have

suffered economic loss in an amount to be proven at trial.

V.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach Of The Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing)

31.

Paragraphs 1 through 30 above are realleged and incorporated herein by this

reference as though fully set forth.
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32.

Every contract in Idaho includes an implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing.
The Idaho Department of Fish and Game has breached the covenant of good faith

33.

and fair dealing towards IWGA, Shirts and Shirts Brothers.
This breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing has proximately

34.

resulted in significant economic damages to IWGA, Shirts and Shirts Brothers in an amount to
be proven at trial.

VI.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Violation Of Statute)
35.

Paragraphs 1 through 34 above are realleged and incorporated herein by this

reference as though fully set forth.
36.

Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D) requires the Idaho Department ofFish and Game to

protect domestic sheep operations from economic harm caused by the reintroduction of Bighorn
Sheep.
37.

Shirts and Shirts Brothers are domestic sheep operators who have been harmed by

the reintroduction of Bighorn Sheep.
38.

The Idaho Department of Fish and Game is obligated under the statute to remedy

any harm caused to Shirts and Shirts Brothers by the reintroduction of Bighorn Sheep, but has
failed to do so.
39.

This failure has caused significant economic losses to Shirts and Shirts Brothers

in an amount to be proven at trial.
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VII.

CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES
40.

Plaintiffs have been required to retain attorneys to prosecute this action and have

agreed to pay said attorneys a reasonable attorney's fee which Plaintiffs are entitled to recover
pursuant to Idaho law, including Idaho Code §§ 12-117, 12-118 and 12-120.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs hereby demand judgment from
Defendants as follows:
1.

On each of Plaintiffs' claims for relief, damages in an amount to be proven at

2.

For costs, disbursements and attorney fees incurred by Plaintiffs in bringing this

3.

For pre- and post-judgment interest; and

4.

For such other and fUliher relief as this Court may deem just.

trial;

action;

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff hereby demands a jury trial on all issues pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 38(b).
7'

DATED this ~ day of March, 2010.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT G.F THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADAMS

IDAHO WOOL GROWERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho corporation,
individually and on behalf of its members;
FRANK SHIRTS, JR., individually and as a
member of the Idaho Wool Growers
Association; RONALD W. SHIRTS,
LESLIE SHIRTS and JOHN T. SHIRTS,
individually and d/b/a SHIRTS BROTHERS
SHEEP and as members of the Idaho Wool
Growers Association,

Case No. CV 20 10-2567

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiffs,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO; IDAHO FISH &
GAME COMMISSION; IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF FISH & GAME; CAL
GROEN, Director of Idaho Department of
Fish and Game,
Defendants.
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COME NOW the Plaintiffs, Idaho Wool Growers Association, Inc., Frank Shirts, Jr., and
Ronald W. Shirts and Leslie Shirts, husband and wife, and John T. Shirts d/b/a Shirts Brothers
Sheep, by and through their counsel of record, Samuel A. Diddle of the firm Eberle, Berlin,
Kading, Turnbow & McKlvcen, Chartered, and for a cause of action against the Defendants
hereby allege and complain as follows.

I.

PARTIES
1.

Idaho Wool Growers Association, Inc. ("IWGA") is a non-profit association

incorporated in Idaho with its principal place of business in Boise, Ada County, Idaho.
2.

Frank Shirts, Jr. ("Shirts") raises sheep and is a member of IWGA. He has grazed

sheep in the Payette National Forest since 1977. His principal place of business is in Wilder,
Canyon County, Idaho.
3.

Ronald W. Shirts and Leslie Shirts, husband and wife, and John T. Shirts operate

Shirts Brothers Sheep ("Shirts Brothers") and are members of IWGA. Shirts Brothers raises
sheep. Shirts Brothers' principal place of business is Weiser, Washington County, Idaho. Shirts
Brothers has grazed sheep in the Payette National Forest since 1979.
4.

The Idaho Fish and Game Commission is a duly constituted entity of the State of

Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code § 32-102.
5.

The Idaho Department of Fish and Game is a duly constituted entity under the

supervision, management and control of the Idaho Fish and Game Commission.
6.

Cal Groen is the Director of the Idaho Department of Fish and Game.
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II.

JURISDICTION AND VENU};:
7.

Venue is proper in Adams County pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-402.

8.

Jurisdiction is appropriate pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-514 and Article I, Section 8

and Article V, Section 20 of the Idaho Constitution.

III.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
9.

Paragraphs 1 through 8 above are incorporated herein by this reference as though

fully set forth.
10.

Prior to 1997, domestic sheep graZll1g was permitted upon National Forest

Systems lands of the Payette National Forest within the Hells Canyon area, and Shirts and Shirts
Brothers were permitted to graze their sheep on certain allotments in the Payette National Forest
at different times during the year.
11.

These grazing permits were and are essential to the success and viability of the

Shirts' and Shirts Brothers' grazing operations.
12.

While Bighorn Sheep were historically abundant in the Hells Canyon area of

Idaho and Oregon, they were extirpated from the area by around 1945.
13.

In approximately 1996/1997, various federal agencies, wildlife agencies of other

states, and the Idaho Department of Fish and Game all reached an understanding regarding
cooperation among the governmental agencies to reintroduce Bighorn Sheep to the I-Iells Canyon
area.

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 3
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14.

In or around 199611997, the federal and state agencIes mentioned above

announced their intention to institute the transplant program.
IS.

On or about January 1, 1997 the Idaho Department of Fish and Game notified the

IWGA that several dozen head of Bighorn Sheep would be transplanted to the Hells Canyon area
within a few weeks.
16.

The IWGA and several of its members were concerned that this transplant

program would disrupt domestic sheep operations and/or lead to the cancellation or termination
of federal land or state land domestic sheep grazing allotments in or around Hells Canyon.
Among those members who were concerned were Frank Shirts, Jr. and Ronald Shirts and John T.
Shilts d/b/a Shirts Brothers Sheep.
17.

In the late 1996/early 1997 time period, the IWGA on behalf of its members and

the Shirts objected to the Bighorn reintroduction plan and threatened to object to the plan and
seek legislation in the Idaho Legislature opposing the reintroduction.
18.

As a result of the threatened opposition from IWGA and its members, and in an

effort to resolve the dispute and eliminate IWGA's and its members' objections and resistance to
the reintroduction of the Bighorn Sheep, the member governmental entities of the Hells Canyon
Bighorn Sheep Restoration Committee, including the Idaho Department of Fish and Game,
signed a Letter Agreement and sent it to the IWGA. A true and correct copy of that Letter
Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
19.

The Letter Agreement provided that the state wildlife agencIes would take

"whatever action IS necessary to reduce further losses of Bighorn Sheep without adversely
impacting existing domestic sheep operators" and recognizes "the existing domestic sheep

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL -4
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operations in or adjacent to the Hells Canyon Complex, on both National Forest and private
lands .... "
20.

The intent of the Letter Agreement was that domestic sheep operators not only

would not be held responsible for losses of Bighorn Sheep, but that the state wildlife agencies,
including the Idaho Department of Fish and Game, would take whatever action was necessary so
that Idaho domestic sheep operations and operators would not be harmed as a result of the
reintroduction of Bighorn Sheep in I-Iells Canyon.
21.

As a result of the agreement with the wildlife agencIes, and based on the

execution of the Letter Agreement, the IWGA and its members forbore from objecting to the
reintroduction of the Bighorn Sheep in Hells Canyon.
22.

Based on this Agreement, on March 24, 1997 the Idaho Legislature enacted Idaho

Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D), which among other things required that the Department of Fish and
Game give notice of Bighorn sheep transplants to any affected federal grazing permittees stating
that the existing sheep operations in the area of any such Bighorn Sheep transplant "are
recognized and that the potential risk, if any, of disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep
when the same invade domestic livestock or sheep operations is accepted."
23.

For several years all parties to this agreement honored their commitment. The

Idaho Department of Fish and Game sent notices to Frank Shirts, 1r. and Ron and John T. Shirts
d/b/a! Shirts Brothers Sheep regarding reintroduction pursuant to Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D).
24.

In or around April of 2007, however, the Forest Service reneged on its

commitment in the Letter Agreement and began to modify various grazing permits in 2007,
2008,2009 and 2010, including those of Shirts and Shirts Brothers.

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 5
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25.

The Idaho Department of Fish and Game took no action to block the Forest

Service from modifying the grazing allotments for Shirts and Shirts Brothers and took
insufficient action to prevent Shirts and Shirts Brothers from being harmed from these decisions.
26.

As the result of the prior and continuing grazing permit modifications, IWGA,

Shirts and Shirts Brothers have suffered significant economic losses and will continue to suffer
economic losses.

IV.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach Of Contract)

27.

Paragraphs 1 through 26 above are realleged and incorporated herein by this

reference as though fully set forth.
28.

The Letter Agreement constitutes a contract between the Idaho Department of

Fish and Game and the IWGA and its members, specifically Shirts and Shirts Brothers.
29.

The Idaho Department of Fish and Game has breached its contractual

commitments.
30.

As a proximate result of this breach, the IWGA, Shirts and Shirts Brothers have

suffered economic loss in an amount to be proven at trial.

V.
SECOND CAUSE HI<' ACTION
(Breach Of The Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing)

31.

Paragraphs 1 through 30 above are realleged and incorporated herein by this

reference as though fully set forth.

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL -6
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32.

Every contract in Idaho includes an implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing.
33.

The Idaho Department of Fish and Game has breached the covenant of good faith

and fair dealing towards IWGA, Shirts and Shirts Brothers.
34.

This breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing has proximately

resulted in significant economic damages to IWGA, Shirts and Shirts Brothers in an amount to
be proven at trial.

VI.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Violation Of Statute)
35.

Paragraphs 1 through 34 above are realleged and incorporated herein by this

reference as though fully set forth.
36.

Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D) requires the Idaho Department ofFish and Game to

protect domestic sheep operations from economic harm caused by the reintroduction of Bighorn
Sheep.
37.

Shirts and Shirts Brothers are domestic sheep operators who have been harmed by

the reintroduction of Bighorn Sheep.
38.

The Idaho Department of Fish and Game is obligated under the statute to remedy

any harm caused to Shirts and Shirts Brothers by the reintroduction of Bighorn Sheep, but has
failed to do so.
39.

This failure has caused significant economic losses to Shirts and Shirts Brothers

in an amount to be proven at trial.
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VII.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Promissory Estoppel)
40.

Paragraphs 1 through 39 above are realleged and incorporated herein by this

reference as though fully set forth.
41.

IWGA and its members, specifically Shirts and Shirts Brothers, detrimentally

relied upon the express and/or implied promises or representations of the Idaho Department of
Fish and Game in the Letter Agreement.
42.

In reliance on the Idaho Department of Fish and Game's actions, IWGA and its

members, specifically Shirts and Shirts Brothers have suffered substantial economic loss, in an
amount to be proven at trial.
43.

The substantial economic loss suffered by IWGA and Shirts and Shirts Brothers

in reliance on the Idaho Department of Fish and Game was or should have been foreseeable by
the Defendants.
44.

The reliance by IWGA and its members, specifically Shirts and Shirts Brothers,

on the Idaho Department of Fish and Game's promises in the Letter Agreement was reasonable
and justified.

VIII.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Equitable Estoppel)
45.

Paragraphs 1 through 44 above are realleged and incorporated herein by this

reference as though fully set forth.
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46.

The Idaho Department of Fish and Game's express and/or implied representations

to IWGA and its members, specifically Shirts and Shirts Brothers, were false representations or
concealments of material fact and the Idaho Department of Fish and Game had knowledge of the
false representations in the Letter Agreement.
47.

The IWGA and Shirts and Shirts Brothers did not know or could not discover the

truth of the Idaho Department ofFish and Game's false representations or concealments.
48.

The Idaho Department of Fish and Game made the false representations or

concealed facts with the intent that the IWGA and Shirts and Shirts Brothers would rely on the
false representations or concealments, upon which the IWGA and its members, specifically
Shirts and Shirts Brothers, justifiably relied and were subsequently damaged thereby, in an
amount to be proven at trial.

IX.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Quasi Estoppel)

49.

Paragraphs 1 through 48 above are reallegcd and incorporated herein by this

reference as though fully set forth.
50.

The Idaho Department of Fish and Game implied and/or expressly represented

that it would take "whatever action is necessary to reduce further losses of Bighorn Sheep
without adversely impacting existing domestic sheep operators" and recognize "the existing
domestic sheep operations in or adjacent to the Hells Canyon Complex, on both National Forest
and private lands ... " and implied and/or expressly represented that the intent of the Letter
Agreement was that domestic sheep operators not only would not be held responsible for losses
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of Bighorn Sheep, but that the state wildlife agencies, including the Idaho Department of Fish
and Game, would take whatever action was necessary so that Idaho domestic sheep operations
and operators vvould not be harmed as a result of the reintroduction of Bighorn Sheep in Hells
Canyon.
51.

The Idaho Department of Fish and Game is now taking a different position

relating to its representations in the 1997 Letter Agreement.
52.

IWGA and its members, specifically Shirts and Shirts Brothers, were induced to

change positions, and did in fact change positions to their detriment.

53.

Based upon the legal principle of quasi estoppel the Defendants may not now

repudiate the promises and commitments set forth in the Letter Agreement.

x.
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES
54.

Plaintiffs have been required to retain attorneys to prosecute this action and have

agreed to pay said attorneys a reasonable attorney's fee which Plaintiffs are entitled to recover
pursuant to Idaho law, including Idaho Code §§ 12-117, 12-118 and 12-120.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs hereby demand judgment from
Defendants as follows:

l.

On each of Plaintiffs' claims for relief, damages in an amount to be proven at

2.

For costs, disbursements and attorney fees incurred by Plaintiffs in bringing this

trial;

action;
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3.

For pre- and post-judgment interest; and

4.

For such other and further relief as this Court may deem just.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff hereby demands a jury trial on all issues pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 38(b).
DATED this --_.---'--- day of April, 2010.

EBERLE, BERLIl'}nKADING, TURNBOW
& McKLVEEN(CHARTERED

By:

.c~/

)

0'5?;k~

!~muel A. Diddle, of the Firm

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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COMES NOW the Defendants State of Idaho, Idaho Fish and Game Commission, Idaho
Department ofFish and Game, and Cal Groen, Director of Idaho Department ofFish and Game,
and move this Court, pursuant to the authorization ofIdaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),
12(b)(6), and 12(b)(7), to dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for failure to join an indispensable party.
Additionally, Defendants request, pursuant to the authority ofIdaho Code § 12-117, that
they be awarded their attorney fees and other reasonable expenses incurred in defending this
action.
Points and authorities in support of this Motion to Dismiss and in support of Defend ants'
Request for Attorney Fees are provided in Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss, filed concurrently with this Motion.
DATED this

/

XiI,

day of May 2010.
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN

Attorney General
CLIVE J. STRONG

Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division

STEVEN "V. STRACK

Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this Jg-~day of May 2010, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing, MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO IDAHO RULE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), AND 12(b)(7), AND REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY
FEES by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and addressed as follows:
Samuel A. Diddle
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chtd.
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530
Post Office Box 1368
Boise, ID 83701-1368

STEVEN W. STRACK
Deputy Attorney General
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I. INTRODUCTION
Concurrently with this Memorandum, Defendants State ofldaho, Idaho Fish and Game
Commission, Idaho Department of Fish and Game, and Cal Groen, Director of Idaho Department
ofFish and Game (hereinafter collectively referred to as "IDFG") filed a Motion to Dismiss this
action pursuant to the authorization ofIdaho Rule of Civil Procedure ("I.R.C.P.") 12(b)(1), for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim, and 12(b)(7), for failure
to join an indispensable party. This Memorandum is provided in support of the Motion to
Dismiss.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 1, 2010, Plaintiffs Idaho Wool Growers Association, Inc., ("IWGA") Frank
Shirts, Jr., Ronald W. Shirts, Leslie Shirts and John T. Shirts, individually and d/b/a Shirts
Brothers Sheep (hereinafter collectively "Plaintiffs"), filed an action against IDFG. The action
alleges that in 1996 and 1997, IDFG, in cooperation with federal agencies and wildlife agencies
in other states, took action to reintroduce bighorn sheep to the Hells Canyon area.
The Amended Complaint further alleges that in response to objections made by Plaintiffs,
the Wallowa-Whitman National Forest sent to Plaintiff Idaho Wool Growers Association
("IWGA"), on January 16, 1997, a letter that stated the intent to reintroduce bighorn sheep to
historic habitat in Hells Canyon. Amended Complaint, Exhibit A (hereinafter the" 1997 Letter").
The 1997 Letter was cosigned by the Idaho Department of Fish and Game, the Oregon
Department ofFish and Wildlife, the Washington Department ofFish and Wildlife, the United
States Bureau of Land Management, and the Foundation for North American Wild Sheep, who
collectively were referred to as the "Hells Canyon Bighorn Sheep Restoration Committee." Id.
The 1997 Letter stated the Committee's interest "in having the support of the woolgrowers
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industry for this effort to repopulate parts of Hells Canyon with bighorn sheep." Id. The 1997
Letter recognized the potential for transmission of diseases from domestic sheep to bighorn
sheep and included the following provisions:
•

"These bighorns will be considered 'at risk' for potential disease transmission and
death."

•

The Committee members "will assume the responsibility for bighorn losses and
further disease transmissions."

•

The fish and wildlife agencies, including IDFG, would "take whatever action is
necessary to reduce further losses of bighorn sheep without adversely impacting
existing domestic sheep operators."

•

"Bighorns straying into currently active sheep allotments will be considered 'at
risk' by all of the Committee entities."

•

The Committee members would "recognize[] the existing domestic sheep
operations in or adjacent to the Hells Canyon complex," and "accept[] the
potential risk of disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep when bighorns
invade domestic sheep operations."

Id. The 1997 Letter was sent to Stan Boyd, executive director of the IWGA, but was not signed
by Mr. Boyd or any other representative of the IWGA. Id.
After execution of the 1997 Letter, the Idaho Legislature took action to amend Idaho
Code § 36-106 to include a new subsection, Idaho Code § 36-1 06(e)(5)(D), which provided:
Upon any transplant of bighorn sheep into areas they do not now inhabit or a
transplant to augment existing populations, the department shall provide for any
affected federal or state land grazing permittees or owners or leaseholders of
private land a written letter signed by all federal, state and private entities
responsible for the transplant stating that the existing sheep or livestock
operations in the area of any such bighorn sheep transplant are recognized and
that the potential risk, if any, of disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep
when the same invade domestic livestock or sheep operations is accepted.
1997 Idaho Sess. L. 865. The legislation included an emergency clause causing it to go into
effect as of March 24, 1997, but did not state an intent to make it retroactive or applicable to the
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1997 Letter. 1997 Idaho Sess. L. 867.'
In 2007, the Payette National Forest and Nez Perce National Forest (hereinafter
collectively "Forest Service"), in response to a federal court action filed by Western Watersheds
Project, took action to modify grazing permits held by Frank Shirts, Jr. and Ron and John T.
Shirts d/b/a! Shirts Brothers Sheep (hereinafter collectively the "Shirts"). W. Watersheds Proiect
v. U.S. Forest Service, 2007 WL 1430734, at *1 (D. Idaho 2007).2 The modifications limited
domestic sheep grazing on six allotments in order to prevent the transmission of diseases from
domestic sheep to bighorn sheep. Id. The Shirts requested an administrative stay of the grazing
limitations, which was denied. W. Watersheds Project v. U.S. Forest Service, 2007 WL
1729734, at *1 (D. Idaho 2007). The Shirts appealed the denial of the administrative stay to the
district court, which held that the Shirts were unlikely to prevail on setting aside the denial of the
stay, and denied preliminary injunctive relief. Id., at *3-*4. The court concluded that given the
evidence of disease transmission between domestic sheep and bighorns, and the past failure to
separate bighorns from domestic sheep on the Shirts' allotments, the Forest Service had
sufficient reason to adopt a "different approach" to "more strictly limit grazing on that
allotment." Id., at *3.

J Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(0) was amended in 2009. Among other actions, the subsection
was amended to require that the parties responsible for transplanting or relocating bighorn sheep provide
an "agreement" to affected grazing permittees instead of the "letter" required in the 1997 legislation.
Because all actions alleged in the Complaint occurred prior to the 2009 amendments, all citations to Idaho
Code § 36-1 06( e)(5)(0) herein will be to the statute as adopted in 1997 and in effect until amended in
2009. A copy of Idaho Code § 36-1 06( e)( 5)(0), as it existed prior to the 2009 amendments, is attached to
this Memorandum as Appendix 1.
2 On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court, ill addition to considering those
facts stated on the face of the complaint, may consider "those facts of which the court may properly take
judicial notice." Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535,537 n.3, 835 P.2d 1346, 1348 n.3 (Ct. App. 1992).
Among the facts of which a court may take judicial notice are the circumstances surrounding related
litigation as set forth in court records. See City of Caldwell v. Roark, 98 Idaho 897, 899 n.l, 575 P.2d
495, 497 n.1 (1978) (citing Saydes v. Cuoio, 71 Idaho 17, 226 P.2d 172 (1951), as authority for taking
judicial notice "offacts set forth in prior opinion in related case").
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Plaintiffs allege that as "the result of the prior and continuing grazing permit
modifications, the IWGA and the Shirts have suffered significant economic losses and will
continue to suffer economic losses." Amended Complaint, ~ 26. Plaintiffs' claims against IDFG
arise solely from the allegation that IDFG failed to "block" the Forest Service from modifying
the Shirts' grazing permits. Amended Complaint ~ 26.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
For a complaint to be dismissed under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) on the ground that the complaint
fails to state a claim, it must appear beyond doubt that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in
support of their claims which would entitle them to relief. Wackerli v. Martindale, 82 Idaho 400,
405, 353 P.2d 782, 787 (1960). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
every reasonable intendment will be made to sustain a complaint. Idaho Comm'n on Human
Rights v. Campbell, 95 Idaho 215, 217, 506 P .2d 112, 114 (1973). The Court may consider only
those facts stated on the face of the complaint and "those facts of which the court may properly
take judicial notice." Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 537 n.3, 835 P.2d 1346, 1348 n.3 (Ct.
App. 1992).
A motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) "is a question of
law that can be raised at any time." Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 471,903 P.2d 58, 60
(1995).
On motions to dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(7) for failure to join an indispensable
party, the "moving party has the burden to demonstrate the indispensability of [the absentee]."
Ada County Highway Dist. v. Total Success Invs., LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 372, 179 P.3d 323, 335
(2008). Federal courts construing the identical federal rule hold that the courts "may consider
materials outside the pleadings in resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(7) ... and
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consideration of such materials will not convert the motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary
judgment." Three Affiliated Tribes ofFOli Berthold Indian Reservation v. United States, 637 F.
Supp. 2d 25, 29 (D. D.C. 2009).
IV. ARGUMENT
1.

All causes of action in the Amended Complaint must be dismissed for failure to join
an indispensable party.

I.R.C.P. 19(a)(1) provides that persons shall be joined as parties if"(1) in the person's
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims
an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action
in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to
protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed
interest." Persons who shall be joined if feasible are commonly referred to as "necessary"
parties. The criteria in Rule 19(a)(1) for determining a necessary party are phrased in the
disjunctive, and thus "an absentee whose nonjoinder results in any of the three problems
identified by the Rule is necessary." 4 James Moore, Federal Practice § 19.03[1] (3d ed. 2010)
("4 Federal Practice").3
a.

The claims set forth in the Amended Complaint raise particular issues relating to

the enforceability of the 1997 Letter as applied to the absentee Forest Service. The Amended
Complaint alleges that the Forest Service "reneged on its commitment in the Letter Agreement
and began to modify various grazing permits in 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010, including those of
Shirts and Shirts Brothers." Amended Complaint ~ 24. The only injury alleged to be caused by
3 The operative provisions of I.R.C.P. 19 are substantially identical to Rule 19 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Under such circumstances it is appropriate to refer to authorities construing the
federal rules for guidance. Herrera v. Estay, 146 Idaho 674, 678, 201 PJd 647, 651 (2009).

3~
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

Page 5

Idaho is IDFO's failure "to block the Forest Service from modifying the [Shirts'] grazing
allotments." Amended Complaint '125. Idaho's alleged liability is predicated, in other words, on
a finding that the 1997 Letter is a contract enforceable against the United States and that the
United States breached said contract by modifying the Shirts' grazing permits. Plaintiffs thus
must establish that the 1997 Letter is a contract, since "[t]he burden of proving the existence of a
contract and the fact of its breach is upon the plaintiff." State v. Peterson, 226 P.3d 535, 537
(Idaho 2010), quoting O'Dell v. Basabe, 119 Idaho 796,813,810 P.2d 1082, 1099 (1991). The
plaintiff "must prove each essential fact, including the existence of a mutual intention." Id.,
quoting Johnson v. Nasi, 309 P.2d 380, 382 (Wash. 1957).

b.

Because the Amended Complaint alleges that the United States violated the 1997

Letter by modifying the Shirts' grazing permits, it is impossible, under I.R.C.P. 19(a)(1), to
accord complete relief among the parties without the presence ofthe Forest Service, for the
applicability of the 1997 Letter to the Forest Service's actions is at the heart of this matter.
Absentees "who have an interest in the object of the suit," as opposed to a mere interest in the
subject matter of the suit, are necessary parties, particularly where the rights of the plaintiffs
against defendant cannot be determined independent of the rights of the absentee. Pro Indiviso,
Inc. v. Mid-Mile Holding Trust, 131 Idaho 741, 746, 963 P.2d 1178, 1183 (1998). Here, because
this suit requires a determination of whether the Forest Service breached any binding obligations
under the 1997 Letter, the Plaintiffs' claims against IDFO cannot be determined independently.
Adjudication of Plaintiffs' claims will require the Court to determine whether the 1997 Letter
was a contract applicable to the Forest Service under federal law and whether the terms of the
1997 Letter would be void for inconsistency with statutes governing grazing on national forest
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lands. "Generally, a provision in a government contract that violates or conflicts with a federal
statute is invalid or void." Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Austin, 75 F.3d 1535, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Such unique legal issues cannot be adequately adjudicated without the presence of the
United States. "The validity and construction of contracts through which the United States is
exercising its constitutional functions, their consequences on the rights and obligations of the
parties, the titles or liens which they create or permit, all present questions of federal law not
controlled by the law of any state." United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 210 n.12 (1970)
(quoting United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 183, (1944)); see also Woodbury
v. United States, 313 F.2d 291, 295 (9th Cir. 1963) ("the law to be applied in construing or
applying provisions of government contracts is federal, not state law").
When a cause of action is based on the allegation that the federal government breached a
contractual obligation, the plaintiff "must establish the existence of a valid contract." Anderson
v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 199,201 (2006). The elements necessary to establish a contract
binding on the Forest Service require inquiry into facts known only by the Forest Service. For
example, the 1997 Letter would not bind the federal government unless, among other elements,
the government representative signing the Letter had "actual authority to bind the United States
in contract." Anderson v. United States, 344 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003). This "general
requirement[) appl[ies] equally to express and implied-in-fact contracts." Id. at 1353 n.3. See
Steinberg v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 435, 447 (2009) (dismissing complaint for failure to plead
signatory officer had authority to bind government); Northern Colorado Water Conservancy
Dist. v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 636,647-48 (2009) (plaintiff has burden of establishing
federal officer's authority to sign contract).
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Here, the Forest Service's joinder is necessary to resolve the unique questions of fact and
federal law posed by the Amended Complaint, including whether the officer signing the Letter
on behalf of the Wallowa-Whitman National Forest had authority to bind the Forest Service
generally. This is a critical question since it was the Payette National Forest, not the WallowWhitman National Forest, that modified the Shirts' grazing permits. The Forest Service's
joinder is also necessary to determine whether the Forest Service had legal authority to enter into
a "contract" that would limit its discretionary authority to cancel grazing permits. Federal courts
have questioned whether the Forest Service possesses the "requisite authority to enter into a
grazing contract" with persons using the national forests for grazing purposes, since federal
grazing privileges are mere licenses "revocable at the government's discretion." Hage v. United
States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 167 (Fed. Cl. 1996). "Forest Service personnel cannot contractually bind
the government without the proper legal authority." Id.
Because of the unique status of the Forest Service and the complex web of rules
governing determination of whether the Forest Service was contractually obligated to refrain
from modifying the Shirts' grazing permits, it is impossible to accord complete relief among the
parties without joining the Forest Service.

c.

Even if the Court were to discount the unique nature of the claims vis-a-vis the

Forest Service, the Forest Service's joinder would still be required by the second and third
factors of I.R.C.P. 19(a)(l), which inquire whether as a practical matter litigation without the
absentees will impair or impede the absentees' ability to protect their interests in the suit's
subject matter, and whether proceeding without the absentees will leave IDFG subject to a
"substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of
the claimed interest."
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Where the existence and validity of a contract are a central issue in litigation, all parties
to the contract must be joined, since a judicial determination that a contract was formed will
affect the rights of each party. "[A] contracting party is the paradigm of an indispensable party."
United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians v. Kempthorne, 630 F. Supp. 2d 1296, l301 (E.D.
Okla. 2009), quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Household Int'l, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 518, 527 (D.
Conn. 1991); see also Allison v. Shapiro & Burson, LLP, 2009 WL 4015410, at *6 (W.O. Va.
2009) ("[i]n determining the validity of a contract ... the parties to the contract are necessary
parties). Here, a judicial declaration that the 1997 Letter is in fact an enforceable contract could
as a practical matter impair the interests of the absentee signatories to the Letter, since it would
fundamentally transform the relations among the signatories by requiring IDFG to interpret the
letter as a contract. Such a determination would also put IDFO at risk of inconsistent obligations
. in the event the other parties refuse to recognize the 1997 Letter as a contract, particularly if the
court determined that IDFO was obligated to compensate grazing permittees in the event other
signatories took actions inconsistent with the Letter.
The risk of inconsistent obligations is magnified by the fact that, with one exception, the
signatories to the 1997 Letter are sovereign governments, each with specific laws that govern
that sovereign's conduct and define the circumstances under which documents such as the 1997
Letter constitute a contract binding upon the sovereign. Generally speaking, the interests of a
sovereign cannot be litigated without its consent. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999),
quoting Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934) ("private suits
against nonconsenting sovereigns are not 'of a justiciable character"'). For this reason, courts
have held that sovereign governments are necessary and indispensable parties to any litigation
that seeks to adjudicate the sovereign'S interest in a contract. Enter. Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v.
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United States ex reI. Hodel, 883 F.2d 890, 892-94 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding Indian tribe was
indispensable party in suit seeking validation of contract with tribe since "the suit would also
effectively abrogate the Tribe's sovereign immunity by adjudicating its interest in that contract
without consent"). Because the determination of whether the 1997 Letter is a contract is, as to
each sovereign party, defined by that sovereign's laws and waivers of sovereign immunity, there
is a heightened risk of inconsistent obligations arising from proceeding in the absence of the
other signatories.
The risk of inconsistent obligations is also heightened because the alleged economic harm
to Plaintiffs was solely the result of the Forest Service's modification of the Shirts' federal
grazing permits. This case cannot proceed without determining: (1) the Forest Service's
obligations under the 1997 Letter, and (2) whether the Forest Service breached those obligations.
"All three Rule 19(a) concerns are implicated when the person whose obligation is centrally at
issue is missing from the action." Cloverleaf Standardbred Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Nat'l Bank of
Wash., 699 F.2d 1274, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The absentee's joinder is necessary where
"plaintiffs' claims cannot succeed" in the "absence of proof of a breach" by absentee. Corsi v.
Eagle Publishing, Inc., 2008 WL 239581 at *3 (D. D.C. 2008). Where the "central question in
Plaintiffs breach of contract claims" is whether an absentee "upheld its obligations under the
Letter Agreement," and "a finding that [the absentee] breached the Letter Agreement is a
necessary factual predicate to all of Plaintiffs remaining claims," then the non-party is a
necessary party. Fiscus v. Combus Fin. AG, 2007 WL 4164388, at *5 (D.N.J. 2007); see also
Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi v. Prudential Sec. Group, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 450,457-58 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (absent party was necessary where it was "not merely a passive entity without affirmative
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legal rights" but rather had "both clear rights and affirmative obligations under the contract
which [the court] must construe").
In sum, this case presents a number of unique legal and factual issues that compel the
conclusion, under the terms ofLR.C.P. 19(a)(1), that the United States is a necessary party that
should be joined. Joinder, however, is infeasible since "[t]he United States, as sovereign, is
immune from suit save as it consents to be sued." United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584,586
(1941). With regard to claims based on alleged contracts, the United States has waived its
sovereign immunity, but with strict forum limitations. The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491,
provides that any actions against the United States founded on express or implied contract for
damages in excess of $1 0,000 must be heard exclusively in the court of federal claims. The
Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.c. § 1346(a)(2), provides that federal district courts may hear breach
of contract actions for damages under $10,000. The United States has not waived its sovereign
immunity to allow it to be joined in breach of contract actions in state court.
d.

Because the United States is a necessary party under I.R.C.P. 19(a)(l), the criteria

ofI.R.C.P. 19(a)(2) must be applied to determine if the United States is an indispensable party in
whose absence this matter must be dismissed. The factors that determine whether a party is
indispensable are as follows: "first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence
might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by
protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice
can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be
adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for
nonjoinder." LR.C.P. 19(a)(2).
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The analytical process for determining whether a sovereign government is an
indispensable party was recently clarified, and arguably streamlined, in Republic of Philippines
v. Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. 2180 (2008). There, the Supreme Court suggested the following black
letter rule: "A case may not proceed when a required-entity sovereign is not amenable to suit."
Id. at 2191. "[W]here sovereign immunity is asserted, and the claims of the sovereign are not
frivolous, dismissal of the action must be ordered where there is a potential for injury to the
interests of the absent sovereign." Id. Application of the "not frivolous" test would require
dismissal here, but Defendants nevertheless analyze the Rule 19 issue with respect to precedent
that did not have the benefit of the guidance in Pimentel.

First, applying the first prong ofI.R.C.P. 19(a)(2), any judgment rendered in the absence
of the United States would be highly prejudicial to IDFO, since the Amended Complaint requires
the threshold determination that the United States breached the 1997 Letter by modifyingthe
Shirts' grazing permits. IDFO is not able to adequately defend this action without the
participation of the United States, which is in sole possession of the facts and legal expertise
necessary to determine a number of threshold issues, including: (l) whether the 1997 Letter
legally binds the United States; (2) whether the 1997 Letter is consistent with federal statutes
governing the administration of grazing permits on national forest lands; (3) whether changed
circumstances or changes in law after signature of the 1997 Letter made the United States'
compliance with the Letter impossible or impracticable;4 and (4) whether the 1997 Letter, under

4 Among the changed circumstances that may be relevant to the Forest Service's modification of
the grazing permits are the ongoing amendments of the forest plan for the Payette National Forest and
related litigation. Nothing in the 1997 Letter relieved the Forest Service from its obligation to prepare a
forest plan in accordance with the terms of the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614
and its accompanying regulations, which required "(fJish and wildlife habitat" to be "managed to maintain
viable populations of existing native and desired non-native vertebrae species." 36 C.F.R. § 219.19
(2000). Regulations issued in 2000 eliminated that provision (65 Fed. Reg. 43,026 (Sept. 20, 2000)), but
the Payette forest management plan was formulated under the earlier regulations and was subject to
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federal law, restricted the Forest Service's legal authority to modify grazing permits without
compensation to Permittees. Proceeding with this litigation without the presence of the Forest
Service prejudices IDFG by making it potentially liable for actions of the Forest Service that
may, in fact, be legal under federal law. See Fiscus v. Combus Fin. AG, 2007 WL 4164388, at
*6 (D. N.J. 2007) (where finding that absentee breached agreement was a "necessary factual
predicate" to plaintiffs claims, the absentee was indispensable); Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi v.
Prudential Sec. Group, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 450,457-458 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (where absentee's
obligations under contract would have to be construed to provide claimed relief, absentee was
indispensable).
Second, because the United States' actions and authorities are so fundamental to the

threshold issues presented, there is, under the second prong of I.R.C.P. 19(a)(2), no means by
which relief can be shaped to lessen or avoid the prejudice to IDFG. If in fact the Forest Service
would not be liable for actions inconsistent with the 1997 Letter, then any award of damages
against IDFG imposing liability for the Forest Service's actions would be prejudicial.

See,~,

Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. 130, 139 (1855) ("indispensable" absentees include persons whose
absence would leave "the controversy in such a condition that its final termination may be
wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience"). I.R.C.P. 19 incorporates fundamental
principles of justice prohibiting the imposition of liability upon IDFG for harm caused solely by
the conduct of an absentee party. See 4 Federal Practice § 19.02[3] (policies underlying Rule 19
include "avoiding unfair imposition of liability on the defendant").
§ 219.19. See Utah Env'l Congo V. Richmond, 483 F.3d 1127, 1131-32(lOth Cir. 2007)(discussing
transition between 1982 and 2000 regulations). Subsequent administrative and judicial appeals of the
Payette forest plan resulted in modification of the grazing permits. See generally W. Watersheds Project
V. U.S. Forest Service, 2007 WL 1729734 (D. Idaho 2007) (discussing appeals). Without the Forest
Service's participation it may be impossible to determine whether the Forest Service's obligation to
comply with those administrative and judicial determinations preempted the obligations, if any, that it
incurred by signing the 1997 Letter.
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Third, under the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint, a judgment rendered in the

absence of the Forest Service would not be adequate, because it would not address the harm
alleged by Plaintiffs, which arises solely from the Forest Service's modification of the Shirts'
grazing permits. "[A]dequacy refers to the 'public stake in settling disputes by wholes,
whenever possible." Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. at 2193, quoting Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust
Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 111 (1968). Where going forward "would not further the public
interest in settling the dispute as a whole" due to the presence of necessary absentees not bound
by the judgment, the action should be dismissed. Id. Here, a judgment rendered in the Forest
Service's absence would do nothing to curtail the only harm alleged in the Amended Complaint,
i.e., the continuing modification of the Shirts' grazing permits, and, assuming the truth of the
allegations presented, would leave IDFG vulnerable to continuing liability for actions of an
absentee which IDFG is powerless to stop.
Fourth, the Plaintiffs, under the last prong of I.R.C.P. 19(a)(2), have an adequate remedy

in the event of dismissal of this action for nonjoinder, since they may proceed against the United
States under the terms of the Tucker Act to recover damages in the court of federal claims, which
has jurisdiction to render judgment against the United States upon any claim founded in express
or implied contract with the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1491. Since the harm identified in the
Amended Complaint arises solely from the allegation that the 1997 Letter contractually
prohibited the Forest Service from modifying the Shirts' federal grazing permits, such claims are
properly heard in federal claims court.
2.

All causes of action in the Amended Complaint must be dismissed for failure to
state a claim because any economic harm suffered by the Shirts as a result of the
Forest Service's modification of Plaintiffs' grazing permits does not, as a matter of
law, give rise to damages.
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The Plaintiffs allege that the Shirts "were permitted to graze their sheep on certain
allotments in the Payette National Forest at different times of the year." Amended Complaint,
~

10. The Plaintiffs allege that in the years 2007-2010, the Forest Service "began to modify

various grazing permits" held by the Shirts. Amended Complaint, ~ 24. They also allege that
"[a]s the result of the prior and continuing grazing permit modifications, IWGA, Shirts and
Shirts Brothers have suffered significant economic losses and will continue to suffer economic
losses." Amended Complaint,

~

26.

In short, the only harm alleged by the Plaintiffs is the Forest Service's modification of the
Shirts' grazing permits. Their cause of action against IDFG is based solely on the allegation that
IDFG "took no action to block the Forest Service from modifying the grazing allotments for
Shirts and Shirts Brothers and took insufficient action to prevent Shirts and Shirts Brothers from
being harmed from these [Forest Service] decisions." Amended Complaint, ~ 25.
a.

By federal law, a federal "grazing permit is a fully revocable, nontransferable

privilege." Fulton v. United States, 825 F. Supp. 261,262 (D. Nev. 1993). "[G]razing permits
are merely a license to use the land rather than an irrevocable right of the permit-holder." Hage
v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 570, 586 (2002). Federal grazing permits are "licenses which
confer certain privileges to the permittee, revocable at the government's discretion." Hage v.
United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 167 (1996). "It is safe to say that it has always been the intention
and policy of the government to regard the use of its public lands for stock grazing, either under
the original tacit consent or, as to national forests, under regulation through the permit system, as
a privilege which is withdrawable at any time for any use by the sovereign without the payment
of compensation." Swim v. Bergland, 696 F.2d 712, 719 (9th Cir. 1983), quoting Osborne v.
United States, 145 F.2d 892, 896 (9th Cir. 1944).
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In shOlt, federal grazing permits are not contracts, Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 167, and holders
of such permits "do not have a property interest in the permit or in the rangeland themselves."
Id. at 170. Because federal grazing permits are mere licenses, "the cancellation of [a permit]
does not give rise to damages." Id. at 150. Thus, the sole harm alleged in Amended Complaint,
economic harm resulting from modification of the Shirts' grazing permits, is not cognizable as a
matter of law.

b.

Given the limited nature of the grazing privileges held by the Shirts, and assuming

the truth of all allegations in the Amended Complaint, this action must be dismissed. The Shirts'
grazing privileges are defined by federal law as neither contractual rights nor property rights, but
instead as licenses revocable at the Forest Service's discretion without compensation. Nothing in
the 1997 Letter or Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D expresses an intent to confer additional grazing
rights upon the Shirts. The 1997 Letter provided that the Committee "recognizes the existing
domestic sheep operations in or adjacent to the Hells Canyon complex," and Idaho Code § 36106(e)(5)(D required that that the "existing sheep or livestock operations in the area of any such
bighorn sheep transplant are recognized" (emphasis added).
Under both the 1997 Letter and Idaho Code § 36-1 06( e)(5)(D, IDFG was obligated only
to recognize the grazing privileges held by the Shirts under their then-existing grazing permits,
and nothing in the Letter or the statute purported to confer additional grazing rights upon the
Shirts. Moreover, any attempt to confer additional rights on the Shirts by contract or by
operation of state law would be preempted by the federal statutes defining the Shirts' grazing
privileges. When Congress enacts legislation respecting federal lands, "the federal legislation
necessarily overrides conflicting state laws under the Supremacy Clause ... [a] different rule
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would place the public domain of the United States completely at the mercy of state legislation."
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529,543 (1976) (internal quotation omitted).
Thus, even assuming the truth of the allegationsthat a duty was imposed on IDFG to
block the Forest Service's modification of the Shirt's grazing privileges by the 1997 Letter,
Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D, or by the various estoppel theories expounded by Plaintiffs,
IDFG's failure to prevent such modification did not result in harm to any legal rights cognizable
under Idaho law or federal law. Because the Forest Service was authorized by federal law to
modify the grazing permits at its discretion, no action can lie against IDFG for damages alleged
to result from such modification.

3.

All causes of action asserting breach of contract or estoppel must be dismissed for
failure to state a claim because Plaintiffs failed to set forth any facts demonstrating
that the claimed damages of lost profits were within the contemplation of the parties
signing the 1997 Letter.
Even assuming, solely for purposes of this motion, that the 1997 Letter was a contract,

that the Forest Service's modification of the Shirts' grazing permits was a breach of said
contract, and ignoring the fact that grazing permits are revocable without compensation,
Plaintiffs' claims for damages must still be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs allege
that "[a]s the result of the prior and continuing permit modifications [by the Forest Service],
IWGA, Shirts and Shirts Brothers have suffered significant economic losses and will continue to
suffer economic losses." Amended Complaint, ~ 26.
"Damages recoverable for breach of contract are those that arise naturally from the
breach and are reasonably foreseeable." Silver Creek Computers, Inc. v. Petra, Inc., 136 Idaho
879, 884, 42 P.3d 672, 677 (2002). "Lost profits are generally not recoverable in contract unless
there is something in that contract that suggests that they were within the contemplation of the
parties and are proved with reasonable certainty." Id. at 884-85,42 P.3d at 677-78; see also
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Taylor v. Browning, 129 Idaho 483, 492, 927 P.2d 873, 882 (1996) (denying lost profits
damages claims because the subject "agreements do not contain any clauses which suggest that
lost profits were within the contemplation of the parties").
Here, Plaintiffs' claims for economic losses resulting from modification of their grazing
permits is tantamount to a claim of lost profits, and all claims based on the representations in the
1997 Letter, including breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, and promissory estoppel, must be dismissed as a matter of
law, because the Amended Complaint fails to identify any provisions in the 1997 Letter
suggesting that payment of lost profits for modification of grazing permits was within the
contemplation of the parties signing the Letter.

4.

All causes of action alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, and promissory estoppel must
be dismissed for failure to state a c1aini because the Amended Complaint does not
set forth any facts demonstrating a representation by IDFG that it would block the
Forest Service from modifying the Shirts' grazing permits.
Central to Plaintiffs' cause of action is the allegation that IDFG was committed, either

contractually or by estoppel, "to block the Forest Service from modifying the grazing allotments"
of the Shirts. Amended Complaint, ~ 25. Solely for purposes of this motion to dismiss, IDFG
assumes the 1997 Letter is an enforceable agreement between IDFG and IWGA, and that the
Shirts are a beneficiary of such agreement. 5 The Amended Complaint must be dismissed,
however, for failure to identify any language in the 1997 Letter or in any other communication
between IDFG and the Plaintiffs that constitutes a promise by IDFG to block the Forest Service
from modifying grazing permits.
5 If this matter were to proceed, one of the central issues to be decided is whether there is
sufficient evidence to establish that the 1997 Letter fulfills the basic elements of a contract, including
"subject matter, consideration, mutual assent by all the parties to all the terms, and an agreement that is
expressed plainly and explicitly enough to show what the parties have agreed." State v. Korn, 148 Idaho
413,415,224 PJd 480, 482 (2009).
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a.

The only statement identified by Plaintiffs as a source ofthe alleged duty to block

the Forest Service from modifying grazing permits is the language in the 1997 letter whereby
IDFO stated that it and the other fish and wildlife agencies would "take whatever action is
necessary to reduce further losses of bighorn sheep without adversely impacting existing
domestic sheep operators." Amended Complaint, Exh. A.
The plain meaning of such language is that IDFO would take whatever action was
necessary to protect bighorn sheep. Nothing in such language commits IDFO to taking
"whatever action is necessary" to protect domestic sheep operators. The stated intent to avoid
adverse impacts on domestic sheep operators is only a limitation on the scope of actions that
IDFO may take to protect bighorns. In other words, the plain language of the 1997 Letter states
that IDFO, in taking "whatever actions" are necessary to protect transplanted bighorn sheep, will
refrain from taking actions that have adverse impacts on domestic sheep operators. Nothing in
the plain language of the 1997 Letter requires IDFO to take affirmative action to protect
domestic sheep operators from Forest Service modification of their grazing permits. Thus,
Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract must be dismissed.

h.

Because the 1997 Letter lacked any provision requiring IDFO to block Forest

Service modification of the Shirts' grazing permits, their claimed cause of action alleging IDFO
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing must also be dismissed. The
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing "applies to all contracts" and "requires only that
the parties perform in good faith the obligations imposed by their agreement." Record Steel &
Const., Inc. v. Martel Const., Inc., 129 Idaho 288, 292, 923 P.2d 995,999 (Ct. App. 1996)
(internal quotations omitted). The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing "arises only
regarding terms agreed to by the parties," and "[ n]o covenant will be implied which is contrary
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to the terms of the contract negotiated and executed by the parties." Bushi v. Sage Health Care,
PLLC, 146 Idaho 764, 768, 203 P.3d 694, 698 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). The implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is "only violated when 'action by either party ... violates,
nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the ... contract.'" Idaho First Nat'! Bank v. Bliss
Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 289,824 P.2d 841, 864 (1991), quoting Metcalfv.
Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 778 P.2d 744 (1989). The implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing does "not result in a cause of action separate from the breach of contract
claims." Id. Thus, to prevail, the plaintiff must "identify [the] specific term within the operating
agreement that [defendants] breached." Bushi, 146 Idaho at 768, 203 P.3d at 698. Here, because
Plaintiffs fail to identify any term in the 1997 Letter specifically requiring IDFG to block Forest
Service modification of grazing permits, the cause of action alleging that IDFG breached the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to block such modifications must be
dismissed as a matter of law.
c.

Plaintiffs' claimed causes of action based on promissory estoppel, equitable

estoppel, and quasi-estoppel likewise must be dismissed because they are based on the alleged
"reliance by IWGA and its members ... on the Idaho Department ofFish and Game's promise

in the Letter Agreement," Amended Complaint, ~ 44 (emphasis added); allegations that the
"Idaho Department of Fish and Game is now taking a different position relating to its

representation in the 1997 Letter Agreement, " Amended Complaint, ~ 44 (emphasis added);
and allegations that "the Defendants may not now repudiate the promises and commitments set

forth in the Letter Agreement." Amended Complaint, ~ 53 (emphasis added). In short, the
Amended Complaint does not identify any representations made by IDFG other than the
representation in the 1997 Letter. Therefore, in the event that the Court finds that the causes of
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action based on the 1997 Letter must be dismissed, the causes of action based on various forms
of estoppel thus must also be dismissed, since each simply seeks to stop IDFO from denying
representations in the 1997 Letter.
d.

To the extent that Plaintiffs seek to use estoppel to prove the existence of an

agreement outside the plain terms of the 1997 Letter, such claims must also be dismissed, for
equitable estoppel is not a substitute for an agreement. See Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat'l Ass'n,
141 Idaho 362, 367,109 P.3d 1104, 1109 (2005) (refusing to apply equitable estoppel because
"[e ]quitable estoppel assumes the existence of a complete agreement, which is lacking here")
Indeed, "[t]he word estoppel 'means simply that someone is "stopped" from claiming or saying
something; usually he is stopped from saying the true facts or claiming a lawful claim. '" Snyder
v. City of Minneapolis, 441 N.W.2d 781, 790-91 (Minn. 1989) (quoting Dobbs, Law of
Remedies § 2.3, at 41. (1973)). As such, estoppel is "a shield, not a sword," and does not furnish
an independent basis for damage claims. Id.; see also Clifford R. Gray, Inc. v. LeChase Const.
Servs., LLC, 819 N. Y.S.2d 182, 186-87 (N. Y.A.D. 2006) (finding "fundamental and fatal flaw"
in cause of action seeking money damages based on equitable estoppel); Regency Hosp. Co. of
Nw. Ark., LLC v. Ark. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 2009 WL 5174246, at *6 (E.D. Ark. 2009)
(equitable estoppel may not be used as a basis for the recovery of money damages); Paquette v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2009 WL 2168918, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) ("[e]quitable
estoppel is not a cause of action but is utilized as a defense"); Sparton Tech., Inc. v. Util-Link,
LLC, 248 Fed. Appx. 684, 689 (6th Cir. 2007) (equitable estoppel is not recognized as a cause of
action).
Moreover, "[e]quitable estoppel may not ordinarily be invoked against a government or
public agency functioning in a sovereign or governmental capacity." Young Elec. Sign Co. v.
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State ex reI. Winder, 135 Idaho 804, 810, 25 P.3d 117, 123 (2001), quoting State v. Adams, 90
Idaho 195, 201, 409 P.2d 415, 421 (1965). Management of wildlife is a core sovereign function.
See Sherwood v. Stephens, 13 Idaho 399, 403, 90 P. 345, 346 (1907) (state exercises police
power to regulate taking of fish and game based on fact that the "wild game and fish within a
state belong to the people in their collective sovereign capacity") (internal quotation omitted).
Therefore, IDFG can not be required by a claim of equitable estoppel to take action not required
by statute or contract.
e.

The doctrine of quasi-estoppel has been described by the Idaho Supreme Court as

an "affirmative defense" that provides "essentially a last-gasp theory under which a defendant
who can point to no specific detrimental reliance due to plaintiffs' conduct may still assert that
plaintiffs are estopped from asserting allegedly contrary positions where it would be
unconscionable for them to do so." Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 357, 358,
48 P.3d 1241, 1246, 1247 (2002) (emphasis added), quoting Schoonover v. Bonner County, 113
Idaho 916, 919, 750 P.2d 95, 99 (1988); see also Hamilton v. Morris Resources, Ltd., 225
S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. Civ. App. 2007) ("[q]uasi-estoppel is an equitable doctrine that operates
as an affirmative defense"). The doctrine of quasi-estoppel "precludes a party from asserting to
another's disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a position previously taken by him." Thomas,
137 Idaho at 357, 48 P.3d at 1246, quoting Schoonover, 113 Idaho at 919, 750 P.2d at 99. Here,
the Amended Complaint does not allege that IDFG has asserted any rights against Plaintiffs
arising from the 1997 Letter; rather, the Amended Complaint alleges only that IDFG failed to
perform certain duties alleged to be owed Plaintiffs under the terms of the 1997 Letter. As such,
the doctrine of quasi-estoppel has no application, and any claims arising under it must be
dismissed.
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f.

Generally, promissory estoppel can be pled as "an affirmative cause of action and

thus differs from equitable estoppel, which operates defensively to bar the assertion of a claim or
defense." Peters v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., 533 FJd 594, 599 (7th Cir. 2008); Jablon v. United
States, 657 F.2d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 1981) ("[p ]romissory estoppel is a sword, and equitable
estoppel is a shield"). Under Idaho law, however, promissory estoppel is "a substitute for
consideration, not a substitute for an agreement between the parties." Lettunich v. Key Bank
Nat'l Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 367,109 P.3d 1104, 1109 (2005) "While promissory estoppel may
provide consideration for a contract, there must be a sufficiently definite agreement to have an
enforceable contract." Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, N.A., 119
Idaho 171, 178,804 P.2d 900, 907 (1991); Grover v. Wadsworth, ]47 Idaho 60, 64, 205 PJd
1196, 1200 (2009)(where "there was no underlying promise between" the parties, "promissory
estoppel is the incorrect legal theory"). Thus, promissory estoppel would do nothing more than
provide a means for establishing one of the elements necessary to conclude that the 1997 Letter
is a contract. Here, however, Plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claim fails for reasons unrelated to
consideration.
In summary, assuming the truth of the allegation that the 1997 Letter is a contract,
nothing in said "contract" obligates IDFG to take action against the Forest Service in the event
the Forest Service modifies the grazing permits of the Shirts. Plaintiffs' claims of good faith and
fair dealing, equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, and promissory estoppels do not impose any
obligations beyond those apparent in the plain language of the 1997 Letter. At most, the cited
estoppel doctrines may be employed to establish that the 1997 Letter is a contract - thus, if the
Amended Complaint is dismissed for failure to plead a contractual obligation to block Forest
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Service modifications of the Shirts' grazing permits, the causes of action based on equitable
estoppel, quasi-estoppel, and promissory estoppels must likewise be dismissed.

5.

All causes of action alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, and promissory estoppel must
be dismissed for failure to state a claim because it was not possible for IDIi'G to
perform the duty alleged to be owed plaintiffs, i.e., blockage of the alleged breach of
the 1997 Letter by the Forest Service.
Plaintiffs allege that IDFG breached its contractual commitment to Plaintiffs by taking

"no action to block the Forest Service from modifying the grazing allotments for Shirts and
Shirts Brothers." Amended Complaint ~ 25. This allegation fails to state a cause of action for
breach of contract or breach of duty imposed by equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, or
promissory estoppel, because the alleged duty to block modification of the Shirts' grazing
permits was impossible to perform. Assuming, solely for purposes of argument, that IDFG was
under a duty to "block" the Forest Service from modifying the Shirts' grazing permits, IDFG is
excused for its nonperformance of such duty under the doctrine of impossibility. Under Idaho
law, when performance of a contractual duty is made impossible by events occurring after
execution of the contract, failure to perform is excused. State v. Chacon, 146 Idaho 520, 523,
198 P.3d 749, 752 (Ct. App. 2008).
"One such superseding event has been the government imposition of a new law,
regulation or order which makes the performance of a duty impractical." Landis v. Hodgson,
109 Idaho 252, 257, 706 P.2d 1363, 1368 (Ct. App. 1985). "[A] contractual duty is discharged
where performance is subsequently prevented or prohibited by a judicial, executive, or
administrative order, in the absence of circumstances showing either a contrary intention or
contributing fault on the part of the person subject to the duty." Id" quoting Lane v. Dashiell, 75
A.2d 348, 353-54 (Md. 1950).
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Here, the Forest Service issued administrative orders prohibiting the Shirts from grazing
sheep on certain subunits of the Shirts' grazing allotments. W. Watersheds Project v. U.S. Forest
Service, 2007 WL 1729734, at *1 (D. Idaho 2007). The Shilis sought to enjoin preliminarily the
administrative orders, which motion was denied by the federal district court for the district of
Idaho. Id., at *4.
The Forest Service's administrative order modifying the Shirt's grazing permits was an
unforeseen superseding event that excuses Idaho's performance of any contractual duties to
protect the grazing rights of the Shirts under the predecessor permits. While Plaintiffs allege that
IDFG had the authority and the duty to "block" the issuance of the administrative order, they fail
to allege the existence of any contract or statute granting such authority to IDFO. IDFO's
authorities do not include the authority to override administrative orders of the Forest Service
regarding use of grazing allotments. Even if the Legislature had granted such authority to IDFO,
it could not be exercised: under the Supremacy Clause and Property Clause of the United States
Constitution, any attempt by the State to override federal land management decisions would be
preempted. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529,540-43 (1976) (Property Clause provides
Congress the power to control the occupancy and use of public lands, and to prescribe the
conditions upon which others may obtain rights in them, and "when Congress so acts, the federal
legislation necessarily overrides conflicting state laws under the Supremacy Clause").
Thus, IDFG's only avenue to "block" the Forest Service's orders modifying the Shirts'
grazing permits would have been a judicial action seeking to enforce the 1997 Letter. Such an
action, however, is forbidden by federal law. While Congress has waived federal sovereign
immunity to allow actions against the United States to recover damages for breach of contract,6 it

6 The waivers offederal sovereign immunity are found in the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.c. § 1491
(court of federal claims may hear actions against United States founded on express or implied contract),
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has not waived sovereign immunity to allow actions for specific performance of contractual
provisions. "An action seeking specific performance, rather than damages, against [the federal
government] is an action against the sovereign and is not maintainable unless consented to."
Price v. U.S. General Services Admin., 894 F.2d 323, 324-25 (9th Cir. 1990), quoting Lee v.
Blumenthal, 588 F.2d 1281,1282 (9th Cir.1979); Cardiosom, LLC v. United States, 2010 WL
723790, at *4 (Fed. Cl. 2010) ("federal district courts consistently hold that the Tucker Act
impliedly prohibits district courts from ordering specific performance by the United States on its
alleged contractual obligations"); Logan Canyon Cattle Ass'n v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 165,
168 ( 1995) (dismissing action seeking specific performance of contract because jurisdiction of
the federal court of claims "encompasses only money claims against the United States");
Robbins v. U.S. Bureau of Land Management, 438 F.3d 1074, 1082 (lOth Cir. 2006) (holding
that the federal Administrative Procedure Act does not waive sovereign immunity "for claims
that arise out of a contract and that seek specific performance of the contract as relief').
In short, the Forest Service's administrative orders modifying the Shirts' grazing permits
was an unforeseen circumstance that was not possible for IDFG to "block" because of federal
supremacy principles and because federal law bars actions to enforce the terms of federal
contracts. Since it was impossible for IDFG to stop the Forest Service from taking the action
that is alleged to have caused harm to Plaintiffs, the Amended Complaint fails to state a cause of
action against IDFG for failing to do so, and must be dismissed pursuant to LR.c'P. 12(b)(6).

6.

All claims for damages for violation of Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(S)(D) must be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim.
a.

The third cause of action in the Amended Complaint claims that Plaintiffs are

entitled to money damages for the alleged violation of Idaho Code § 36-1 06(e)(5)(D) by IDFG.
and the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.c, § 1346(a)(2) (federal district courts may hear breach of contract
actions for damages under $10,000).
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This cause of action must be dismissed because Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D) had not yet been
enacted at the time the 1997 Letter was executed. The 1997 Letter was executed on January 16,
1997, and marked as received by the IWGA on March 11, 1997. Amended Complaint, Exhibit
A. Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D)was not enacted until March 24,1997. 1997 Idaho Sess. L.
867. Because Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D) did not provide for retroactive application, it does
not govern the terms of the 1997 Letter. See Woodland Furniture. LLC v. Larsen, 142 Idaho
140, 146, 124 PJd 1016, 1022 (2005) ("[t]he law is well settled that, unless a contrary intention
is clearly indicated, a new statute will not be given retroactive effect").

b.

Moreover, even if the Court were to apply Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D)

retroactively, the Amended Complaint fails to identify any IDFG actions inconsistent with the
plain terms of the statute. Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D) requires only that IDFG and
cooperating agencies provide grazing permittees "a written letter ... stating that the existing
sheep or livestock operations in the area of any such bighorn sheep transplant are recognized and
that the potential risk, if any, of disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep when the same
invade domestic livestock or sheep operations is accepted." Upon execution of the 1997 Letter,
and its provision to affected grazing permittees, IDFG's statutory duties were fulfilled. Nothing

in Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D) imposed any ongoing duties upon IDFG with regard to such
letter.
c.

Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that Idaho Code § 36-1 06( e)( 5)(D)

imposed a duty upon IDFG to block other parties from violating the terms of the 1997 Letter, and
that IDFG violated such duty, Plaintiffs' claim: (1) must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
since such claim was not brought within the time frame specified in Idaho Code § 67-5273, and
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(2) must be dismissed because money damages cannot be awarded for agency violations of Idaho
Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D).
First, Idaho Code § 67-5270 provides that "[j]udicial review of agency action shall be

governed by the provisions of this chapter [Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, Idaho Code §§
67 -5201 through 67 -5292] unless other provision of law is applicable to the particular matter."
Idaho Code § 67-5273 provides that a "petition for judicial review of a final agency action other
than a rule or order must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days ofthe agency action, except as
provided by other provision oflaw. Here, the agency action that is at the crux of Plaintiffs'
claims, i.e., IDFG's alleged decision to not block the Forest Service from modifying the Shirts'
grazing permits, occurred in 2007. Amended Complaint ~ 25. Hence, Plaintiffs' claims are
untimely and must be dismissed, because failure to file "a petition for judicial review within the
time permitted by statute is jurisdictional." Erickson v. Idaho Bd. of Registration of Profl Eng'rs
and Prof'1 Land Surveyors, 146 Idaho 852, 854,203 PJd 1251, 1253 (2009), quoting Horne v.
Idaho State Univ., 138 Idaho 700, 703, 69 P.3d 120, 123 (2003). Failure to timely file a petition
for judicial review "shall cause automatic dismissal of the petition for judicial review." Id.,
quoting Canyon County Bd. of Equalization v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., LLC, 143 Idaho 58, 62,
137 P.3d 445, 449 (2006).
Second, even if Plaintiffs were able to evade the jurisdictional time limit of Idaho Code

§ 67-5273, the court could not award money damages for violation ofIDFG's alleged duties
under Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D). Idaho Code § 67-5279 provides that if the Court, in
reviewing an agency action, determines that the agency's action was in "violation of ... statutory
provisions," the sole remedy is to set aside the agency action in whole or part, and remand for
further proceedings as necessary.
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As a general matter, therefore, agency violations of statutory duties may not be remedied
by the award of money damages absent a statute explicitly authorizing the award of damages
against the state. Nothing in the plan language ofIdaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D) provides for
IDFO to provide monetary reimbursement to sheep operators in the event one of the other
signatories to such a letter takes action to restrict grazing for the purpose of protecting bighorn
sheep. Rather, the subsection that requiring IDFO to provide grazing Permittees a letter has two
operative elements: first, IDFO must "recognize" existing sheep operations in the area of the big
horn transplant. The term "recognize" means to "perceive or show acceptance of the validity or
reality" of the subject matter. American Heritage Dictionary 1460 (4th ed. 2000). Second,
subsection (e)(5)(D) requires that the potential risk of disease transmission from domestic sheep
to bighorn sheep will be "accepted" by IDFO. The plain meaning of such a requirement is that
IDFO was required to verify that the risk of disease transmission was understood and that IDFG,
by transplanting bighorns into areas with preexisting domestic sheep operations, voluntarily
exposed the bighorns to such risk.
Thus, the plain meaning of the terms of the subsection require IDFG to recognize and
accept the validity of existing grazing privileges held by grazing permittees. As discussed
previously in this memorandum, grazing privileges are licenses revocable at the will of the
Forest Service. Nothing in the plain language of the terms "recognize" and "accept" confers
additional rights upon grazing permittees or provides for reimbursement in the event of
revocation or modification of the grazing permit by the Forest Service.
In sum, the third cause of action, alleging violation ofldaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D),
must be dismissed because (1) IDFG has complied with the plain term ofldaho Code § 36106( e)(5)(D), (2) the plain terms of Idaho Code § 36-1 06( e)(5)(D) do not obligate IDFG to
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reimburse Plaintiffs for economic harms caused by the Forest Service's modification of the
Shirts' grazing permits, (3) the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the cause of action
alleging violation ofIdaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D) because it was not timely filed, and (4)
money damages may not be awarded for agency violations of statutory duties.

7.

IDFG must be awarded its attorney fees and other reasonable expenses.
Idaho Code § 12-117(1) was amended during the 2010 legislative session to read as

follows:
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding or civil
judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or political
subdivision and a person, the state agency or political subdivision or the court, as
the case may be, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees,
witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/legislationl201 0/H0421.pdf The changes to Idaho Code § 12117 "shall apply to all cases filed and pending as of June 1, 2009." Id. Significantly, the 2010
changes to Idaho Code § 12-117 removed the provision requiring that ajudgment be rendered as
a prerequisite to the award of attorney fees. The legislature's clear intent was to authorize the
award of attorney fees on orders that dispose of actions in favor of a prevailing party even if such
orders do not result in entry of a "judgment."
The Supreme Com1 has held that § 12-117 was intended to "provide a remedy for persons
who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against groundless charges."
Bogner v. State Dept. of Revenue and Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 859,693 P.2d 1056, 1061
(1984).7 Section 12-117 is "not a discretionary statute; but it provides that the court shall award
attorney fees" when the stated conditions are fulfilled. Rincover v. State, Dept. of Finance, 132

7 Bogner was addressing the original version of § 12-117, which provided for awards of attorney fees to
persons litigating against state agencies. Section 12-117 was later amended to also authorize the award of attorney
fees to state agencies that prevail in actions. See 2000 Idaho Sess. L. 675.
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Idaho 547,549,976 P.2d 473, 475 (1999). The "two predicate determinations for an award"
(prevailing party and no reasonable basis in fact or law) do not require factual findings but are:
more in the nature of legal conclusions, since the first one depends upon
successfully achieving some form of favorable relief that properly can be granted
by the court to the 'person,' and the other depends upon the assessment of the
conduct of the other party to decide if that party's activities can be characterized as
having been unreasonably premised or undertaken upon either a set of facts or
under relevant legal principles applicable to the situation in which the parties were
engaged.
Id. at 549-50, 976 P.2d at 475-76.

a.

If the Court enters an order dismissing this action, IDFG is the prevailing
party for purposes of awarding attorney fees.

In the event the Court enters an order dismissing this action on any of the grounds stated
herein, IDFG will have prevailed. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(l) states that the
prevailing party is to be determined by considering "the result of the action in relation to the
relief sought." When a party obtains dismissal of an action, such party is a prevailing party. For
example, in Sanders v. Lankford, 134 Idaho 322, 1 P Jd 823 (2000), defendant Lankford filed a
motion to dismiss for failure to name the proper party in the lawsuit, and the motion was granted.
The magistrate and district court held that Lankford was not a prevailing party and could not be
awarded attorney fees. Id. at 324-25, 1 P.3d at 825-26. The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the "result obtained in this case was a dismissal of Sander's action-the most favorable
outcome that could possibly be achieved by Lankford as defendant." Id. at 326, 1 P.3d at 827.
Likewise, dismissal of this action on the grounds outlined in this memorandum would be
the most favorable outcome IDFG could obtain as defendant, requiring the determination that
IDFG has prevailed in this action.
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b.

The entry of an order dismissing this action for the reasons set forth herein
necessarily includes the determination that there is no reasonable basis in law
or fact for the causes of action set forth in the Amended Complaint.

Idaho Code § 12-117 "considers the character of the losing paliy's case." Roe v. Harris,
128 Idaho 569, 573, 917 P.2d 403, 407 (1996) overturned on other grounds, Rincover v. State,
Dept. of Finance, 132 Idaho 547,976 P.2d 473 (1999). Here, dismissal of the Amended
Compliant for failure to state a claim, failure to join an indispensable party, or lack of
jurisdiction necessarily requires the decision that there is no reasonable basis in fact or law for
proceeding with the causes of action in the Amended Complaint. For the reasons set forth
herein, Plaintiffs' claims are without legal foundation and "unreasonably premised." Rincover,
132 Idaho at 550, 976 P.2d at 476. IDFG has had to defend itself against baseless claims at
considerable expense. Under such circumstances, the award of attorney fees under the terms of

§ 12- I 17 is required.

V. CONCLUSION
The Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint sets forth the following causes of action:
• First cause of action: breach of contract;
• Second cause of action: breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing;
• Third cause of action: violation ofldaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D);
• Fourth cause of action: promissory estoppel;
• Fifth cause of action: equitable estoppel;
• Sixth cause of action: quasi-estoppel.
For the reasons set forth herein, all causes of action should be dismissed for failure to join
the Forest Service as an indispensable party.
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For the reasons set forth herein, all causes of action should be dismissed for failure to
state a claim because the Plaintiffs suffered no damages recognizable at law because the Shirts'
grazing permits were mere licenses subject to modification without compensation.
Alternatively, causes of action 1,2,4, 5 and 6 must be dismissed for failure to state a
claim because Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the claimed damages of lost profits were
within the contemplation of the parties who signed the 1997 Letter.
Alternatively, causes of action 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 must be dismissed for failure to state a
claim because Plaintiffs have failed to identify any representation by IDFG obligating IDFG to
block the Forest Service from modifying the grazing permits of the Shirts that is enforceable as a
matter of contract or enforceable under the various estoppel theories asserted by Plaintiffs.
Alternatively, causes of action 1,2,4,5 and 6 must be dismissed because any obligation
by IDFG to block the Forest Service's modification oftheShirts' grazing permits was excused as
a matter of law because it was impossible to perform.
Alternatively, the third cause of action must be dismissed for failure to state a claim
because the Amended Complaint fails to identify any action by IDFG that violates the terms of
Idaho Code § 36-1 OG(e)( 5)(D) and because money damages may not be awarded for agency
violation of statutory duties.
Alternatively, the third cause of action must be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because the Plaintiffs failed to file their claims within the jurisdictional time limit
established by Idaho Code § 67-5273 for review of agency actions.
Additionally, upon dismissal of this action, IDFG is entitled to the award of its attorney
fees and other reasonable expenses incurred in defending this action. pursuant to the authority of
Idaho Code § 12-117.
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Appendix 1
Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D)
(As enacted in 1997 and in place until amended on May 7, 2009)
(D) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 36-408, Idaho Code, to the contrary, on
and after the effective date of this act, the director shall not expend any funds, or take any action,
or authorize any employee or agent of the department or other person to take any action, to
undertake actual transplants of bighorn sheep into areas they do not now inhabit or to augment
the number of bighorn sheep in existing herds until:
(i) The boards of county commissioners of the counties in which the release is proposed to
take place have been given reasonable notice of the proposed release.
(ii) The affected federal and state land grazing permittees and owners or leaseholders of
private land in or contiguous to the proposed release site have been given reasonable notice
of the proposed release.
(iii) The president pro tempore of the senate and the speaker of the house of representatives
have received from the director a plan for the forthcoming year that details, to the best of the
department's ability, the proposed transplants which shall include the estimated numbers of
bighorn sheep to be transplanted and a description of the areas the proposed transplant or
transplants are planned for.
Upon request, the department shall grant one (1) hearing per transplant if any affected
individual or entity expresses written concern within ten (10) days of notification regarding any
transplants of bighorn sheep and shall take into consideration these concerns in approving,
modifying or canceling any proposed bighorn sheep transplant. Any such hearing shall be held
within thirty (30) days of the request. Upon any transplant of bighorn sheep into areas they do
not now inhabit or a transplant to augment existing populations, the department shall provide for
any affected federal or state land grazing permittees or owners or leaseholders of private land a
written letter signed by all federal, state and private entities responsible for the transplant stating
that the existing sheep or livestock operations in the area of any such bighorn sheep transplant
are recognized and that the potential risk, if any, of disease transmission and loss of bighorn
sheep when the same invade domestic livestock or sheep operations is accepted.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADAMS

IDAHO WOOL GROWERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho corporation,
individually and on behalf of its members;
FRANK SHIRTS, JR., individually and as a
member of the Idaho Wool Growers
Association; RONALD W. SHIRTS,
LESLIE SHIRTS and JOliN T. SHIRTS,
individually and d/b/a SHIRTS BROTHERS
SHEEP and as members of the Idaho Wool
Growers Association,

Case No. CV 2010-2567

PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISMISS AND REQUEST FOR
ATTORNEYS FEES

Plaintiffs,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO; IDAHO FISH &
GAME COMMISSION; IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF FISH & GAME; CAL
GROEN, Director of Idaho Department of
Fish and Game.
Defendants.
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COME NOW the Plaintiffs, Idaho Wool Growers Association, Inc., ("IWGA"), Frank
Shirts, Jr., and Ronald W. Shilis and Leslie Shirts, husband and wife, and John T. Shirts d/b/a
Shirts Brothers Sheep, by and through their attorneys of record, Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow
& McKlveen, Chmiered, and submit this objection to Defendants' Memorandum in Support of

Motion to Dismiss and Request for Attorney's Fees.

I.
INTRODUCTION
The argument of the Defendants, State of Idaho, Idaho Fish & Game Commission, Idaho
Department of Fish & Game and Cal Groen, Director of Idaho Department of Fish and Game
(hereinafter referred to as "IDFG") is well-researched, logically sound, and quite persuasive.
The only problem with IDFG's argument is that it is directed at a claim not raised by Plaintiffs
and is therefore quite irrelevant. It was a waste of state taxpayer monies to prepare it and a waste
of the Court's time to consider.
Plaintiffs concede that if their claim against IDFG were solely that IDFG failed to
"block" the Forest Service from modifying the Shirts' grazing permits then their Complaint
could be and should be dismissed. Plaintiffs concede that IDFG probably has no legal power to
block the United States Forest Service from modifying federal grazing permits and that if this
were their claim the United States Forest Service would be an indispensable party. However, as
would be clear from a reading of the Complaint, this is not Plaintiffs' claim.
Plaintiffs' claim, to the contrary, is this: the January 16, 1997 Letter Agreement signed by
IDFG constitutes a contract with IWGA and its members by which IDFG agrees to indemnify
the IWGA and its members from any harm or economic loss caused by the reintroduction of the
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bighorn sheep into the Hells Canyon area. The Idaho Legislature recognized that contractual
agreement, ratified the contract, and approved that Agreement through the enactment of Idaho
Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D) in the 1997 Idaho legislative session.
The essence of Plaintiffs' Complaint is that IDFG brcached its contract and violated the
statute by not protecting the Plaintiffs from the adverse economic impacts associated with the
reintroduction of bighorn sheep, including the nullification and/or eradication of historic grazing
permits.
IDFG's brief does a good job of describing the factual background to this case.

It

neglects to note that the State of Idaho claims ownership of all wildlife in the state 1, including the
bighorn sheep that were reintroduced in the Hells Canyon area in 1997, but does accurately state
the background of the reintroduction.

That background is that various wildlife agencies

including IDFG wished to initiate a bighorn reintroduction effort in 1996 or 1997, but were faced
with opposition from various interests, including especially the Idaho Wool Growers, which
recognized that the proposed reintroduction might have adverse effects on its members. The
Idaho Wool Growers Association on behalf of its members, as well as the Shilis individually,
prepared to oppose the reintroduction and started gathering support in the Idaho Legislature for
legislation preventing the bighorn reintroduction into Idaho.

Recognizing this powerful

opposition and real threat to the reintroduction effort, IDFG and the other State wildlife agencies
agreed to those certain terms in the 1997 Letter Agreement in consideration for Plaintiffs'
agreement to drop their efforts to stop the reintroduction efforts.

1 Idaho Code § 36-103(a) (HAil wildlife ... within the State ofIdaho, is hereby declared to be the property of the
State of Idaho.")
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It is Plaintiffs' position that that 1997 Letter Agreement constituted a contract by which
IDFG agreed either to prevent interference with domestic sheep operations or provide monetary
recompense to domestic sheep operators who did suffer economic damages as a result of the
bighorn sheep reintroduction. All of the parties involved recognized that if the bighorns were
brought into the Hells Canyon area this would affect domestic sheep operations. The parties
recognized that historic domestic sheep grazing allotments might be modified or eliminated.
IDFG through its Letter Agreement and the State through enactment of the 1997 statute therefore
guaranteed that the Wool Growers members would be indemnified for any economic loss they
suffered because of the reintroduction of the bighorns.
The breach of that contractual and statutory promise is the essence of Plaintiffs'
Complaint. If Plaintiffs lost their grazing allotments, whether or not IDFG made any efforts to
convince the United States Forest Service not to modify those grazing allotments, or if the
Plaintiffs suffered any other economic harm arising from the introduction of the bighorn sheep,
then IDFG is contractually, statutorily and ethically obligated to protect and indemnify Plaintiffs.
This obligation could be satisfied by various means: providing alternative sources of feed;
providing alternative grazing lands; or providing monetary compensation for the economic losses
suffered by Plaintiffs.

Since IDFG has not provided feed or land, the Plaintiffs are seeking

monetary recompense.
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II.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
A. The United States Forest Service is not an Indispensable Party
IDFG claims that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed for failure to join an
indispensible party, the U.S. Forest Service. "Whether or not a party is indispensible to an action
depends largely upon the relief sought." Barlow v. International Harvester Company, 95 Idaho
881,896,522 Pold 1102,1117 (1974). The "moving party has the burden to demonstrate the
indispensability of [the absent party]." Ada County Highway District v. Total Success Invs, LLC,
145 Idaho 360, 372, 179 P.3d 323, 335 (2008). A person is "indispensible" under Rule 19(a) (1),
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and must be joined only if:
(1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded
among those already parties, or
(2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the
action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the
person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede
the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of
the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations by reason of the claimed interest.
None of those provisions apply to the Forest Service.
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint does not assert that the Forest Service owes the Plaintiffs
money under the 1997 Letter Agreement nor does it seek to enforce any contractual obligations
against the Forest Service. As a matter of fact, Plaintiffs note that the Letter Agreement does not
list the Forest Service, as it states:
[T]he Idaho Department of Fish and Game, the Oregon Department
ofFish and Wildlife, and the Washington Department of Wildlife
will assume the responsibility for bighorn losses and further disease
transmission in their respective states. The three Departments will
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS'
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also take whatever action is necessary to reduce further losses of
bighorn sheep without adversely impacting existing domestic sheep
operators.

Thus, it is the IDFG which is agreeing to take whatever action is necessary in Idaho to
prevent adverse economic impact among existing domestic sheep operators such as the Shirts. It
is the IDFG that has breached the contract, not the United States Forest Service. Thus, the Forest
Service is not a necessary or indispensable party because Plaintiffs are not seeking relief from
the Forest Service.
Complete relief can be accorded the Plaintiffs without the presence of the Forest Service
since the Plaintiffs' argument is that IFDG failed to live up to its contractual and statutory
obligations. Nowhere in the Complaint do Plaintiffs suggest that the "only injury alleged to be
caused by Idaho is IDFG's failure 'to block the Forest Service from modifying the [Shirts']
grazing allotments.'" Defendants' Memorandum at 6.

Instead, the Plaintiffs contend that

because grazing allotments were modified, IDFG has a contractual and statutory obligation to
make the Plaintiffs whole. Plaintiffs are not attempting to claim they had an agreement with the
Forest Service or to claim that the Forest Service breached a contract, and thus whether or not the
Forest Service must comply with the contract is irrelevant.
Plaintiffs are not seeking to adjudicate the interest of the United States in a contract and
thus IDFG's argument that somehow proceeding without the Forest Service as a party will
impede its ability to protect its interest is specious. The jury's determination that IDFG breached
its contract and therefore owes Plaintiffs monetary damages will have absolutely no effect on the
United States' sovereign immunity. Furthermore, there is no risk of inconsistent obligations
because the Plaintiffs' economic harm was not "solely the result of the Forest Service's
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modification of the Shirts' Federal grazing permits" as claimed by IDFG but instead, according
to the Plaintiffs' Complaint, was solely the result of IDFG not doing "whatever is necessary" to
protect the Plaintiffs, as IDFG committed to do in the 1997 Agreement. Thus, the determination
by the jury will be not whether the United States breached the 1997 Agreement, but whether
IDFG had an obligation to protect Plaintiffs from economic harm caused by the reintroduction of
the bighorn sheep. IDFG appears to misunderstand that the award of damages against IDFG
would not be imposing liability for the Forest Service actions, but rather for the failure of IDFG
to take action that it committed to in the 1997 Letter Agreement.
The disposition of this case is not precluded by the absence of the United States Forest
Service, and the disposition of this case would not impede the Forest Service's ability to protect
its own interest or subject it to substantial risk, because the Plaintiffs are not claiming that the
Forest Service breached the Agreement. Neither would the disposition of this case leave IDFG
subject to risk of incurring inconsistent obligations because it is IDFG which contracted to
protect the Plaintiffs, and it is IDFG which owes the duty to Plaintiffs.
Accordingly, IDFG has failed to meet its burden to show the indispensability of the
federal government.

B.

The Amended Complaint States a Claim Against IDFG Upon Which Relief
May be Granted.

"In reviewing a ruling in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, the question is whether the non-movant has alleged sufficient facts in support of
his claim, which if true, would entitle him to relief." Rincover v. Department of Finance, 128
Idaho 653, 656, 917 P.2d 1293, 1296 (1996).

The Court should make "every reasonable
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intendment" in order to "sustain a complaint against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim." Idaho Commission on Human Rights v. Campbell, 95 Idaho 215,217,506 P.2d 112, 114
(1973).
When ruling on such a motion, the Court looks no further than the pleadings. Young v.

City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 PJd 1157, 1159 (2002). The non-moving party is
entitled to have all inferences from the record viewed in his favor and only then may the question
be asked whether a claim for relief has been stated. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635,
778 P.2d 757 (1989).
IDFG asserts that Plaintiffs have not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted
because the only harm alleged by Plaintiffs "is the Forest Services' modification of the Shirts'
grazing permits."

Defendants' Memorandum at 15.

Once again, IDFG has misread or

misunderstood the gravamen of the Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs are not asserting a cause of
action against IDFG because it failed to block the Forest Service from modifying the grazing
allotments, they are asserting a cause of action against IDFG because it has not lived up to its
contractual and statutory duties to Plaintiffs to remedy the economic harm caused to the
Plaintiffs by, among other things, the modification of the grazing allotments relating to the
reintroduction of the bighorn sheep population in Hells Canyon. Certainly these allegations state
a claim upon which relief may be granted and are more than sufficient to defeat a 12(b)(6)
motion.
The Plaintiffs do not take issue with IDFG's statement that federal grazing permits are
not contracts. The Plaintiffs recognize this fact today and recognized that fact in 1997, just as
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did IDFG. That is why IDFG agreed to indemnify Plaintiffs for any modifications the Forest
Service made to Plaintiffs' allotments.
IDFG contends that the 1997 Letter Agreement merely recognized the "existing"
domestic sheep operations and obligated IDFG simply to recognize the existing grazing
privileges held by Plaintiffs at that time. IDFG states that nothing in the Letter Agreement or the
statute "purported to confer additional grazing rights upon the Shirts." While Plaintiffs submit
this is substantively incorrect and conflicts with the plain language of the Letter Agreement, it
may be ajury argument for IDFG to make. But it is not appropriate in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss context. That argument deals with the interpretation of the contract and the statute, and
requires consideration by the fact finder.
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint clearly states a cause of action against IDFG upon which
relief can be granted to the Plaintiffs. The Amended Complaint asserts that the .1997 Letter
Agreement and the contract and the statute require IDFG and the State to take "whatever action
is necessary" to protect existing domestic sheep operators from adverse economic consequences
flowing from reintroduction of bighorn sheep in the Hells Canyon area. Plaintiffs have alleged
sufficient facts to entitle them to relief if the jury accepts those facts as correct. That is all that is
required to defeat a 12(b)( 6) motion to dismiss.
IDFG is also premature in arguing that Plaintiffs' claim for lost profits fails to state a
claim. That issue, of course, is dependent upon evidence regarding the intention of the parties to
the 1997 Letter Agreement. Again, that is not an issue for this Court to decide on a 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss.

The Amended Complaint certainly sets out sufficient facts to support

Plaintiffs' claimed damages as it recites that IDFG as the signatory to the 1997 Letter Agreement
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agreed to take whatever action was necessary to prevent adverse economic impact among
existing sheep operators.

Allegations in the Amended Complaint certainly assert that such

economic losses/lost profits were contemplated by the IDFG and the other parties; otherwise,
there would have been little reason for the Letter Agreement in the first place. Accordingly,
there is no basis for this Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, as the Amended
Complaint alleges sufficient facts that will entitle Plaintiffs to relief.
IDFG argues that certain causes of action must be dismissed because the Amended
Complaint does not set forth any facts demonstrating any representations by IDFG that it would
block the Forest Service from modifying the Shirts' grazing permits. Once again, the IDFG
argument is based on an intentional or unintentional misreading of the Amended Complaint.
Nowhere does the Amended Complaint assert that IDFG represented that it would block the
Forest Service from modifying the grazing allotments.

IDFG mayor may not have been

obligated to at least make some efforts to convince the Forest Service that the Plaintiffs' grazing
allotments should be maintained at the 1997 level, but certainly IDFG had an obligation under
the 1997 Letter Agreement to take whatever action was necessary to prevent such modifications
from adversely affecting the existing operators' economic well-being.

The intent of the

Agreement was not solely that the IDFG would take whatever action was necessary to protect
bighorn sheep, but rather that IDFG would take whatever action was necessary to protect bighorn
sheep without adversely impacting existing domestic sheep operators. Those actions were not
enumerated in the Agreement, but the parties contemplated "whatever" actions, which would
include continuing existing grazing allotments, removing the bighorn sheep (which are owned by
the State, see Idaho Code § 36-103), from the area to protect them from disease transmission,
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providing feed to the Plaintiffs in lieu of grazing allotments, providing alternative allotments,
and compensating the domestic sheep operators for the economic impacts caused by the
reintroduction of the bighorn sheep.
Trying to get around this reality, IDFG states that its view of the intent of the Agreement
is that it only constitutes a "limitation on the scope of actions that IDFG may take to protect
bighorns." Its interpretation is that IDFG "will refrain from taking actions that have adverse
impacts on domestic sheep operators" but is not required to take affirmative action to protect
domestic sheep operators if the Forest Service modifies the grazing allotments because of the
impact domestic sheep might have on bighorn sheep reintroduction. While this interpretation,
although strained, is certainly one that IDFG may argue to the jury if it can do so with a straight
face, it is again irrelevant in the context of a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a
Claim.
The Amended Complaint alleges that IDFG, in return for the IWGA's and its members'
agreement that they would not oppose the reintroduction of the bighorn sheep, agreed to
indemnify sheep operators from adverse economic impact arising from the reintroduction. That
allegation, in and of itself, is sufficient to state a claim for relief for breach of contract, breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, equitable estoppel, quasi estoppel and promissory
estoppel. The IDFG made a promise upon which Plaintiffs relied to their detriment, made a
representation, and entered into a contract.

It has not complied with its promise, its

representations, nor its contract. The Plaintiffs have a right to obtain relief from this Court under
one or all ofthe alternate theories they have asserted.
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Similarly, while IDFG claims that it was "impossible" to override administrative orders
of the Forest Service regarding use of grazing allotments or block the Forest Service's breach of
the 1997 Letter Agreement, and therefore all causes of action must be dismissed based on the
doctrine of impossibility, this argument suffers from the same fatal flaw as all of IDFG's other
arguments: namely, IDFG's failure to perform is not its failure to block the Forest Service's
actions but rather is its own failure to comply with its duty of indemnifying Plaintiffs from the
adverse effects of the reintroduction of the bighorn sheep. The Amended Complaint does not
allege that IDFG had either the authority or the duty to "block" the issuance of the Forest Service
order. While Plaintiffs believe that the Forest Service's modification of their grazing allotments
is legally and factually improper, and while Plaintiffs believe that IDFG should have taken a
position in support of Plaintiffs' objections to the Forest Services' actions, this is not the basis of
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. Therefore, the "impossibility" argument is irrelevant.

C. The Amended Complaint States a Claim Under Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(S)(D)
Over Which this Court has Jurisdiction.
Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D) provides that it "is the policy of the state of Idaho that
existing sheep or livestock operations in the area of any bighorn sheep transplant or relocation
are recognized and that the potential risk, if any, of disease transmission and loss of bighorn
sheep when the same invade domestic livestock or sheep operations is accepted." This provision
is in the section creating the office of Director of the Department of Fish & Game and specifying
the duties and powers of the director. The provision was enacted on March 24, 1997 and went
into effect on that day as an emergency measure. Specifically, the amended portion provided:
Upon any transplant of bighorn sheep into areas they do not now
inhabit or a transplant to augment existing populations, the
department shall provide for any affected federal or state land
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grazing permittees or owners or leaseholders of private land a
written letter signed by all federal, state and private entities
responsible for the transplant stating that the existing sheep or
livestock operations in the area of any such bighorn sheep
transplant are recognized and that the potential risk, if any, of
disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep when the same
invade domestic livestock or sheep operations is accepted.

It is also important to note that the contact listed for the 1997 bill was Stan Boyd of the Idaho
Wool Growers Association.
Furthermore, Section 36-106. was amended in 2009 to include a new subsection,
(e)(5)(E), which requires the Department of Fish & Game to develop a State management plan
to maintain the population of bighorn sheep "which shall consider as part of the plan the current
federal or state domestic sheep grazing allotment(s) that currently have any bighorn sheep upon
or in proximity to the allotment(s)," and also directed IDFG to "cooperatively develop best
management practices with the permittee(s) on the allotment(s)."
It is unclear what IDFG's objections to Plaintiffs' third cause of action for violation of
this statute consists of. There is nothing in that third cause of action that relies upon a retroactive
application of the statute prior to its March 24, 1997 effective date.

Certainly it is no

coincidence that the 1997 Letter Agreement was signed by IDFG at the same time as the
provision was being debated and enacted by the legislature. But the statute that is relied upon for
Plaintiffs' third cause of action is the statute that is in effect at the time of filing.

It is Plaintiffs' contention, as supported by the legislative history, the context of the
enactment and the plain language of the statute itself, that the Idaho legislature when recognizing
the "policy in the State of Idaho" that domestic existing sheep operations shall not be harmed by
the reintroduction of bighorn sheep, mandated IDFG to protect domestic sheep operators such as
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the Shirts from economic harm. It is apparent that IDFG has not done so. It is accordingly
apparent that IDFG has not fulfilled its statutory duties as intended by the state legislature. It is
clear that that breach of statutory duty is continuing even as of this date. This third cause of
action seeks a remedy for that continuing breach of statutory duty.
Again, Plaintiffs' third cause of action does not rest upon some failure oflDFG to block
the Forest Service from modifying the Shirts' grazing allotments. Moreover, it is unclear what
"agency action" IDFG is pointing to in regards to the decision not to take any action in regards to
the modification of the grazing allotment(s).
It is Plaintiffs' contention that Idaho Code § 36-106 should be read to authorize an award
of damages against the State in the amount of the economic harm sustained by the Plaintiffs.
That is the plain import of the provision enacted in 1997 when the initial bighorn reintroduction
was about to commence. Certainly the legislature intended to protect the domestic sheep
operators from all adverse consequences of that reintroduction effort. This interpretation will be
verified by testimony of the relevant witnesses as well as the relevant legislative history.
States and state agencies are liable for breaches of their contracts. Plaintiffs assert that
IDFG entered to a contract in 1997 and that contract has been breached. Plaintiffs assert that the
Legislature recognized that contract and approved that contract by enacting the statute.
Furthermore, even if the Court determines that the statute does not explicitly authorize an
award of monetary damages, the Court can still find that the statute was violated and can require
IDFG to provide non-monetary remedies to the Shirts in the form of alternative grazing
locations, feed for the domestic sheep or other arrangements which would protect the Plaintiffs'
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operations. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' third cause of action is a viable claim and there is no
lack of jurisdiction by this Court to hear tl1at claim.
D. Plaintiffs are Entitled to Attornevs' Fees and Costs in Defending Against this
Unjustified Motion.

Plaintiffs agree that Idaho Code § 12-117 provides for an award of attorneys fees to the
prevailing party when the court finds that the other party acted without a reasonable basis in fact
or law. IDFG's motion to dismiss meets that standard: there is no reasonable basis in fact or in
law for IDFG's argument. This motion is frivolous and appears to be really intended to cause the
Plaintiffs to incur substantial unnecessary expenses in an attempt to intimidate Plaintiffs from
continuing their action. Plaintiffs have already been substantially economically damaged by the
failure of IDFG to protect them from the consequences of the reintroduction of the bighorn
sheep, in direct contravention ofIDFG's promises and obligations in the 1997 Letter Agreement
and Idaho Code § 36-106. IDFG does not want to allow the fact finder to determine if it
breached its obligations and conclude that IDFG must remedy the losses suffered by Plaintiffs.
Instead, its strategy appears to be to file 34 page frivolous motions requiring Plaintiffs to
respond. This is exactly the case where attorneys fees and costs under § 12-117 should be
awarded to Plaintiffs.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs submit that IDFG's motion to dismiss is unfounded and unjustified. The entire
motion is based on a misunderstanding or misapprehension of the basis for the Amended
Complaint. IDFG's entire argument is an incorrect assertion that the only injury alleged by
Plaintiffs is IDFG's failure to block the Forest Service from modifying the Plaintiffs' grazing
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allotments. This is not the Plaintiffs' allegation. The allegations stated in the Amended
Complaint fairly state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court to deny IDFG's motion to dismiss
in its entirety and grant Plaintiffs their costs and attorneys fees for defending against this
frivolous and unsupported motion.
,.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TmRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
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IDAHO WOOL GROWERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho corporation,
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NOTICE
After filing Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, the
undersigned counsel discovered that the copy 0 f Senate Bill 1175 included in Exhibit 3 was the
amended version of the Bill, and not the original version of the bill containing the "hold

hannless» provision discussed at the top of page 9 of the Defendants' Reply Memorandum.
Defendants therefore submit the attached Corrected Exhibit 3, which should be substituted for
Exhibit 3 to the Defendants' Reply Memorandum.

DATED this

3tJth

day of August 2010.

LA\VRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General

CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief) Natural Resources Division

STEVEN W. STRACK

Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ~day of August 2010, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing, DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF ERRATA AND SUBSTITUTE
EXHIBIT by U,S. Mail, postage prepaid, and addressed as follows:
Samuel A. Diddle
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen> Chtd.
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530
Post Office Box 1368
Boise,ID 83701-1368

STEVEN W. STRACK
Deputy Attorney General
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LA\VRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General

SHERRY'VARD, CLERK

~J. ~ \\\._u ?

CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division
STEVEN W. STRACK (ISB # 3906)
Deputy Attorney General
PO Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-00 I 0
Telephone: (208) 334-2400
Facsimile: (208) 854-8072

Attorneys for Defendants.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADAMS

IDAHO WOOL GROWERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho corporation,
individually and on behalf of its members;
FRANK SHIRTS, JR., individually and as a
member of the Idaho Wool Growers
Association; RONALD W. SHIRTS, LESLIE
SHIRTS and JOHN T. SHIRTS, individually
and d/b/aJ SHIRTS BROTHERS SHEEP and
as members of the Idaho Wool Growers
Association,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO; IDAHO FISH & GAME )
COMMISSION; IDAHO DEPARTMENT
)
OF FISH & GAME; CAL GROEN, Director
)
ofIdaho Department ofFish and Game,
)
)
Defendants.
)

Case No. CV-2010-2567

DEFENDANTS'REPLY
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS

-----------------------------)
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INTRODUCTION
It is the policy of the state ofIdaho to recognize "existing sheep or livestock operations in
the area of any bighom sheep transplant or relocation" and to accept "the potential risk, if any, of
disease transmission and loss of bighom sheep." Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D). Defendants
state of Idaho, Idaho Fish and Game Commission, Idaho Department of Fish and Game
("IDFG"), and IDFG Director Cal Groen are committed to working cooperatively with sheep
operators and to using their authorities to the fullest extent allowed by law to implement this
policy. Defendants, however, find themselves at odds with Plaintiffs because of the Plaintiffs'
unreasonable and unwarranted allegations seeking to impose liability upon the Defendants for
economic losses arising from the cancellation of their federal grazing permits by the United
States Forest Service, despite the fact that Defendants have no authority over, or responsibility
for, the actions ofthe Forest Service, and despite Plaintiffs' concession that the cancellation of
the grazing permits did not violate the terms ofthe 1997 Letter. 1 Moreover, as discussed in
detail below, the Constitution and statutes of the state of Idaho forbid the Defendants from
assuming such liability either by statute or contract. If anything, Plaintiffs' responses to the
motion to dismiss affirm that all causes of action in the Complaint must be dismissed for failure
to state a claim.

ARGUMENT
The Plaintiffs' response to the Motion to Dismiss demonstrates that the claims in the First
Amended Complaint (hereinafter "Complaint") have no legal basis. First, in order to avoid a
finding that the Forest Service is an indispensable party, the Plaintiffs assert in their Response

I Nothing herein or in the State's opening brief should be construed to agree with, or defend, the recent
actions of the United States Forest Service that resulted in modification of grazing permits held by Frank Shirts, Jr.,
Ronald W. Shirts, Leslie Shirts and John T. Shirts, individually and d/b/a Shirts Brothers Sheep (hereinafter
collectively "Shirts").
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Brief that "the Plaintiffs are not claiming that the Forest Service breached the Agreement."
Response Brief at 7. Yet, the Complaint plainly alleges that the 1997 Letter was an agreement
and that the economic harm alleged by Plaintiffs is due solely to the Forest Service's breach of
the Agreement. Relevant allegations include:
24. In or around April of 2007, however, the Forest Service reneged on its
commitment in the Letter Agreement and began to modify various grazing
permits in 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, including those of Shirts and Shirts
Brothers.

26. As the result of the prior and continuing grazing permit modifications,
IWGA, Shirts and Shirts Brothers have suffered significant economic losses and
will continue to suffer economic losses.
Complaint at 5-6 (emphasis added).
Second, in an apparent attempt to avoid dismissal, Plaintiffs assert that their Complaint
makes the claim that "the January 16, 1997 Letter Agreement signed by IDFG constitutes a
contract with IWGA [Idaho Wool Growers Association] and its members by which IDFG agrees
to indemnify the IWGA and its members from any harm or economic loss caused by the
reintroduction ofthe bighorn sheep into the Hells Canyon area." Response Brief at 2-3. The
term "indemnify," however, does not appear anywhere in the Complaint or in the plain language
of the 1997 Letter. It is only in the Response Brief that the Court and the Defendants learn that
the Plaintiffs believe the 1997 Letter is an agreement to indemnify the Plaintiffs against
economic loss.
Plaintiffs should be held to the allegations in their Complaint. Nevertheless, for purposes
of this Reply Brief, the Defendants will demonstrate that even if the Court accepts the Plaintiffs'
new-found characterizations of their allegations and causes of action, dismissal is still warranted.
Indeed, if anything, the new allegations in Plaintiffs' Response Brief compel the conclusion that
Plaintiffs' Complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim and that attorney fees must be
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awarded to Defendants due to the complete lack of factual or legal basis for Plaintiffs' causes of
action.

1.

Any allegation that the 1997 Letter was an agreement to indemnify Plaintiffs for
future economic losses must be dismissed because such an agreement is void as a
matter of law.
In response to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs allege that the 1997 Letter signed by the

Idaho Department ofFish and Game and other parties was in fact an agreement to indemnify the
IWGA and its members from any harm or economic loss caused by the reintroduction of bighorn
sheep into the Hells Canyon area.
Plaintiffs then go further, and allege that such indemnification was intended to apply even
if the economic loss is caused by actions that are not themselves a breach of the alleged
agreement. As now conceded by Plaintiffs, nothing in the 1997 Letter prohibits the Forest
Service from modifying grazing permits held by IWGA members. Response Brief at 5-6.
Plaintiffs also concede that the grazing permits modified by the Forest Service were not
contracts, Response Brief at 8, and do not contest the fact that the grazing permits were mere
licenses cancellable by the Forest Service without any right of compensation.

In short, the Plaintiffs make the extraordinary claim that IDFG, by means of a letter that
does not contain any mention of indemnification, agreed to indemnify the Plaintiffs against any
economic losses caused by the transplant of bighorn sheep into Hells Canyon, even if the federal
action that caused such losses was not itself a breach of the alleged agreement, and even if the
alleged loss of grazing rights was not compensable under the federal laws creating those rights.
Such an extraordinary commitment of state resources would have to be stated explicitly.
"The language imposing indemnity must be clear, unequivocal, and certain [and] the losses to be
indemnified must be clearly stated and the intent of the indemnitor's obligation to indemnify
against them must be expressed in clear and unequivocal terms and to such an extent that no
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other meaning can be ascribed." 41 Am. Jur. 2d Indemnity § 7 (2010). Yet, Plaintiffs'
complaint fails to identify any clear and unequivocal indcmnification language in thc 1997
Letter.
Defendants will not dwell on the lack of indemnification language, however, for even if
the 1997 Letter is assumed, for purposes of argument, to set forth an intent to indemnify
Plaintiffs for economic losses, such an agreement would be void as a matteroflaw. Idaho Code

§ 59-1015 provides:
No officer, employee or state board of the state of Idaho, or board of regents or
board of trustees of any state institution, or any member, employee or agent
thereof, shall enter, or attempt to offer to enter into any contract or agreement
creating any expense, or incurring any liability, moral, legal or otherwise, or at all,
in excess of the appropriation made by law for the specific purpose or purposes
for which such expenditure is to be made, or liability incurred, except in the case
of insurrection, epidemic, invasion, riots, floods or fires.
Idaho Code § 59-1016 provides that any contract attempting to create indebtedness "in violation
of the provisions of this chapter ... shall be void." Both statutes implement the provisions of
Idaho Constitution Article 7, section 13, which prohibits the withdrawal ofmoncy from the state
treasury "but in pursuance of appropriations made by law." In State ex reI. Hansen v. Parsons,
57 Idaho 775, 69 P.2d 788 (1937), the Court, in applying the predecessors to §§ 59-1015 and 591016,2 held that the "prohibitions of the statutes and the Constitution against creating any
expense or incurring any liability against the state, in excess of existing appropriations therefor,
apply to the time of incurring the expense or liability rather than to the time the particular bill or
claim is presented for payment." Id. at 790, 69 P.2d at 794. 3

2 The predecessor statutes, 57-1015 and 57-1016, were, except for numbering, identical to the
current versions ofIdaho Code §§ 59-1015 and 59-1016.
3 Hansen was partially overruled, on other grounds, in State ex reI. Williams v. Musgrave, 84
Idaho 77, 87, 370 P .2d 778, 784 (1962) (holding that money in state insurance fund does not belong to
state and is not subject to art. 7, § 13, of the Constitution).

9D
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Thus, the Idaho Code plainly prohibits, and declares void, any contract purporting to
create a liability that is not covered by appropriations existing at the time of contracting.
Because the Complaint alleges that the 1997 Letter was an agreement to indemnify Plaintiffs for
any future economic losses suffered by Plaintiffs due to the reintroduction of bighom sheep, such
allegation fails to state a claim and must be dismissed, since such an agreement is void as a
matter oflaw.

2.

Neither the plain language or legislative history ofldaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(E)
support Plaintiffs' assertion that the Legislature intended to authorize
compensation to Plaintiffs for economic losses resulting from transplant of bighorn
sheep.
Plaintiffs assert that "Idaho Code § 36-106 should be read to authorize an award of

damages against the State in the amount ofthe economic harm sustained by Plaintiffs."
Response Brief at 14. Such assertion must be dismissed out of hand, since Plaintiffs fail to
identify any language in Idaho Code § 36-106 authorizing such compensation. Plaintiffs assert,
mistakenly, that they can avoid responding to the motion to dismiss by simply asserting that
legislative intent is a factual issue that will be "verified by testimony of the relevant witnesses."
Response Brief at 14. Idaho law, however, generally prohibits introduction of the testimony of
individual legislators or other participants in the legislative process. For example, in Gillihan v.
Gump, 140 Idaho 264, 92 P.3d 514 (2004), the Court held that it would not consider an "affidavit
of a member of the House of Representatives as support for [appellant's] interpretation of the
statute." Id. at 268, 92 P .3d at 518. The Court reasoned that:
First, post-enactment statements oflegislators are not part of the record of the
Legislative Assembly that are considered the contemporaneous "history" that is
appropriate for courts to consult. .,. Second, a post-enactment statement of an
individual legislator represents the views--or, perhaps more accurately, the
recollections--of a single participant in the legislative process. Even when the
statements of individual legislators are offered during the enactment process, they
are commonly viewed cautiously as evidence of the intentions of the entire
assembly.. " Courts are all the more loath to determine the intentions of the
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institution as a whole on the basis of isolated statements that are generated after
enactment, without any evidence that the other members of the legislative body
even were aware of them, much less that they agreed with them.
Id. at 268-69,92 P.3d at 518-19, quoting Salem Keizer Ass'n of Classified Employees v. Salem
Keizer Sch. Dist., 61 P.3d 970 (Or. App. 2003).4 See also In re Mexico Money Transfer
Litigation, 267 F.3d 743, 748 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that affidavits oflegislators setting forth
their understanding of a statute's intent, "offered away from the legislative halls and long after
the law's enactment, are worthless").
Thus, Plaintiffs' assertions that they intend to demonstrate their interpretation of the
statute by post-enactment testimony of participants in the legislative process is not sufficient
grounds to deny the motion to dismiss, since such testimony is inadmissible, and even if
admitted cannot be used to demonstrate intent counter to the plain language of the statute.
Here, the plain language ofthe statute requires dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims. The 2009
amendments to Idaho Code § 36-106 inserted a new subsection, (e)( 5)(E) 5, which sets forth the
exclusive duty owed to Plaintiffs in the event that bighorn sheep transplants create conflicts with
grazing on federal or state grazing allotments. In the event of such conflicts, IDFG is to
"cooperatively develop best management practices with the permittee(s)." Idaho Code § 36106(e)(5)(E). Then, upon implementation of the best management practices, IDFG is to "certify
that the risk of disease transmission, if any, between bighorn and domestic sheep is acceptable
for the viability of the bighorn sheep." Id. Nothing in the plain language of the statutes requires

Gillihan was overturned on other grounds in Gonzalez v. Thacker, 148 Idaho 879, 231 PJd 524
.
5 Plaintiffs assert that "the statute that is relied upon for Plaintiffs' third cause of action is the
statute that is in effect at the time of filing [of the Complaint]." Response Brief at 13. For purposes of
replying to Plaintiffs' arguments, the Defendants will assume that the current version of § 36-106 is
applicable to the Plaintiffs' claims.
4

(2009).
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or authorizes IDFG to compensate holders of federal grazing allotments in the event such
allotments are cancelled by federal agencies.
As opposed to the post-enactment testimony by legislators, which is generally
inadmissible, the Court may take "judicial notice of public and private acts of the legislature and
the journals of the legislative bodies for the purpose of ascertaining what was done by the
legislature." Idaho State Tax Comm'n v. Haener Bros., Inc., 121 Idaho 741, 743, 828 P.2d 304,
306 (1992), quoting Knight v. Employment Sec. Agency, 88 Idaho 262, 266, 398 P.2d 643, 645
(1965). The pre-enactment legislative history of the 2009 amendments to Idaho Code § 36106(e)(5)(E) confirms that the legislature did not intend to authorize compensation to Plaintiffs
for economic harm. The relevant language in Idaho Code § 36-106 was adopted in 2009 as part
of Senate Bill 1232 in response to the Forest Service's modification of the Shirts' grazing rights. 6
The minutes of the House Resources and Conservation Committee for April 20, 2009, indicate
that the Shirts' attorney was involved in negotiating the language of Senate Bill 1232, and that
the issue of "grazing on the Payette National Forest lands ... is addressed in this legislation
[S.B. 1232]" and that the bill was intended to give "clear direction ... to the Forest Service, to
the Executive Branch, and to the Fish & Game Commission." 7
Ifthe legislature had intended to authorize the award of monetary compensation to
holders of grazing allotments adversely impacted by bighorn sheep it would have stated such
intent explicitly. The Legislature, however, chose not to authorize such awards. Indeed, the
same legislative session that amended Idaho Code § 36-106 to provide for cooperative
preparation of best management practices also rejected proposed legislation that would have
provided that any domestic sheep operation "adversely impacted from any past, present, or future
A copy of Senate Bill 1232 is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.
A copy of the minutes of the House Resources and Conservation Committee are attached hereto
as Exhibit 2.
6

7
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transplant or relocation of bighorn sheep" would be "held harmless from adverse impacts by the
state ofIdaho." Sen. Bill 1175, p. 3, 11. 28-31 (2009) (copy attached hereto as Exhibit 3). Senate
Bill 1175 was amended on the Senate floor for the purpose of removing the "hold harmless"
provision. See Exhibit 4. 8 The Legislature's rejection of "hold harmless" language can only be
interpreted as an intent to avoid any suggestion that the state was responsible for financial losses
suffered by sheep operators. 9
3.

Any allegation that Idaho Code § 36-106 indemnifies Plaintiffs from future
economic harm must be dismissed because any such provision is void as a matter of
law.
Even if it were possible to construe the 2009 amendments to Idaho Code § 36-106 as

assuming an obligation to reimburse Plaintiffs for "economic harm" resulting from bighorn
sheep transplants, such claim must be dismissed, since any such interpretation of the statute
would violate article VIII, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution.· Article VIII, § 1 provides that the
"legislature shall not in any manner create any debt or debts, liability or liabilities" unless said
law provides ways and means for repayment of the debt or liability within twenty years and is
approved by popular vote at the next general election. The prohibition on creation of financial
liabilities is absolute: it matters not whether the debt or liability is quantified or inchoate.
Plaintiffs' assertion that Idaho Code § 36-106 created an obligation on the part ofthe
State of Idaho to reimburse Plaintiffs for any financial losses caused by the transplant of bighom
sheep cannot be reconciled with the prohibitions of article VIII, § 1. In Idaho Water Resource
Bd. v. Kramer, 97 Idaho 535,548 P.2d 35, (1976), the Court noted that: "'Liability' as used
within our constitution, has been afforded a broader and more comprehensive definition [than

8 Exhibit 4 is an excerpt from the 2009 Senate Journal indicating that lines 28 through 31 of page
3 of Sen. Bill 1175 [which set forth the "hold harmless" language] were to be deleted.
9 Even after removal of the hold harmless provision, Senate Bill 1175 was ultimately vetoed.
The history of Senate Bill 1175 is set forth on the first two pages of Exhibit 3.
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'debf]. It refers to an obligation one is bound in law or justice to perforn1." Id. at 556,548 P.2d
at 56. The authorities cited in Kramer likewise hold that the teml "liability" is "sweeping and
comprehensive." 10 Hanson v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 512,514,446 P.2d 634,636 (1968),
quoting Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32,129 P. 643 (1912). In Feil, the Court held
that the term "liability" means "the state of being bound or obligated in law or justice to do, pay,
or make good something." 23 Idaho at 50, 129 P. at 649. Notably, the Court also cited the
dictionary definition of "liability" to mean "[t]he condition of being responsible for a possible or
actual loss, penalty, evil, expense or burden." Id.
In short, the Idaho Constitution's prohibition on creation of "liability" prohibits the
legislature from assuming responsibility for possible or actual financial losses by sheep operators
or others without contemporaneously providing ways or means for payment of such liability as it
falls due. Idaho Constitution art. VIII, § 1. The Plaintiffs' allegations that the Legislature
"mandated IDFG to protect domestic sheep operators such as the Shirts from economic harm"
must be dismissed as a matter of law.
4.

The sole non-monetary remedy available to Plaintiffs is the cooperative development
of best management practices that will allow continuation of grazing on federal
grazing allotments.
Plaintiffs assert that even ifthe Legislature could not require IDFG to cover Plaintiffs'

alleged financial losses, this Court could "still find that the statute was violated and can require
IDFG to provide non-monetary remedies to the Shirts in the fonn of alternative grazing
locations, feed for the domestic sheep or other arrangements which would protect the plaintiffs'
operations." Response Brief at 14-15.

10 In footnote 36 ofthe Kramer decision the Court, in defining the term "liability" as used in
article VIII, § 1, cited as authority Hanson v. City ofIdaho Falls, 92 Idaho 512, 446 P.2d 634 (1968) "and
cases cited therein," which construe the term "liability" as used in the closely-related article VIII, § 3.
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As explained in Defendants' opening brief, however, the Court may not simply craft
equitable remedies for alleged agency violations of statutory duties. Because Plaintiffs do not
seek a writ of mandate, the remedy for the alleged violation of statutory duty is limited by Idaho
Code § 67-5279(2) to setting aside the agency action in whole or part. Even if the Complaint
could be construed as seeking a writ of mandate, the Court is limited to "compel[ling] the
performance of an act which the law especially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station." Idaho Code § 7.:.302. As explained at length above, the sole duty imposed on IDFG in
the event of conflict between federal agencies and holders of federal grazing permits is the
preparation and implementation of best management practices to maintain separation of domestic
sheep and bighorn sheep, and the certification that the risk of disease transmission between
bighorn sheep and domestic sheep is acceptable for the viability ofthe bighorn sheep. Idaho
Code § 36-106(e)(5)(E). Plaintiffs do not allege that IDFG has failed in this duty, and indeed,
IDFG has made every effort to cooperatively develop best management practices upon request of
domestic sheep operators.
5.

As to the remaining grounds for dismissal identified in Defendants' opening brief,
Plaintiffs either expressly or impliedly concede that dismissal is warranted.
Plaintiffs concede that to the extent their cause of action is predicated on a finding that

the Forest Service breached the terms of the alleged 1997 Letter agreement, the Forest Service is
an indispensable party. Thus, Defendants reiterate their argument that the allegations on the face
of the Complaint, asserting that the harm to Plaintiffs resulted from the Forest Service's alleged
breach of commitments made in the 1997 Letter, compel the conclusion that the Forest Service is
an indispensable party to this action, and the action must be dismissed in the Forest Service's
absence.

'1&'
DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

Page 11

Likewise, Defendants reiterate their argument, not responded to by Plaintiffs, that the
Defendants fulfilled all statutory duties imposed by that version of Idaho Code § 36-106 adopted
by the Legislature on March 24, 1997. Plaintiffs' only response to such arguments is to simply
assert that the latest version of the statute controls, but it is plain that the 1997 legislation,
adopted shortly after execution of the 1997 Letter, is the best indicator of legislative intent with
regard to the effect of the 1997 Letter. Since the 1997 legislation required only that IDFG and
other parties provide a "letter" to affected grazing permittees, the plain and unambiguous
language of the 1997 legislation demonstrates that the Legislature did not intend the 1997 Letter
to be construed as an agreement.
Plaintiffs also fail to respond to those portions of Defendants' motion moving for
dismissal ofthose claims in the Complaint based on equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel,
promissory estoppel and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiffs' failure
to respond is sufficient grounds for dismissing such claims. Additionally, all such claims must
be dismissed for the same reasons that Plaintiffs' claims alleging the existence of an agreement
to indemnify Plaintiffs must be dismissed: Idaho Code §§ 59-1015 and 59-1016 declare void any
attempt by a state agency or state officer to "attempt to offer" to incur any "liability, moral, legal
or otherwise" in excess of appropriations existing for such purpose at the time of the offer. The
statutory prohibition on assumption of liability is absolute, and makes no exception for offers
relied upon by the offerees. Hence, to the extent that the Complaint alleges that state agencies or
officers represented to Plaintiffs that the state would assume liability for economic losses
resulting from transplant of bighom sheep, such allegation fails to state a claim, for any such
offer or representation would have been void as a matter oflaw and any reliance upon such offer
by Plaintiffs cannot alter the terms ofIdaho Code §§ 59-1015 and 59-1016.
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6.

Idaho Code § 12-117 requires that the Court award Defendants the attorney fees
incurred in defending this action.
Plaintiffs' response in this action affinns that the Complaint was "without a reasonable

basis in fact or law." Idaho Code § 12-117. In order to avoid the motion to dismiss for failure to
join an indispensable pmty, Plaintiffs disavow the plain allegations in their Complaint that the
Forest Service's modification of the Shirts' grazing permits was a breach of the 1997 Letter
"Agreement." To avoid dismissal, Plaintiffs now assert, contrary to the plain terms of the 1997
Letter and the allegations in the Complaint, that the 1997 Letter "constituted a contract by which
IDFG agreed to ... provide monetary recompense to domestic sheep operators who did suffer
economic damage as a result of bighorn sheep reintroduction."
Such reversals by Plaintiffs demonstrate that the Complaint did not have a reasonable
basis in law or fact. Moreover, Plaintiffs' new-found allegations that the Defendants intended to
indemnify Plaintiffs from economic hann are in plain violation of the Idaho Constitution and
Idaho Code, a fact that could have been revealed with a minimum oflegal research. Yet,
Defendants have been forced, at considerable expense, to defend against this unfounded action.
In such circumstances, the mandatory language of Idaho Code § 12-117 provides that the Court
"shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees."
DATED this

~7 tb

day of August 2010.
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division

STEVEN W. STRACK
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby celiify that on this ;;>"7t~day of August 201 0, I caused to be served a true and
COlTect copy of the foregoing, DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and addressed as follows:
Samuel A. Diddle
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Tumbow & McKlveen, Chtd.
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530
Post Office Box 1368 .
Boise, ID 83701-1368

STEVEN W. STRACK
Deputy Attorney General
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Exhibit 1·
Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss
Idaho Wool Growers Association et al. v. State ofIdaho et al.,
Case No. CV-2010-2567
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SENATE BILL 1232
Fu \I Bill Information
Individual links:
B.W Text
Amendment
~ngI.o.$sOJgnLl

- amendment(s) incorporated
Statement of Purpose / Fiscal Note
S 1232aa .......................................................................................by STATE AFFAIRS COMMIITEE
FISH AND GAME - Amends existing law relating to fish and game to provide that
the department shall take specified action relating to the relocation of bighorn
sheep, to state a policy of the state of Idaho, to provide for the development of a
state management plan, to provide for the development of best management
practices with certain permittees, to provide for certain certification by the Director
of the Department of Fish and Game; and to delete reference to provisions relating
to the employment of certain veterinarians by the Department of Agriculture.
04/24 Senate intro - 1st rdg - to printing
Rpt prt - to St Aff
Rpt out - rec dip - to 2nd rdg
04/27 To 14th Ord
04/28 Rpt out amen - to engros
Rpt engros - 1st rdg - to 2nd rdg as amen
Ris susp - PASSED - 26-8-1
AYES--Bair, Brackett, Broadsword, Cameron, Coiner, Corder,
Darrington, Davis, Fulcher, Geddes(Geddes), Goedde, Hammond,
Heinrich, Hill, Jorgenson, Keough, Lodge, McGee, McKague, McKenzie,
Mortimer, Pearce, Siddoway, Smyser, Stegner, Winder
NAYS--Andreason, Bilyeu, Herzfeld(Bock), Kelly, LeFavour, Sagness
(Malepeai), Schroeder, Werk
Absent and excused--Thorson(Stennett)
Floor Sponsor - Siddoway
Title apvd - to House
04/29 House intro - 1st rdg - to Res/Con
Rpt out - rec dIp - to 2nd rdg
Ris susp - PASSED - 47-20-3
AYES -- Anderson, Andrus, Barrett, Bayer, Bedke, Bell, Bilbao, Black,
Block, Bolz, Boyle, Chadderdon, Collins, Crane, Eskridge, Gibbs,
Hagedorn, Hart, Hartgen, Harwood, Henderson, Jarvis, Kren, Labrador,
Lake, Loertscher, Luker, Marriott, Mathews, Moyle, Nielsen, Nonini,
\ D

I
o

I') "'! I') f\ 1 f\

'"Bill Status: Sl232
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Palmer, Raybould, Roberts, Schaefer, Shepherd(02), Shepherd(08),
Shirley, Simpson, Stevenson, Takasugi, Thayn, Thompson, Wills, Wood
(27), Mr. Speaker
NAYS -- Boe, Burgoyne, Chavez, Chew, Cronin, Durst, Higgins,
Jaquet, Killen, King, Pasley-Stuart, Pence, Ringo, Ruchti, Rusche,
Sayler, Smith(30), Smith(24), Trail, Wood(35)
Absent and excused -- Clark, McGeachin, Patrick
Floor Sponsor - Wood(27)
Title apvd - to Senate
04/30 To enrol
05/01 Rpt enrol - Pres signed
Sp signed
To Governor
05/07 Governor signed
Session Law Chapter 314
Effective: 05/07/09

ID~

REVISED

REVISED

REVISED

REVISED

REVISED

REVISED

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
RS19058
S 1232 sets policy for the state of Idaho for acceptance of disease transmission in transpanted
or relocated bighorn sheep. It also directs the Department of Fish and Game to develop certain
practices and enter into agreements with domestic sheep owners or permittees. It eliminates the
dual veterinarian of the Idaho Department ofFish and Game and the Department of Agriculture.

FISCAL NOTE
No fiscal impact.

Contact:
Name: Senator Jeff C. Siddoway
Office:
Phone: (208) 332-1000

Statement of Purpose / Fiscal Note
REVISED

REVISED

REVISED

S 1232
REVISED

REVISED

REVISED

Sixtieth Legislature

LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
First Regular Session - 2009
IN THE SENATE
SENATE BILL NO. 1232, As Amended
BY STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
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RELATING TO FISH AND GAME; AMENDING SECTION 36-106, IDAHO CODE, TO
CLARIFY APPLICATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS, TO STRIKE ARCHAIC
VERBIAGE,TO REVISE CERTAIN RESTRICTIONS, TO PROVIDE THAT THE
DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME SHALL TAKE SPECIFIED ACTION
RELATING TO THE RELOCATION OF BIGHORN SHEEP, TO STATE A POLICY OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, TO PROVIDE FOR CERTAIN WRITTEN AGREEMENTS
PRIOR TO SPECIFIED TRANSPLANT OR RELOCATION OF BIGHORN SHEEP,
TO PROVIDE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A STATE MANAGEMENT PLAN
BY THE DEPARTMENT, TO PROVIDE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF BEST
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES WITH CERTAIN PERMITTEES, TO PROVIDE FOR
CERTAIN CERTIFICATION BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FISH
AND GAME AND TO DELETE REFERENCE TO PROVISIONS RELATING TO
THE EMPLOYMENT OF CERTAIN VETERINARIANS BY THE DEPARTMENT
OF AGRICULTURE; AMENDING SECTION 36-408, IDAHO CODE, TO DELETE
REFERENCE TO A CERTAIN VETERINARIAN PROGRAM AND TO MAKE
TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS; AND DECLARING AN EMERGENCY.
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Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:

19

SECTION 1. That Section 36-106, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended to
read as follows:
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36-106. DIRECTOR OF DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME. (a) Office of Director
Created. The commission shall appoint a director of the department of fish and game,
hereinafter referred to as the director, who shall be a person with knowledge of, and experience
in, the requirements for the protection, conservation, restoration, and management of the
wildlife resources of the state. The director shall not hold any other public office, nor any
office in any political party organization, and shall devote his entire time to the service of the
state in the discharge of his official duties, under the direction of the commission.
(b) Secretary to Commission. The director or his designee shall serve as secretary to the
commIssion.
(c) Compensation and Expenses. The director shall receive such compensation as the
commission, with the concurrence and approval of the governor, may determine and shall
be reimbursed at the rate provided by law for state employees for all actual and necessary
traveling and other expenses incurred by him in the discharge of his official duties.
(d) Oath and Bond. Before entering upon the duties of his office, the director shall take
and subscribe to the official oath of office, as provided by section 59-401, Idaho Code, and
shall, in addition thereto, swear and affirm that he holds no other public office, nor any position
under any political committee or party. Such oath, or affirmation, shall be signed in the office
of the secretary of state.
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The director shall be bonded to the state of Idaho in the time, form and manner prescribed
by chapter 8, title 59, Idaho Code.
(e) Duties and Powers of Director.
l. The director shall have general supervision and control of all activities, functions, and
employees of the department of fish and game, under the supervision and direction of the
commission, and shall enforce all the provisions of the laws of the state, and rules and
proclamations of the commission relating to wild animals, birds, and fish and, further,
shall perform all the duties prescribed by section 67-2405, Idaho Code, and other laws of
the state not inconsistent with this act, and shall exercise all necessary powers incident
thereto not specifically conferred on the commission.
2. The director is hereby authorized to appoint as many classified employees as the
commission may deem necessary to perform administrative duties, to enforce the laws
and to properly implement management, propagation, and protection programs established
for carrying out the purposes of the Idaho fish and game code.
3. The appointment of such employees shall be made by the director in accordance with
chapter 53, title 67, Idaho Code, and rules promulgated pursuant thereto, and they shall be
compensated as provided therein. Said employees shall be bonded to the state of Idaho in
the time, form, and manner prescribed by chapter 8, title 59, Idaho Code.
4. The director is hereby authorized to establish and maintain fish hatcheries for the
purpose of hatching, propagating, and distributing all kinds of fish.
5.
(A) The director,or any person appointed by him in writing to do so, may take
wildlife of any kind, dead or alive, or import the same, subject to such conditions,
restrictions and rules as he may provide, for the purpose of inspection, cultivation,
propagation, distribution, scientific or other purposes deemed by him to be of
interest to the fish and game resources of the state.
(B) The director shall have supervision over all of the matters pertaining to
the inspection, cultivation, propagation and distribution of the wildlife propagated
under the provisions of title 36, Idaho Code. He shall also have the power and
authority to obtain, by purchase or otherwise, wildlife of any kind or variety which
he may deem most suitable for distribution in the state and may have the same
properly cared for and distributed throughout the state of Idaho as he may deem
necessary.
(C) The director is hereby authorized to issue a license/tag/permit to a nonresident
landowner who resides in a contiguous state for the purpose of taking one (I)
animal during an emergency depredation hunt which includes the landowner's
Idaho property subject to such conditions, restrictions or rules as the director may
provide. The fee for this license/tag/permit shall be equal to the costs of a resident
hunting license, a resident tag fee and a resident depredation permit.
(D)
Unless relocation is required pursuant to subparagraph (E) herein,
QNotwithstanding the provisions of section 36-408, Idaho Code, to the contrary,
on and after the effeetive date of this aet, the director shall not expend any funds,
or take any action, or authorize any employee or agent of the department or other
person to take any action, to undertake actual transplants of bighorn sheep into
areas they do not now inhabit or to augment the nUffiber of bighorn sheep in
mtisting herds for the purpose of augmenting existing populations until:
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(i)
The boards of county commissioners of the counties in which the
release is proposed to take place have been given reasonable notice of the
proposed release.
(ii) The affected federal and state land grazing permittees and owners or
leaseholders of private land in or contiguous to the proposed release site
have been given reasonable notice of the proposed release.
(iii) The president pro tempore of the senate and the speaker of the
house of representatives have received from the director a plan for the
forthcoming year that details, to the best of the department's ability, the
proposed transplants which shall include the estimated numbers of bighorn
sheep to be transplanted and a description of the areas the proposed
transplant or transplants are planned for.
Upon request, the department shall grant one (I) hearing per transplant or
relocation if any affected individual or entity expresses written concern within
ten (10) days of notification regarding any transplants or relocations of bighorn
sheep and shall take into consideration these concerns in approving, modifying or
canceling any proposed bighorn sheep transplant or relocation. Any such hearing
shall be held within thirty (30) days of the request. ~ It is the policy of the
state of Idaho that existing sheep or livestock operations in the area of any bighorn
sheep transplant or relocation are recognized and that the potential risk, if any, of
disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep when the same invade domestic
livestock or sheep operations is accepted. Prior to any transplant or relocation
of bighorn sheep into areas they do not now inhabit or a transplant or relocation
to augment for the purpose of augmenting existing populations, the department
shall provide for any affected federal or state land grazing permittees or owners
or leaseholders of private land a written ffittef agreement signed by all federal,
state and private entities responsible for the transplant or relocation stating that
the existing sheep or livestock operations in the area of any such bighorn sheep
transplant or relocation are recognized and that the potential risk, if any, of disease
transmission and loss of bighorn sheep when the same invade domestic livestock
or sheep operations is accepted.
@ The Idaho department of fish and game: (1) shall develop a state management
plan to maintain a viable, self-sustaining population of bighorn sheep in Idaho
which shall consider as part of the plan the current federal or state domestic sheep
grazing allotment(s) that currently have any bighorn sheep upon or in proximity
to the allotment(s); (2) within ninety (90) days of the effective date of this act
will cooperatively develop best management practices with the permittee(s) on the
allotment(s). Upon commencement of the implementation of best management
practices, the director shall certify that the risk of disease transmission, if
any, between bighorn and domestic sheep is acceptable for the viability of the
bighorn sheep. The director's certification shall continue for as long as the best
management practices are implemented. The director may also certify that the risk
of disease transmission, if any, between bighorn and domestic sheeR is acceptable
for the viability of the bighorn sheep based upon a finding that other factors exist,
including but not limited to previous eXRosure to pathogens that make separation
between bighorn and domestic sheep unnecessary.
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6.

(A) The director shall have the power, at any time when it is desired to introduce any
new species, or if at any time any species of wildlife of the state of Idaho shall
be threatened with excessive shooting, trapping, or angling or otherwise, to close
any open season or to reduce the bag limit or possession limit for such species
for such time as he may designate; in the event an emergency is declared to exist
such closure shall become effective forthwith upon written order of the director; in
all other cases upon publication and posting as provided in section 36-105, Idaho
Code.
(B) In order to protect property from damage by wildlife, the fish and game
commission may delegate to the director or his designee the authority to declare an
open season upon that particular species of wildlife to reduce its population. The
director or his designee shall make an order embodying his findings in respect to
when, under what circumstances, in which localities, by what means, and in what
amounts, numbers and sex the wildlife subject to the hunt may be taken. In the
event an emergency is declared to exist such open season shall become effective
forthwith upon written order of the director.or his designee; in all other cases upon
publication and posting as provided in section 36-105, Idaho Code.
(C) Any season closure order issued under authority hereof shall be published in
at least one (\) newspaper of general circulation in the area affected by the order
for at least once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks, and such order shall be
posted in public places in each county as the director may direct.
(D) During the closure of any open season or the opening of any special
depredation season by the director all provisions of laws relating to the closed
season or the special depredation season on such wildlife shall be in force and
whoever violates any of the provisions shall be subject to the penalties prescribed
therefor.
(E) Prior to the opening of any special depredation hunt, the director or his
designee shall be authorized to provide up to a maximum of fifty percent (50%)
of the available permits for such big game to the landholder(s) of privately
owned land within the hunt area or his designees. If the landholder(s) chooses
to designate hunters, he must provide a written list of the names of designated
individuals to the department. If the landholder(s) fails to designate licensed
hunters, then the department will issue the total available permits in the manner
set by rule. All hunters must have a current hunting license and shall have equal
access to both public and private lands within the hunt boundaries. It shall be
unlawful for any landholder(s) to receive any f0l111 of compensation from a person
who obtains or uses a depredation controlled hunt permit.
7. The director shall make an annual report to the governor, the legislature, and the
secretary of state, of the doings and conditions of his office, which report shaH be made in
accordance with section 67-2509, Idaho Code.
8. The director may sell or cause to be sold publications and materials in accordance
with section 59-1012, Idaho Code.
9. Any deer, elk, antelope, moose, bighorn sheep or bison imported or transported by
the department of fish and game shall be tested for the presence of certain communicable
diseases that can be transmitted to domestic livestock. Those communicable diseases to
be tested for shaH be arrived at by mutual agreement between the department of fish and
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game and the department of agriculture. Any moneys expended by the department of fish
and game on wildlife disease research shall be mutually agreed upon by the department of
fish and game and the department of agriculture.
In addition, a comprehensive animal health program for all deer, elk, antelope, moose,
bighorn sheep, or bison imported into, transported, or resident within the state of Idaho
shall be implemented after said program is mutuaIly agreed upon by the department of
fish and game and the department of agriculture.
In order to enhance and protect the health of wildlife within the state, as '•.,.ell as
safegl:Jard the health of livestool( resources, the director of the department of agriel:lltl:lre
shall employ at least one (l) veterinarial1 licenscd in Idaho \\'hose dl:lties shall iHclude, eut
Hot be limited to, addressing wildlife disease issues and ceerdiHating disease prevention
work bet\.,.cen the department of fish and game aHd the deJ3srtment of agricl:lltl:lre. The
employing of said veteriH!lFian shall be by mutual agrecmeHt of the direetor of the
department of fish and game and of the director of the deflurtmeHt of agrieultl:lfe. The
veteriHarian shall be on the staff of the division of anilflal inclustries, departm!:Wlt of
agrieultl:lfe. The salary or eompensation to bc paid said veterinarian or veterinarians
shall be divided equally between the departmeHt of fish anti game and the department of
agriculture, and the department of fish and game's portion shall be dcposited directl)' into
the liyestoclc disease control account. Thc vcteriHariaH shall be erHployed 01'1 aAd after
July 1, 1989.
10. In order to monitor and evaluate the disease status of wildlife and to protect
Idaho's livestock resources, any suspicion by fish and game personnel of a potential
communicable disease process in wildlife shall be reported within twenty-four (24) hours
to the department of agriculture. All samples collected for disease monitoring or disease
evaluation of wildlife shall be submitted to the division of animal industries, department
of agriculture.
11. (A) The director is authorized to enter into an agreement with an independent
contractor for the purpose of providing a telephone order and credit card payment
service for controlled hunt permits, licenses, tags, and permits.
(B) The contractor may collect a fee for its service in an amount to be set by
contract.
(C) All moneys collected for the telephone orders of such licenses, tags, and
permits shall be and remain the property of the state, and such moneys shaIl be
directly deposited by the contractor into the state treasurer's account in accordance
with the provisions of section 59-1014, Idaho Code. The contractor shall furnish
a good and sufficient surety bond to the state of Idaho in an amount sufficient to
cover the amount of the telephone orders and potential refunds.
(D) The refund of moneys for unsuccessful controlled hunt permit applications
and licenses, tags, and pelmits approved by the department may be made by the
contractor crediting the applicant's or licensee's credit card account.
12. The director may define activities or facilities that primarily provide a benefit: to the
department; to a person; for personal use; to a commercial enterprise; or for a commercial
purpose.
SECTION 2. That Section 36-408, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended to
read as follows:
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36-408. COMMISSION'S AUTHORITY - TAGS - PERMITS - NONRESIDENTS
LIMITED - OUTFITTERS SET-ASIDE. (I) Tags and Permits - Method of Use. The
commission is hereby authorized to prescribe the number and kind of wildlife that may be
taken under authority of the several types of tags and permits provided for in this title, and the
manner in which said tags and permits shall be used and validated.
(2) Limit - Licenses, Tags or Permits - Controlled Hunts. The commission is hereby
authorized to establish a limit annually as to the number of each kind and class of licenses,
tags, or permits to be sold or issued and is further authorized to limit the number or prohibit
entirely, the participation by nonresidents in controlled hunts.
(3) . Outfitters Set-aside. When the commission establishes a limit as to the number
of nonresident deer tags and nonresident elk tags, it shall set aside annually a maximum of
twenty-five percent (25%) of the nonresident deer tag and nonresident elk tag limit. The
set-aside tags shall be sold pursuant to commission rule, only to persons that have entered
into an agreement for that year to utilize the services of an outfitter licensed pursuant to chapter
21, title 36, Idaho Code.
In order for a person to purchase any set-aside nonresident deer tag or nonresident elk
tag, that person's outfitter must submit an application with the proper fees as required by
the director. If any nonresident deer tags or nonresident elk tags set aside pursuant to this
subsection are unsold by July 1 of the year in which they were set aside, they may be sold by
the department to the general public who are nonresidents. The commission may promulgate
all necessary rules to implement the provisions of this subsection.
(4) Deer and Elk Tag Allocation. If the commission limits the number of deer or elk tags
available for use in any game management area, unit or zone, the commission may allocate by
rule a number of deer or elk tags for use by hunters that have entered into an agreement for that
year to utilize the services of an outfitter licensed pursuant to chapter 21, title 36, Idaho Code.
(5) Special Game Tags. The commission is hereby authorized to issue two (2) special
bighorn sheep tags per year.
(a) Auction bighorn sheep tag. One ill special bighorn sheep tag shall be auctioned
off by an incorporated nonprofit organization dedicated to wildlife conservation, selected
by the commission. The tag shall be issued by the department of fish and game to the
highest eligible bidder. No more than five percent (5%) of all proceeds for the tag may
be retained by the organization. The tag to be issued pursuant to this subsection shall be
taken from the nonresident bighorn sheep tag quota. The net proceeds shall be forwarded
to the director for deposit in the fish and game expendable trust account and shall be
used for bighorn sheep research and management purposes. Moneys raised pursuant to
this subsection may not be used to transplant additional bighorn sheep into that portion
of southwest Idaho south of the Snake River and west of U.S. highway no. 93, nor for
litigation or environmental impact statements involving bighorn sheep. No transplants of
bighorn sheep accomplished with moneys raised pursuant to this subsection shall occur in
any area until hearings are conducted in the area.
(b) Lottery bighorn sheep tag. The commission is also authorized to issue one (1)
special bighorn sheep tag which will be disposed of by lottery. The lottery permit can
be marketed by the department of fish and game or a nonprofit organization dedicated
to wildlife conservation selected by the commission. The tag will be issued by the
department of fish and game to an eligible person drawn from the lottery provided in this
subsection. No more than twenty-five percent (25%) of gross revenue can be retained
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for administrative costs by the organization. All net proceeds for the tag disposed of by
lottery pursuant to this subsection shall be remitted to the department and deposited in the
fish and game expendable trust account. Moneys in the account from the lottery bighorn
sheep tag shall be utilized by the department in solving problems between bighorn
sheep and domestic sheep, solving problems between wildlife and domestic animals or
improving relationships between sportsmen and private landowners by beiRg utilized iR
the veteriRariaR prograffi established iR subseetioA (e)9. of seetiol'l 36 106, Idaho Code.
(6) Issuance of free permit or tag to minor children with life:threatening medical
conditions. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the commission may issue free big
game pennits or tags to minor children who have Iife:threatening medical conditions that
have been certified eligible by a qualified organization. The commission may prescribe by
rule the manner and conditions of issuing and using the penn its or tags authorized under
this subsection (6). For purposes of this subsection (6) a "qualified organization" means a
nonprofit organization that is qualified under section 501 (c )(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
and that affords opportunities and experiences to minor children with life:threatening medical
conditions.
(7) Special Wolf Tags. The commission is hereby authorized to issue up to ten (10)
special auction or lottery tags for hunting wolves. Special wolf tags will be auctioned off
or made available through lottery by incorporated nonprofit organizations dedicated to wildlife
conservation and selected by the director. No more than five percent (5%) of all proceeds for
each tag may be retained by the nonprofit organization for administrative costs involved. Each
wolf tag shall be issued by the department of fish and game and awarded to the highest eligible
bidder or winner of a lottery. Each tag will be good for the harvest of one (1) wolf pursuant to
commission rule. The proceeds from each tag wiII be sent to the director to be placed in the
department general license fund.
SECTION 3. An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby declared to
exist, this act shall be in fulI force and effect on and after its passage and approval.
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Exhibit 2
Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss
Idaho Wool Growers Association et al. v. State of Idaho et aI.,
Case No. CV-2010-2567
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MINUTES

HOUSE RESOURCES & CONSERVATION COMMITTEE

DATE:

April 29, 2009

TIME:

Upon Recess of the House

PLACE:

Room 148

MEMBERS:

Chairman Stevenson, Vice Chairman Shepherd, Representatives Wood,
Bell, Barrett, Moyle, Eskridge, Raybould, Bedke, Andrus, Wood (27), Boyle,
Hagedorn, Harwood, Sayler, Chavez, King, Pence .

ABSENTI
EXCUSED:

Reps. Bedke, Moyle

GUESTS:

Benjamin Davenport, Risch Pisca
Chairman Stevenson called the meeting to order at 2:50 p.m.

S 1232a

Chairman Stevenson reminded committee members that they had already
considered and passed S 1175 and that Governor Otter had vetoed that bill.
He said the bill before the committee today, S 1232a, is a replacement that
had originated in the Senate and was subsequently amended and passed
by them.
Chairman Stevenson said Rep. Boyle would explain the
amendments to the original S 1232 since she had been involved in their
discussion.
Rep. Boyle explained that the original replacement bill, S 1232, was found
to be problematic by the Attorney General's office and was therefore
amended to meet those concerns. She acknowledged that the resulting
S 1232a is still not perfect, but it is probably the best compromise legislation
acceptable to all parties.
During committee discussion, Rep. Boyle said the stricken language on
page 7, regarding the veterinarian program, is the same language that was
stricken in the original S 1175. She stated that the term "agreement" is
SUbstituted for the term "letter" on page 3, line 26, because the document
actually is an agreement, although it has taken the form of a letter in recent
years.
Asked whether Governor Otter is supporting this legislation, Rep. Boyle said
the language in the bill is his language. She said it is her understanding that
the bill is also acceptable to the Governor's task force, to the Forest Service,
and to other parties. Chairman Stevenson said David Hensley from the
Governor's office had been involved in the discussions over the past couple
of days and had indicated this was the agreement the Senate thought they
could achieve. He also noted that he had talked to the Fish & Game
Commission and they are aware of the language in the bill.

\\A

Asked about the requirement in S 1232a that the state shall develop a

management plan, Rep. Boyle said Fish & Game does have a management
plan for bighorn sheep, but it has not been updated since 1995. She said
Fish & Game began discussing an update to the plan in May 2008 and
planned to have an updated version ready for presentation to the public by
January 2009. According to Mr. Hensley, however, that plan is still being
refined.
Rep. Boyle was asked about how this legislation will impact the Payette
National Forest's plan. She responded that the Payette National Forest is
developing an environmental impact statement (EIS), but this is different
from the state's plan which will say how Idaho will manage its bighorn
population. She noted that all wildlife belongs to the state and the state
bears the responsibility for managing the animals. The federal government
has to abide by the state's management plan. This is especially important
in the case of large animals such as the bighorn because such animals
travel back and forth across federal land, state land, and private land. Rep.
Boyle said the Forest Service has to take all these factors into account as
they develop their environmental impact statement.
Responding to further committee questions, Rep. Boyle said Mr. Hensley
has not indicated who is developing the management plan forthe state. She
noted that the working group is made up of a wide variety of interested
parties, but that it has no authority and is only an advisory group. The final
plan will still need to go to Fish & Game and the Governor's office. Fish &
Game is ultimately responsible for developing the final plan for managing
and hunting bighorn sheep.
A concern was expressed over the time frame of the plan and the fact that
if it takes too long to develop and implement a plan, the sheep grazers may
be gone from the state of Idaho before it becomes effective. A question was
also raised about the Statement of Purpose's fiscal note, which states that
there will be no fiscal impact as a result of this bill. Since the management
plan will have to be developed by someone, probably a state employee, the
real cost of that person's time is not accurately reflected in the fiscal note.
Chairman Stevenson expressed gratitude to Rep. Boyle for handling the
presentation and explanation of S 1232a, saying she was the only person
available who was familiar with the changes made and the work done on the
bill during the last couple of days.
MOTION:

Rep. Eskridge moved to send S 1232a to the floor with a DO PASS
recommendation.
Rep. Hagedorn stated his belief that the Fish & Game Commission has
lagged behind in its responsibility to manage the bighorn sheep population,
and this legislation will be a clear signal to them that they need to perform
this function in a timely manner. Chairman Stevenson again noted that,
although S 1232a is not a perfect bill, it is the one that has been negotiated
and agreed upon by the Governor's office, the Senate, and the Shirts
family's attorney. Although no one got the bill they wanted, all agreed this
would have the best chance of passage by the Senate and House.

Rep. Wood (27) noted that the 1997 agreement dealt with risk but had
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nothing to do with a management plan. He said there will be two
management plans. One will originate with the Fish & Game Commission
and will deal strictly with managing wild sheep and hunting them. The other
plan is associated with grazing on the Payette National Forest lands, and is
addressed in this legislation. This plan is what the Forest Service, the State
of Idaho, and the Shirts family have come to agreement on. He said Fish &
Game may have some input but they won't be drawing it up. S 1232a will
allow the state to develop this plan without conflicting with federal rules.

J
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Asked whether any plan will be developed in time to have any good effect in
Idaho, Rep. Wood pointed out that the bill does have an emergency clause,
which will allow development of the plan to start immediately. Rep. Andrus
noted that the legislation contains a gO-day time limit for such a plan to be
developed. He also said that legal counsel for the Shirts family had
requested a 30-day time limit, but that very short time frame was not
acceptable to the Governor, who thought it would be impossible for the Fish
& Game Commission to come up with a plan in only 30 days.
Rep. Harwood indicated that, in his opinion, this bill does not seem to
contain timely enough help for the farmers or sheepherders, and he asked
whether an override of the Governor's veto of S 1175 was feasible.
Chairman Stevenson said the Senate has already indicated it will not
entertain an override effort.
Rep. Hagedorn reminded committee members that Idaho's bighorn sheep
belong to the state and it is Idaho's responsibility to develop a management
plan. He said there needs to be clear direction given to the Forest Service,
to the Executive branch, and to the Fish & Game Commission. If the
Legislature takes no action, Rep. Hagedorn said, the situation will default to
the old 1990 plan. He acknowledged that this bill may not be perfect, but the
Governor has already indicated his position by vetoing the previous bill.
Rep. Boyle stated that she supports S 1232a, although reluctantly. Her
support is based on two sections of the bill that remain from the previous
S 1175, namely, the elimination of the dual veterinarians, which will help with
budget concerns, and the language on lines 18-22, page 3 of the bill, which
explicitly states the policy of the State of Idaho.
VOTE ON
MOTION:

Chairman Stevenson called for a vote on the motion to send S 1232a to the
floor with a DO PASS recommendation. A roll call vote was requested.
Motion passed, 12-4-2. Voting in favor of the motion: Reps. Shepherd,
Bell, Barrett, Eskridge, Raybould, Andrus, Wood (27), Boyle, Hagedorn,
Harwood, Sayler, and Chairman Stevenson. Voting in opposition to the
motion: Reps. Wood (35), Chavez, King, and Pence. Reps. Bedke and
Moyle were absent and excused. Rep. Wood (27) will sponsor the bill on
the floor.
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ADJOURN:

There being no further business to come before the committee, the meeting
was adjourned at 3: 25 p.m.

Representative John A. Stevenson
Chairman

Marylou Molitor
Secretary

\\ s-

HOUSE RESOURCES & CONSERVATION
April 29. 2009 - Minutes - Page 4

MINUTES

HOUSE RESOURCES & CONSERVATION COMMITTEE

DATE:

May 5,2009

TIME:

Upon Adjournment of the House

PLACE:

Room 145

MEMBERS:

Chairman Stevenson, Vice Chairman Shepherd, Representatives Wood (35),
Bell, Barrett, Moyle, Eskridge, Raybould, Bedke, Andrus, Wood (27), Boyle,
Hagedorn, Harwood, Sayler, Chavez, King, Pence

ABSENTI
EXCUSED:

Reps. Shepherd, Wood (35), Barrett, Moyle, Eskridge, Bedke, Boyle, Sayler

GUESTS:

None
Chairman Stevenson called the meeting to order at 2:03 p.m.

MOTION:

Rep. Pence moved to approve the minutes of April 29, 2009 as written;
motion carried on voice vote.

ADJOURN:

There being no further business to come before the committee, the meeting
was adjourned at 2:05 p.m.

Representative John A. Stevenson
Chairman

Marylou Molitor
Secretary
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SENATE BILL 1175
FulUillJ.. Information

Individual links:

12IH .Is;>;t.
Am,~.!.ld.m,~nt
fD.flr.Q,~s.me.D..Ll.

- amendment(s) incorporated

Sta!ern.~to.f.E.IJ.!l2QS~.Llli.~~.Q.t~

51175aa.......................................................................................by STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
FISH AND GAME - Amends existing law relating to fish and game to provide that
the department shall take specified action relating to the relocation of bighorn
sheep, to state a policy of the state of Idaho, to provide for the relocation or
control of certain bighorn sheep by the Director of the Department of Fish and
Game and to delete reference to provisions relating to the employment of certain
veterinarians by the Department of Agriculture.
03/31 Senate intro - 1st rdg - to printing
04/01 Rpt prt - to Res/Env
04/07 Rpt out - to 14th Ord
Rpt out amen - to engros
04/08 Rpt engros - 1st rdg - to 2nd rdg as amen
04/09 2nd rdg - to 3rd rdg as amen
'Rls susp - PASSED ... 27-1-1
AYES--Andreason, Bair, Brackett, Broadsword, Cameron, Coiner,
Corder, Darrington, Davis, Fulcher, Geddes, Goedde, Hammond,
Heinrich, Hill, Jorgenson, Keough, Lodge, McKague, McKenzie,
Mortimer, Pearce, Schroeder, Siddoway, Smyser, Stegner, Winder
NAVS--Bilyeu, Bock, Kelly, LeFavour, Sagness(Malepeai), Thorson
(Stennett), Werk
Absent and excused .... McGee

Floor Sponsor .. Siddoway
04/10
04/14
04/15
04/16

R?\)

Title apvd - to House
House intro - 1st rdg - to Res/Con
Rpt out - rec dIp - to 2nd rdg
2nd rdg - to 3rd rdg
3rd rdg .. PASSED .. 51-17-2
AYES -- Anderson, Andrus, Barrett, Bayer, Bedke, Bell, Bilbao, Block,
Bolz, Boyle, Chadderdon, Collins, Crane, Eskridge, Gibbs, Hagedorn,
Hart, Hartgen l Harwood, Henderson, Jarvis l Kren, Labrador, Lake,
Loertscher, Luker, Marriott, Mathews, McGeachin, Moyle, Nielsen,
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Nonini, Palmer, Patrick, Raybould, Roberts, Sayler, Schaefer, Shepherd
.(02), Shepherd(08), Shirley, Simpson, Smith(24), Stevenson,
Takasugi, Thayn, Thompson, Wills, Wood(27L Wood(35), Mr. Speaker
NAYS -- Boe, Burgoyne, Chavez, Chew, Cronin, Durst, Higgins,
Jaquet, Killen, King, Pasley-Stuart, Pence, Ringo, Ruchti, Rusche,
Smith(30), Trail
Absent and excused -- Black, Clark

Floor Sponsor - Boyle
Title apvd - to Senate
To enrol
04/17 Rpt enrol - Pres signed
04/20 Sp signed
To Governor
04/27 Governor VETOED on 04/25/09
Ret'd to Res/Env
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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
RS18882
The stated purpose of this bill j~ to make three changes in Section 36·106, Idaho Code, to clarify
actions that shall take place before the transplant or relocation may take place. It provides for
certain agreements, provides that domestic sheep and livestock operators will be heJd harmless
from adverse impacts by the State ofIdaho, provides for control of certain bighorn by the Director,
and that the shared veterinarian program between IDA and IDFO be dissolved. This bill also deletes
a reference to that veterinarian in Section 36408.

FISCAL NOTE
There should be no fiscal impact to the General Fund. There will be an expected impact to the
Department of Fish and Game; however, because of the unknowns as to if and when any actions
may be required the amount is unknown at this time.

Contact:
Name: Senator Jeff C. Siddoway
Office:
Phone: (208) 332-1000

Statement of Purpose / Fiscal Note
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LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
First Regular Session - 2009
IN THE SENATE
SENATE BILL NO. 1175
BY STATE AFFAIRS COMMITfEE

18
17

AN ACT
RELATING TO FISH AND GAME; AMENDING SECTION 36-106, IDAHO CODE, TO
CLARIFY APPLICATION OF CERTAIN PROVIsrONS, TO STRlKE ARCHAIC
VERBIAGE, TO PROVIDE THAT THE DEPARTMENT SHALL TAKE SPECIFIED
ACTION RELATING TO THE RELOCATION OF BIGHORN SHEEP, TO PROVIDE
FOR CERTAIN WRITTEN AGREEMENTS PRIOR TO TRANSPLANT OR
RELOCATION OF BIGHORN SHEEP, TO PROVIDE THAT SPECIFIED DOMESTIC
SHEEP AND LIVESTOCK OPERATIONS SHALL BE HELD HAR..M:LESS FROM
ADVERSE IMPACTS BY THE STATE OF IDAHO, TO .PROVIDE FOR THE
RELOCATION OR CONTROL OF CERTAIN BIGHORN SHEEP BY THE
DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME, TO PROVIDE AN
EXCEPTION, TO PROVIDE FOR THE BASIS OF CERTIFICATION AND TO
DELETE REFERENCE TO PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE EMPLOYMENT
OF CERTAIN VETERINARIANS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE;
AMENDING SECTION 36-408, IDAHO CODE, TO DELETE REFERENCE
TO A CERTAIN VETERINARlAN PROGRAM AND TO MAKE TECHNICAL
. CORRECTIONS; A1\TD DECLARING AN EMERGENCY.

1a

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:

19

SECTION 1. That Section 36-106, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended to
read as follows:
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36-106. DIRECTOR OF DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME. (a) Office of Director
Created. The commission shall appoint a director of the department of fish and game,
hereinafter referred to as the director, who shall be a person with knowledge of, and experience
in, the requirements for the protection, conservation, restoration, and management of the
wildlife resources of the state. TIle director shall not hold any other public office, nor any
office in any political party organization, and shall devote his entire time to the service of the
state in the discharge of his official duties, under the direction of the commission.
(b) Secretary to Commission. The director or his designee shall serve as secretary to the
commission.
(c) Compensation and Expenses. The director shall receive such compensation as the
commission, with the concurrence and approval of the governor, may determine and shall
be reimbursed at the rate provided by law for state employees for all actual and necessary
traveling and other expenses incurred by him in the discharge of his official duties.
(d) Oath and Bond. Before entering upon the duties of his office, the director shall take
and subscribe to the official oath of office, as provided by section 59-401, Idaho Code, and
shall, in addition thereto, swear and affirm that he holds no other public office, nor any position
under any political committee or party. Such oath, or affirmation, shall be signed in the office
of the secretary of state.
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The director shall be bonded to the state of Idaho in the time) form and manner prescribed
by chapter 8, title 59, Idaho Code.
(e) Duties and Powers of Director.
1. The director shall have general supervision and control of all activities, functions, and
employees of the department of fish and game, under the supervision and direction of the
commission, and shall enforce all the provisions of the laws of the state, and rules and
proclamations of the commission relating to wild animals, birds, and fish and, further,
shall perform all the duties prescribed by section 67-2405, Idaho Code, and other laws of
the state not inconsistent with this act, and shall exercise all necessary powers incident
thereto not specifically conferred on the commission.
2. The director is hereby authorized to appoint as many classified employees as the
commission may deem necessary to perfom1 administrative duties, to enforce the laws
and to properly implement management, propagation, and protection programs established
for carrying out the purposes of the Idaho fish and game code.
3. The appointment of such employees shall be made by the director in accordance with
chapter 53, title 67, Idaho Code, and rules promulgated pursuant thereto, and they shall be
compensated as provided therein. Said employees shall be bonded to the state of Idaho in
the time, form, and manner prescribed by chapter 8, title 59, Idaho Code.
4. The director is hereby authorized to establish and maintain fish batcheries for the
purpose of hatching, propagating, and distributing all kinds of fish.
5.
(A) The director, or any person appointed by him in writing to do so, may take
wildlife of any kind, dead or alive, or import the same, subject to such conditions,
restrictions and rules as he may provide, for the purpose of inspection, cultivation,
propagation, distribution, scientific or other purposes deemed by him to be of
interest to the 'fish and game resources of the state.
(B) The director shall have supervision over all of the matters pertaining to
the inspection, cultivation, propagation and distribution of the wildlife prop/lgated
. under the provisions of title 36, Idaho Code. He shall also have the power and
authority to obtain, by purchase or otbelWise, wildlife of any kind or variety which
he may deem most suitable for distribution in the state and may have the same
properly cared for and distributed throughout the state of Idaho as he may deem
necessary.
(C) The director is hereby authorized to issue a license/tag/penn it to a nonresident
landowner who resides in a contiguous state for the purpose of taking one (l)
animal during an emergency depredation hunt which includes the landowner's
Idaho property subject to such conditions, restrictions or roles as the director may
provide. The fee for this license/tag/pennit shall be equaJ to the costs of a resident
hunting license, a resident tag fee and a resident depredation pelmit.
(D)
Unless relocation is reguired Eursuant to subparagraph (F) herein,
gNotwithstanding the provisions of section 36·408, Idaho Code, to the contrary,
eff-tl.fl<l-aftoF th~ffeeti",~ {)f this eet, the director shall not expend any funds,
or take any action, or authorize any employee or agent of the department or other
person to take any action, to undertake actual transplants of bighorn sheep into
areas they do not now inhabit or to augment the number of bighorn sheep in
existing herds until:
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(i) The boards of county commissioners of the counties in which the
release is proposed to take place have been given reasonable notice of the
proposed release.
(ii) The affected federal and state land grazing permittees and owners or
leaseholders of private land in or contiguous to the proposed release site
. have been given reasonable notice of the proposed release.
(iii) The president pro tempore of the senate and tbe speaker of the
house of representatives have received from the director a plan for the
forthcoming year that details, to the best of the department's ability, the
proposed transplants which shall include tne estimated numbers of bighorn
sheep to be transplanted and a description of the areas the proposed
transplant or transplants are planned for.
Upon request, the department shall grant one (1) hearing per transplant .Q!
relocation if any affected individual or entity expresses written concern within
ten (10) days of notification regarding any n-ansplants or relocations of bighorn
sheep and shall take into consideration these concerns in approving, modifying or
canceling any proposed bighorn sheep transplant or relpcation. Any such hearing
shall be held within thirty (30) days of the request. ~ Prior to any transplant
or relocation of bighorn sheep into areas they do not now inhabit or a transplant
or relocation to augment existing populations, the department shall provide for
any affected federal or state land grazing permIttees or owners or leaseholders
of private land a written ~ a,greement signed by all federal, state and private
entities responsible for the transplant or relocation stating that the existing sheep Or
livestock operations in the area of any such bighorn sheep transplant or relocation
are recognized and that the potential risk, if any, of disease transmission and loss
of bighorn sheep when the same invade domestic livestock or sheep operations is
accepted.
@ If anv domestic sheep or livestock operation i§....or has been. adversely
imeacted from any past. present or future transplant or relocation of bighorn sheep.
the domestic sheep or livestock operation shall be held hannless from adverse
ime.acts by the state of Idaho.
Should any bighorn sheep graze. stray or~drift upon. or in close proximity to.
any private, state or federal 1ands that have any domestic .2J1e,ep use, or have any
domestic sheee allotments administered bv the bureau of land management, the
U.S. forest service or the Idaho detwrtment of lands. the director shall relocate
or control the bighorn sheep to ensure that appropriate separation between the
bighorn sheep and the domestic sheep is maintained. unless the director certifies
that the risk of disease transmission,.if anYl between the bighorn sheep and t~
domestic sheep is acceptable. This certification may be based upon:
.ill An agreement regarding a separation strategy between the bighorn
sh~ee and the domestic sheep entered into b:t the owners of the domestic
sheep and the dir'yctor or his designee; or
@ A finding by the director that the bighorn sheep have alreadv been
exposed to certain pathogens that makes separation betws:~n the bighorn
sheep and the domestic sheep unwarrant~
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(A) The director shall have the power, at any time when it is desired to introduce any
new species, or if at any time any species of wildlife of the state of Idaho shall
be threatened with excessive shooting, trapping, Dr angling Or otherwise. to close
any open season or to ,educe the bag limit or possession limit for such species
for such time as he may designate; in the event an emergency is declared to exist
such closure shall become effective forthwith upon wriqen order of the director; in
all other cases upon pubJication and posting as provided in section 36-10S, Idaho
Code.
(B) In order to protect property from damage by wildlife, tbe fish and game
commission may delegate to the director or his designee the authority to declare an
. open season upon that particular species of wildlife to reduce its population. The
director or his designee shall make an order embodying his findings in respect to
when, under what circumstances, in which localities) by what means, and in what
amounts, numbers and sex the wildlife subject to the hunt may be taken. In the
event an emergency is declared to exist such open season shall become effective
forthwith upon written order of tho director or his designee; in all other cases upon
publication and posting as provided in section 36·105, Idaho Code.
(C) Any season closure order issued under authority hereof shall be published in
at least one (1) newspaper of genera) circulation in the area affected by the order
for at least once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks, and such order shall be
posted in public places in each county as the director may direct.
(D) During the closure of any open season or the opening of any special
depredation season by the director all provisions of laws relating to the closed
season or the special depredation season on such wildlife shall be in force and
whoever violates any of the provisions shall be subject to the penalties prescribed
therefor.
(E) Prior to the opening of any special depredation hunt, the director or his
designee shall be authorized to provide up to a ma.ximurn of fifty percent (50%)
of the available permits for such big game to the landholder(s) of privately
owned land within the hunt area or his designees. If the landholder(s) chooses
to designate hunters, he must provide a written list of the names of designated
individuals to the department. If the landholder(s) fails to designate licensed
hunters, then the department will issue the total available penn its in the manner
set by rule. 'All hunters must have a current hunting license and shall bave equal
access to both public and private lands within the hunt boundaries. It shall be
unlawful for any landholder(s) to receive any fom of compensation from a person
who obtains or lfses a depredation controlled hunt pennit.
7. The director shall make an annual report to the governor, the legislature, and the
secretary of state, of the doings and conditions of his office, which report shall be made in
accordance with section 67-2509, Idaho Code.
8. The director may sell or cause to be sold publications and materials in accordance
with section 59-1012, Idaho Code.
9. Any deer, elk, antelope, moose, bighorn sheep or bison imported or transported by
the department of fish and game shall be tested for the presence of certain communicable
diseases that can be transmitted to domestic livestock. Those communicable diseases to
be tested for shall be arrived at by mutual agreement between the department of fish and
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game and the department of agriculture. Any moneys expended by the department of fish
and game on wildlife disease research shall be mutually agreed upon by the department of
fish and game and the department of agriculture.
In addition, a comprehensive animal health program for all deer, elk, antelope, moose,
bighorn sheep, or bison imported into, transported, or resident within the state of Idaho
shall be implemented after said program is mutually agreed upon by the department of
fish and game and the department of agriculture.
In ol'Elel' t&'t>uh£lHee- ooEl flroteet tlte-fiooltft-.of wilalifo witffin...tl~tate, as weB as
safeguard the·heEHfu~f live9toek t'esotll'ees,-tRHj~etef of the OOpartffiont of agrieulturo
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weFk·between the depal:tfl'lent <>f..fl'Sl:r-QAd game &l't6 the d~tlftm:eflt of agyiettltl:tl't>... =I=he
offlpleyitl'g-&Hatd veterinarian 9)tftH-be· by fFlIHual agroen'teltt-of tae diFe~el' of the
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l,'eteriflM'tftl'l shaU-eo-on the Staff of the- <ii¥isieR <>f B:ftiftlal jndl:l5tt=4e9,~artffieFlt of
agrieultl:il'o. The -sa:lftFy-<>r ooAlpen9f1tion to be Pfth:l-sakl veterinarian ol'-¥eteflnarians
shall be di. . .ided equal~ eetweefl the deflEtt1mel'lt~ itell-tffid game fttld the dopat'BMRt of
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10. In order to monitor and evaluate the disease status of wildlife and to protect
Idaho's livestock resources, any suspicion by fish and game personnel of a potential
communicable disease process in wildlife shall be reported within twenty-four (24) hours
to the department of agriculture. All samples collected for disease monitoring or disease
evaluation of wildlife shall be submitted to the division of animal industries, department
of agricultUre.
11. (A) The director is authorized to enter into an agreement with an independent
contractor for the purpose of providing a telephone order and credit card payment
service for controlled hunt permits, licenses, tags, and permits.
(B) The contractor may collect a fee for its service in an amount to be set by
contract.
(C) All moneys collected for the telephone orders of such licenses, tags, and
pennits shall be and remain the property of the state, and such moneys shall be
directly deposited by the contractor into the state treasurer's account in accordance
with the provisions of section 59-1014, Idaho Code. The contractor shall furnish
a good and sufficient surety bond to the state of Idaho in an amount sufficient to
cover the amount of the telephone orders and potential refunds .
(D) The refund of moneys for unsuccessful controlled hunt permit applications
and licenses, tags, and pennits approved by the department may be made by the
contractor crediting the applicant's or licensee's credit card account.
12. The director may define activities or facilities that primarily provide a benefit: to the
department; to a person; for personal use; to a commercial enterprise; or for a commercial
purpose.
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SECTION 2. That Section 36-408, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended to
read as follows:
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36-408. COMMISSION'S AUTHORITY - TAGS - PERMITS - NONRESIDENTS
LIMITED - OUTFITTERS SET-ASIDE. (1) Tags and Permits - Method of Use. The
commission is hereby authorized to prescribe the number and kind of wildlife that may be
taken under authority of the several types of tags and permits provided for in this title, and the
manner in which said tags and permits shall be used and validated.
(2) Limit ~ Licenses, Tags or Permits - Controlled Hunts. The commission is hereby
authorized to establish a limit annually as to the number of each kind and class of licenses,
tags, or pennits to be sold or issued and is further authorized to limit the number or prohibit
entirely, the participation by nonresidents in controlled hunts,
(3) Outfitters Set-aside, When the commission establishes a limit as to the number
of nonresident deer tags and nonresident elk tags, it shall set aside annually a maximum of
twenty-five percent (25%) of the nonresident deer tag and nonresident elk tag limit. The
set-aside tags shall be sold pursuant to commission rule, only to persons that have entered
into an agreement for that year to utilize the services of an outfitter licensed pursuant to chapter
21, title 36, Idaho Code.
In order for a person to purchase any set-aside nonresident deer tag or nonresident elk
tag, that person's outfitter must submit an application with the proper fees as required by
the director. If any nonresident deer tags or nonresident elk tags set aside pursuant to this
subsection are unsold by July 1 of the year in which they were set aside, they may be sold by
the department to the general public who are nonresidents. The commission may promulgate
all necessary rules to implement the provisions of this subsection.
(4) Deer and Elk. Tag Allocation. If the commission limits the number of deer or elk tags
available for use in any game management area, unit or zone, the commission may allocate by
rule a number of deer or elk tags for use by hunters that have entered into an agreement for that
year to utilize the services of an outfitter licensed pursuant to chapter 21, title 36, Idaho Code.
(5) Special Game Tags. The commission is hereby authorized to issue two (2) special
bighorn sheep tags per year.
(a) Auction bighorn sheep tag. One ill special bighorn sheep tag shall be auctioned
off by an incorporated nonprofit organization dedicated to wildlife conservation) selected
by the commission. The tag shall be issued by the department of fish and game to the
highest eligible bidder. No more than five percent (5%) of all proceeds for the tag may
be retained by the organization. The tag to be issued pursuant to this subsection shall be
taken from the nonresident bighorn sheep tag quota. The net proceeds shall be forwarded
to the director for deposit in the fish and game expendable trust account and shall be
used for bighorn sheep research and management purposes. Moneys raised pursuant to
this subsection may not be used to transplant additional bighorn sheep into that portion
of southwest Idaho south of the Snake River and west of U.S. highway no. 93, nor for
litigation or environmental impact statements involving bighorn sheep. No transplants of
bighorn sheep accomplished with moneys raised pursuant to this subsection shall occur in
any area until hearings are conducted in the area.
(b) Lottery bighorn sheep tag. The commission is also authorized to issue one (1)
special bighorn sheep tag which will be disposed of by lottery. The lottery permit can
' be marketed by the department of fish and game or a nonprofit organization dedicated
to wildlife conservation selected by the commission. The tag will be issued by the
department of fish and game to an e1igible person drawn from the lottery provided in this
subsection. No more man twenty-five percent (25%) of gross revenue can be retained
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for administrative costs by the organization. All net proceeds for the tag disposed of by
lottery pursuant to this subsection shall be remitted to the department and deposited in the
fish and game expendable trust account. Moneys in the account from the lottery bighorn
sheep tag shall be utilized by the department in solving problems between bighorn
sheep and domestic sheep, solving problems between \vildJife and domestic animals or
impr~ving relationships between sportsmen and private landowners by Being utiJize6 ~fI
the 't'erel'lltflt-ian 1'I'og!'tltfl-es-tabH9hed tTl roSuegeet~ (e)9. of seetioft 36 10e, Idahe Cede.
(6) Issuance of free permit or tag to minor children with lifc:threatening medical
conditions. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the commission may issue free big
game permits or tags to minor children who have life:threatening medical conditions that
have been certified eligible by a qualified organization. The commission may prescribe by
rule tbe manner and conditions of issuing and using the permits or tags authorized under
this subsection (6). For purposes of this subsection (6) a "qualified organization" means a
nonprofit organization that is qualified under section SOl(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
and that affords opportunities and experiences to minor children with life.:threatening medical
conditions.
(7) Special Wolf Tags. The commission is hereby authorized to issue up to ten (10)
special auction or lottery tags for hunting wolves. Special wolf tags will be auctioned off
or made available through lottery by incorporated nonprofit organizations dedicated to wildlife
conservation and selected by the director. No more than five percent (5%) of all proceeds for
each tag may be retained by the nonprofit organization for administrative costs involved. Each
wolf tag shall be issued by the department of fish and game and awarded to the highest eligible
bidder or winner of a lottery. Each tag will be good for the harvest of one (1) wolf pursuant to
commission rule. The proceeds from each tag will be sent to the director to be placed in the
department general license fund.
SECTION 3. An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby declared to
exist, this act shall be in fu1l force and effect on and after its passage and approval.
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SENATE JOURNAL

CORRECTION TO TITLE
On page I, in line 2, following "SCHOOLS" insert:
"AND TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT"; delete lines 3 and
4, and insert: "TO PROVIDE THAT THE ONLY MILES
FROM WIlICH COSTS MAY BE REIMBURSED SHALL BE
MILES DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED WITH TRANSPORTING
STUDENTS FOR CERTAIN PURPOSES, TO PROVIDE
FOR CERTAIN ALLOWABLE COSTS ON AND AFTER
JULY I, 2010"; in line 5, delete "FOR CERTAIN COSTS";
following line 11, insert: "AMENDING CHAPTER 10,
TITLE 33, IDAHO CODE, BY THE ADDITION OF A
NEW SECTION 33- 1006A, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE
THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION SHALL
AUDIT CERTAIN TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS, TO
PROVIDE FOR RECOMMENDATIONS, TO PROVIDE FOR
CERTAIN REDUCTIONS IN REIMBURSEMENT;"; and in
line 15, foHowing "COSTS" insert: "; AND DECLARING AN
EMERGENCY".

RECESS
Af'TERNOON SESSION
The Senate reconvened at 3:30 a.m., pursuant to recess,
President Little presiding.
Roll call showed all mem bers presen t except Senator
McKaguc, absent and formally excused by the Chair; and
Senators Andreason, Brackett, Cameron, Coiner, Keough,
Lodge, McKenzie, and Stegner, absent and excused.
Prior to recess the Senate was at the Sixth Order of Business,
Reports of Standing Committees.
April 7, 2009
The JUDICIARY AND RULES Committee reports that
S lI92, S 1193, S I194, S 1195, S 1197, and S 1198 have been
correctly printed.
DARRlNGTON, Chairman

SENATE AMENDMENT TO S 1175
AMENDMENT TO SECTION I
On page 2 of the printed bill, in line 39, delete "ill" and
insert: "ru"; on page 3, in line 18, fo1\owing "tI-peft" insert:
"It is the policy of the state of Idaho that existing sheep or
livestock operations in the area of any bighorn sheep transplant
or relocation are recognized and that the potential risk, if any, of
disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep when the same
invade domestic livestock or sheep operations is accepted.";
delete lines 28 through 31; and in line 32, delete "ill" and insert:

Hill"·

CORRECTIONS TO TITLE
On page I, in line 5, following "SHEEP," insert: "TO STATE
A POLICY OF THE STATE OF IDAHO"; and delete lines 7
through 9, and insert: "RELOCATION OF BIGHORN SHEEP,
TO PROVIDE FOR THE".

S 1192, S 1193, S 1194, S 1195, S 1197, and S 1198 were
referred to the Finance Committee.
April 7, 2009
The FINANCE Committee reports out S 1192, S 1193,
S 1194, S 1195, S 1197, and S 1198 with the recommendation
that they do pass.
CAMERON, Chairman
S 1192, S 1193, S 1194, S 1195, S 1197, and S 1198 were
filed for second reading.
April 7, 2009
The FINANCE Committee reports out 11272,11273. H 274,
H 277, and H 280 with the recommendation that they do pass.
CAMERON, Chairman

The Committee also has S 1055, S 1092, S 1095, S 1147,
II 187, and S 1182 under consideration, reports progress, and begs
leave to sit again.

II 272, 11273, 11274, H 277, and H 280 were filed for second
reading.

STEGNER, Chairman

On request by Senator Davis, granted by unanimous consent,
the Senate advanced to the Thirteenth Order of Business.

On motion by Senator Stegner, seconded by Senator Werk,
the report was adopted by voice vote.
S 1140, as amended, and S 1175, as amended, were referred
to the Judiciary and Rules Committee for engrossing and the
amendments thereto were referred to the Judiciary and Rules
Committee for printing.
II 256, as amended in the Senate, was filed for first reading
as amended, and the amendments thereto were referred to the
Judiciary and Rules Committee for printing.
On request by Senator Davis, granted by unanimous consent,
the Senate returned to the Sixth Order of Business.
Reports of Standing Committees

Third Reading of Bills
Senators Andreason, Brackett, Cameron, Coiner, Keough,
Lodge, McKenzie, and Stegner were recorded present at this
order 0 f business.
H 232, as amended in the Senate, was read the third time at
length, section by section, and placed before the Senate for final
consideration. Senator Hill arose as sponsor of the bill and opened
the debate. The question being, "Shall the bill pass?"
Roll call resulted as follows:
AYES-Andreason, Bair, Bilyeu, Bock, Brackett,
Broadsword, Cameron, Coiner, Corder, Darrington. Davis,
Fulcher, Geddes, Goedde, Hammond, Heinrich, Hill, Jorgenson,
Kelly, Keough, LeFavour, Lodge, McGee, McKenzie, Mortimer,
Pearce, Sagness (Malepeai), Schroeder, Siddoway, Smyser,
Stegner, Thorson (Stennett), Werk, Winder. Total - 34.
NAYS-None.

On motion by Senator Davis, seconded by Senator Kelly, by
voice vote the Senate recessed at I: 16 p.m. until the hour of 3:30
p.m. of this day.
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Absent and excused-McKague. Total - 1.
Total - 35.
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADAMS

IDAHO WOOL GROWERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho corporation,
individually and on behalf of its members;
FRANK SHIRTS, JR., individually and as a
member of the Idaho Wool Growers
Association; RONALD W. SHIRTS,
LESLIE SHIRTS and JOHN T. SHIRTS,
individually and d/b/a SHIRTS BROTHERS
SHEEP and as members of the Idaho Wool
Growers Association,

Case No. CV 2010-2567

PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO DISMISS

Plaintiffs,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO; IDAHO FISH &
GAME COMMISSION; IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF FISH & GAME; CAL
GROEN, Director of Idaho Department of
Fish and Game.
Defendants.
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COME NOW Plaintiffs, Idaho Wool Growers Association, Inc ("IWGA"), Frank Shirts,
Jr, and Ronald W. Shirts and Leslie Shilis, husband and wife, and John T. Shirts d/b/a Shirts
Brothers Sheep, by and through their attomeys of record, Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Tumbow &
McKlveen, Chartered, and submit this Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss and Request for Attomey's Fees.
I.
INTRODUCTION
IWGA is a non-profit association consisting of most of the remaining wool
growers/sheep ranchers left in the State of Idaho. Those few include the other Plaintiffs, the
Shirts, who have grazed sheep in the Payette National Forest for more than three decades. In late
1996, IWGA and the Shirts became aware that various federal agencies, other state agencies and
the Idaho Department of Fish & Game ("IDFG") wished to reintroduce bighom sheep to the
Hells Canyon area. Presciently aware that the proposed reintroduction might have deleterious
effects on wool growers, as had occurred in Oregon, IWGA and the Shirts prepared to oppose
this plan in the Idaho Legislature, as the State of Idaho owns all wildlife in the state and can
control such wildlife. Idaho Code Section 36-103.
Recognizing the fonnidable political power possessed by IWGA and recognizing the
significant economic benefits from hunting and tourism which reintroduction of bighom sheep
would give the State, IDFG and the other states executed a Letter Agreement on January 16,
1997.

That Letter Agreement memorialized the "deal" IDFG had reached with the Wool

Growers: the Wool Growers would drop their objections to the reintroduction of the bighom
sheep and in retum IDFG promised that it would protect the Wool Growers from economic hann
arising from the reintroduction. The legislature of the State of Idaho gave its stamp of approval
PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS - 2
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to this agreement two months later through enactment of Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D). The
Wool Growers complied with this agreement and withdrew their objections to the reintroduction
of the bighoms and cooperated with IDFG. For several years IDFG lived up to its obligations
under the Letter Agreement as well but now that the United States Forest Service has taken steps
which have resulted in the economic harm which the Wool Growers feared and which the Letter
Agreement agreed to protect them against, IDFG is apparently taking the position that it does not
have to comply with contractual obligations since its written promises are worth less than the
paper on which they were written. IDFG's arguments are wrong as a matter of law and a matter
of equity. This Court should protect the citizens of this state, protect the sanctity of contracts and
require the State of Idaho acting in its commercial and proprietary capacity to comply with its
contractual obligations.

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In the letter dated January 16, 1997 but not fully executed until March 4, 1997, the Hells
Canyon Bighorn Sheep Restoration Committee, consisting of the U.S. Forest Service and Bureau
of Land Management, the Idaho, Oregon and Washington Fish & Game Departments and the
Foundation for North American Sheep, specified that it was "interested in having the support of
the woolgrowers industry for this effort to repopulate parts of Hells Canyon with bighom sheep."
To obtain this support, the Committee and its members made certain promises. More
specifically, the three state departments pledged to assume responsibility for bighorn losses in
their state and pledged to "take whatever action is necessary to reduce further losses of bighorn
sheep without adversely impacting existing domestic sheep operators." Letter of January 16,
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1997, attached as Exhibit A to Complaint. The Idaho Legislature gave its imprimatur to the
Agreement through enactment of the March 24, 1997 revision to Idaho Code Section 36-106(e).
While the United States Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management had been
signatories to the Letter Agreement, they, unlike IDFG, had not agreed to assume the
responsibility to take whatever action was necessary to reduce further loss of bighorn sheep
without adversely impacting existing domestic sheep operators. The Forest Service, beginning in
2007, began to modify the Shirts' grazing allotments. The Shirts suffered severe economic harm
from these modifications of grazing permits designed to introduce losses of bighorn sheep based
on alleged scientific information. The 'Wool Growers asked IDFG to comply with its contractual
obligations but IDFG took no action to remedy the economic harm suffered by the Shirts.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs filed with this lawsuit.
Defendants then filed a Motion to Dismiss based on their mistaken impression that the
Complaint sought damages solely because IDFG failed to block the Forest Service from
modifying the Shirts' grazing permits. IDFG's entire Motion to Dismiss rested on this mistaken
assumption; it argued that the State had no authority to stop the Forest Service from modifying
the permits.

The Plaintiffs responded, pointing to the Complaint which alleged breach of

contract and other causes of action arising from IDFG's failure not to block the Forest Service
but rather its failure to protect the Shirts from economic harm arising from the reintroduction of
the bighorn sheep/modification of the grazing permits. In reply, Defendants did not attempt to
defend their original Motion to Dismiss but instead came up with an entirely new argument. The
parties agreed, subject to the Court's approval, that Plaintiffs could respond to these new
arguments by Defendants.
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III.

LEGAL ARGUMENT
Rule 8(a)(1) requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief." The Complaint need only contain a concise statement of the facts constituting
the cause of action and a demand for relief. Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802,221 P.3d
1164 (2010). The Idaho Supreme Court noted that "under notice pleading, a party is no longer
slavishly bound to stating particular theories in its pleading." !d. at 807, 229 P.3d at 1169
(quoting Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. North Pacific Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 241, 246, 178 P.3d 606,
611 (2008». The complaint must merely state claims upon which relief may be granted, and
pleadings should be liberally construed in the interest of securing "a just, speedy and inexpensive
resolution of the case." Id. "The technical rules of pleading have long been abandoned in Idaho,
and the 'general policy behind the current rules of civil procedure is to provide every litigant
with his or her day in court.' Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 325,715 P.2d 993,995 (1986)." Id.
Plaintiffs' Complaint satisfies these requirements. It sets out the background of this dispute and
the claim that the Letter Agreement is valid and was breached. It alleges that the Shirts have
suffered economic damages and are entitled to relief. Plaintiffs need do no more.

It is important to remember that this is a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules
12(b)(1), 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(7) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Apparently the claims
under 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(7), lack of subject manner jurisdiction and failure to join an
indispensable party, have been waived by the Defendants in their most recent brief.
Accordingly, this motion must be considered under the standard for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. The Idaho Supreme Court recently stated the standard under Rule
12(b)(6):
PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS - 5
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After reviewing all facts and inferences from the record in favor of
the non-moving party, the court will ask whether a claim for relicf
has been stated. The issue is not whether the plaintiff will
ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer
evidence to support the claims.
Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670,672-73, 183 P.3d 758, 760-61 (2008).

Questions of fact or questions of credibility are not to be decided at this time. The Court
must look no further than the pleadings.

It must conclude that it is beyond doubt that the

Plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claim which would entitle them to relief
before granting such motion. Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960,895 P.2d 561 (1995).
This is not the situation in the present case and the Court accordingly must deny Defendants'
motion.

A.

Idaho Code §§ 59-1015 or 59-1016 Do Not Prohibit This Claim.

Idaho Code § 59-1015 prohibits state employees or boards from entering into contracts or
agreements creating expense or incurring any liability in excess of the appropriation made by

°

law. Section 59-1 16 says that any "indebtedness" attempted to be created in violation of the
provisions of this Chapter are void. Defendants suggest that both of these statutes implement the
provisions of Idaho Constitution, Article 7, § 13 which prohibits the withdrawal of money from
the State Treasury except in pursuance of appropriations made by law.
First of all, in this early stage of litigation and on a motion to dismiss, there is no proof
that the Idaho Legislature in its appropriations to the Department of Fish & Game in 1996 and
1997 did not provide monies to the Department to aid in bighorn sheep restoration.

The

appropriation power and these statutes apply only to money in the State Treasury. Article VII §
13.

For example, special custodial funds held in trust by the State are not subject to

PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS - 6
44561-1/ 00197188.000

\3[",

appropriation. State v. Musgrove, 84 Idaho 77, 84-87, 370 P.2d 778 (1962). Moneys received
by the agency from a federal source may not be subject to appropriation. 1982 Idaho Attorney
General Opinion 97,1912 WL156267 (Idaho A.G.). Idaho Code § 36-108 provides for a Fish
and Game Expendable Account which may be used by IDFG in the public interest and in
accordance with the policies set forth in the Fish & Game Code. See also § 36-111 (Set Aside
Account), § 36-112 (Animal Damage Control Fund), and § 36-115 (Big Game Depredation
Fund), as well as § 36-110 (Federal Account).
Next, it could be that there was no expectation that an appropriation be made in 1997
because in 1997 there was no way to know whether or not the introduction of the bighorn sheep
would cause economic damages to the Shirts or the extent of those damages. The 1996-1997
Legislature need not have appropriated money at that time. l Nor did the Letter Agreement
necessarily obligate IDFG to withdraw money from the State Treasury as there are other options
to protect the Shirts from economic harnl other than merely a monetary payout. IDFG could
have raised money through licensing, etc., sufficient to fund the amounts needed to protect the
Wool Growers without taking funds from the State Treasury or IDFG could provide alternative
grazing on State land.
If the statutes apply to invalidate the contractual obligations contained in the Letter
Agreement, as contended by Defendants, then those statutes as applied violate the United States
and Idaho Constitutions.

Amendment 14 of the U.S. Constitution proscribes deprivation of

property rights without due process. Article 1, § 10 of the U.S. Constitution denies states the
power to impair contracts. The Idaho Constitution forbids the deprivation of property rights

1 Moreover, § 59-1015 has an exception for cases of epidemic. As IDFG and the Forest Selvice claim that domestic
sheep cause an epidemic among bighorn sheep (through some mechanism not yet identified), then perhaps this
exception comes into play to take the matter out of the scope of the statute.
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without due process oflaw, Article I, § 13, and in Article I, § 16 provides that no law "impairing
the obligation of contracts shall ever be passed."
Furthennore, the case law interpreting Idaho Constitution Article VII, § 13 notes that no
set fornl of words is necessary to make appropriation by the Legislature and if an appropriation is
made payable from a specific fund (e.g., the IDFG budget), it is not necessary to appropriate a
specific sum. Herrick v. Gallet, 35 Idaho 13,204 P. 477 (1922); State ex rei. Hansen v. Parsons,
57 Idaho 775, 69 P.2d 788 (1937).
Finally, Defendants failed to mention the Section following Sections 59-1015 and 1016.
It provides that any person violating the provisions of those sections shall be deemed guilty of a

misdemeanor and disqualified from holding state office or being employed by the state. If the
1997 Letter Agreement violated the statute, then presumably the Attorney General's office
should have prosecuted the person -signing the Agreement on behalf of the Idaho Department of
Fish & Game. There is no evidence of this in the record and thus no indication of any violations
of Sections 1015 or 1016.
B.

The Court Cannot Take Notice of Any Document Outside of the Pleadings.
A 12(b)(6) motion looks only at the pleadings to detennine
whether a claim for relief has been stated.

Youngv. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104,44P.3d 1157, 1159(2002).
In Hellickson v. Jenkins, the Idaho Court of Appeals discussed judicial notice in the
context of a 12(b) motion to dismiss, stating:
The only facts which a court may properly consider on a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim are those appearing in the
complaint, supplemented by such facts as the court may properly
judicially notice. Cohen v. United States, 129 F.2d 733 (8th
Cir.1942). However, a trial court, in considering a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, has no right to hear evidence; and since judicial
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notice is merely a substitute for the conventional method of taking
evidence to establish facts, the court has no right to take judicial
notice of anything, with the possible exception offacts of common
knowledge which controvert averments of the complaint.
118 Idaho 273, 276, 796 P.2d 150, 153 (Ct.App. 1990) (emphasis in original). See also Fleming
v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 922 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1990) (comparing a 12(b)(6) motion to a Rule

56 motion and finding "the one fundamental difference between the two motions lies in the scope
of the court's consideration.

The grounds for a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal comprise only the

pleadings and no more") (cited with approval by the Idaho Supreme Court in Taylor v.
McNichols, 2010 WL 3448851 (September 3,2010)).

C.

Plaintiffs Have Stated a Claim Under Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(S).

The last signature on the 1997 Letter Agreement was obtained on March 4, 1997.
Twenty days later, on March 24, 1997, the Idaho Legislature enacted Idaho Code § 36106(e)(5)(D) defining the policy of the State ofIdaho as recognizing existing sheep or livestock
operations in the area of any bighorn sheep transport or relocation "and accepting the potential
risk of disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep when they invade domestic livestock or
sheep operations." What does that statute mean? Does it mean, as the Wool Growers assert, that
the Legislature approved IDFG's promise that it would protect the Wool Growers against
economic harm?

The legislative history which will be developed during the course of the

lawsuit will be instructive. Certainly the Wool Growers should have the opportunity to develop
the evidence.
Idaho Code § 36-1 06( e)( 5)(E) was recent! y enacted and goes beyond subsection D. It
requires the Department to develop a state management plan for bighorn sheep which "considers
as part of the plan" the current domestic sheep grazing allotments.

Does the statute in
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conjunction with the preceding subsection require IDFG to take action to protect the Wool
Growers? Certainly it seems to and certainly Plaintiffs' allegations in their Complaint entitle
them to assert the statutory claim.
Defendants make an unfounded claim that Plaintiffs assert that they can avoid responding
to the Motion to Dismiss by simply arguing that legislative intent is a factual issue that will be
verified by testimony of the relevant witnesses. (Defendants' Reply Memorandum at 6.) While
all that issue is in reality moot at least on this Motion to Dismiss, the Court should note that this
is not what Plaintiffs assert at all. They assert that the statute, as enacted and as amended,
requires IDFG to protect domestic sheep operations from economic harm caused by the
introduction of bighorn sheep. They should have the right to attempt to prove that claim by such
means as looking at the legislative history. They have no obligation to prove their claim on a
motion to dismiss. Defendants are obviously afraid to allow Plaintiffs to obtain evidence on the
intent of the Legislature regarding IDFG's statutory responsibilities, but they cannot foreclose
Plaintiffs from doing so merely by asserting their own interpretation of the statute.
The Department of Fish & Game is authorized to sell licenses and tags and sell
pUblications and materials and raise money to fund programs and repay obligations. See, e.g.,
Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(8). Section 36-106(e)(5)(E) requires the Department ofFish & Game to
develop a "self-sustaining" population of bighorn sheep in Idaho and requires the Defendant to
consider as part of that plan the sheep grazing allotments. Self-sustaining means that the plan for
the bighorn sheep, considering Plaintiffs' grazing allotments, must require the Department to
consider the Plaintiffs' rights.

While Plaintiffs continue their assertion that documents outside

of the pleadings should not be considered by this Court, if the Court does consider any of the
legislative materials submitted by Defendants, it should note that under the Statement of
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Purpose/Fiscal Note for Senate Bill 1175 that the sponsors stated that while "there wiII be an
expected impact to the Department of Fish & Game, however, because of the unknowns as to if
and when any actions may be required the amount is unknown at this time." CeI1ainly this
statement, if it could be considered, strongly suggests that the Legislature intended the
Department to expend monies from its budget to accomplish the purposes set out in the
legislation, including protecting the Plaintiffs from economic harm caused by bighorn sheep
reintroduction and later modification of grazing leases.
Plaintiffs are not asking the Court to simply craft equitable remedies for IDFG's
violations.

They are asking the Court to enforce contractual and statutory rights.

In the

alternative, they are asking the Court to require IDFG to comply with the statute; since IDFG has
taken no action the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act do not apply. But under
Idaho Code § 7-303, the Court may require IDFG to act if there is no "plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law," if IDFG refuses to comply with its obligations
under the Letter Agreement and the statute. Plaintiffs assert that § 36-106(e) requires IDFG to
do more than develop "best management practices" and they should be allowed to convince the
fact finder of this.

D. The Cause of Action for Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Remains Viable.

The covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies to all contracts. Lettunich v. Key

Bank Nat. Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362,368, 109 P.3d 1104, 1110 (2005).
Any action by either party which violates, nullifies or significantly
impairs any benefit of the ... contract is a violation of the impliedin-law covenant.

Metcalfv. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 627, 778 P.2d 744, 749 (1989).
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The covenant requires the parties to perfonn, in good faith, the
obligations contained in their agreement, and a violation occurs
when either patiy violates, qualifies, or significantly impairs any
benefit or right of the other party under the contract - whether
express or implied.

Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 243, 108 PJd 380, 390 (2005).

All that

Plaintiffs are asking is that IDFG act in good faith to live up to the 1997 promises.
In Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 399, 111 P.3d 73, 84
(2005), the Idaho Supreme Court noted that "the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
exists in all contracts in Idaho." Plaintiffs have not been able to find a case which excludes the
State or State entities from this sweeping holding. See also Huyett v. Idaho State University, 140
Idaho 904, 104 P.3d 946 (2004)(applying the implied covenant to Idaho State University, a State
institution).
Defendants do not appear to contest that the 1997 Letter Agreement is a contract. There
was an offer, acceptance and consideration. The Wool Growers perfonned their obligation by
withdrawing their objections to the re-introduction of the bighorn sheep. IDFG and the State are
now attempting to nullify the benefit of the contract by asserting they have no ability or
obligation to protect the Wool Growers. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing obligates
the parties to a contract to cooperate with each other and to perform the obligations imposed by
their agreements. Huyett, 140 Idaho at 909, 104 P.3d at 951. IDFG has refused to cooperate
with the \Vool Growers to protect them from the negative effects caused by the reintroduction of
bighorn sheep. They are refusing to perfonn the obligations imposed by that Letter Agreement.
Thus they have violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and this cause of
action remains viable.
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E. The Estoppel Claims Remain Viable.
First of all, Plaintiffs never expressly or impliedly conceded in their original Response
Brief that dismissal of any claims were warranted. Instead, Plaintiffs noted that the primary
basis that Defendants had suggested for dismissal of the estoppel and breach of the covenant and
good faith and fair dealing causes of action was the fact that IDFG had not represented that it
would block the Forest Service from modifying the Shirts' grazing permits. As noted in that
Response Brief, Plaintiffs asserted that their allegations in the Complaint regarding the
agreement made by IDFG were sufficient to state a claim for relief for the causes of action listed
in the Complaint. Plaintiffs noted that IDFG had made a promise upon which Plaintiffs had
relied to their detriment and did not fulfill the obligations of the contract. This was sufficient to
preclude dismissal of these causes of action. Defendants have now come back to argue that
despite the Letter Agreement and the 1997 statutory enactment, there really was no enforceable
agreement after all.

This assertion has already been responded to earlier in this brief and

Plaintiffs will not repeat that argument.
The other argument suggested by Defendants in their Reply Brief was that protection of
the Wool Growers against economic harm was not within the contemplation of the parties
signing the Letter. By definition, this assertion defeats Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as the
question what was in the contemplation of the parties is a question of fact to be decided by the
fact finder upon consideration of the testimony and the evidence. A motion to dismiss is not the
proper procedure for deciding that issue.
The real issue is whether estoppel applies in this situation. Generally estoppel cannot be
applied to a governmental agency acting in its sovereign capacity. State v. Adams, 90 Idaho 195,
201, 409 P.2d 415, 419 (1965). Estoppel, however, may be applied to a governmental agency
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acting in its proprietary or commercial capacity. See Curry v. Ada County Highway Dist., 103
Idaho 818, 654 P.2d 911 (1982) (applying equitable estoppel to a highway district due to its
proprietary nature); Dalton Highway Dist. of Kootenai County v. Sowder, 88 Idaho 556,401 P.2d
813 (1965) (same). See also Sagewillow v. Idaho Dept. of Water Res., 138 Idaho 831, 70 P.3d
669 (2003) (while noting that equitable estoppel may not ordinarily be invoked against a
government agency functioning in a sovereign capacity, nevertheless considering the elements of
equitable estoppel as applied to the Department of the Water Resources). Justice McQuade
noted in Dalton Highway District that the reluctance to invoke the doctrine of estoppel against a
public officer "is more especially true with reference to their acts and conduct in governmental
and purely municipal affairs. It has never been held with the same strictness in reference to
purely business and proprietary matters and transactions." 88 Idaho 556,561,401 P.2d 813, 815
(quoting concurrence in Boise City v. Wilkinson, 16 Idaho 150, 102 P. 148 (1909».
Plaintiffs submit that IDFG was acting in a proprietary or commercial capacity when it
was negotiating with the Wool Growers about the reintroduction of bighorn sheep. IDFG was
interested in bringing back bighorn sheep in the Hells Canyon area for tourism and hunting
purposes and was willing and anxious to cut a deal with the Wool Growers to convince the Wool
Growers to withdraw their opposition. The Wool Growers made a business decision as well,
agreeing to withdraw their opposition in return for a guarantee they would be protected
economically by the IDFG. If IDFG was acting in a sovereign/governmental capacity, it would
have had no reason or necessity to cut a deal with individual commercial interests such as
IWGA. If a State agency is acting in its sovereign capacity, it does not cut deals with those
affected by its decisionmaking. Only when a State agency acts outside of its sovereign capacity
must it strike deals with affected commercial interests. Thus, estoppel does apply here as IDFG
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was acting in a business and proprietary manner. See also Kelso & Invin, PA v. State Ins. Fund,
134 Idaho 130, 138, 997 P.2d 591, 599 (2000) ("therefore, because the SIF is undisputedly a
public agency acting in a proprietary capacity, the doctrine of equitable estoppel would nonnally
be applicable to the SIF").
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit and the Idaho Court of Appeals have each suggested or held
that estoppel may be applied against the government even in its sovereign capacity under certain
limited circumstances. In Brandt v. State of Idaho, 126 Idaho 101,878 P.2d 800 (Ct.App. 1994),
Judge Lansing writing for a unanimous court noted that the control of penal institutions and
parole are functions of the state as a sovereign and a claim of estoppel would ordinarily be
precluded. She went on, however:

Brandt contends, however, that in some circumstances the
government's conduct is such that estoppel does apply even when
the government is acting as a sovereign. He refers us to Johnson v.
Williford, 682 F.2d 868 (9th Cir.1982), where a convicted felon,
sentenced to a tenn of ten years without possibility of parole, was
mistakenly granted parole and lived at large for fifteen months.
Despite his ineligibility, the prisoner in Johnson, was considered
for parole on eight separate occasions and was eventually released
on parole after a full hearing. When the mistake was discovered
fifteen months later, the parole was revoked. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the interests of justice and fair play
required that the government be estopped from then denying the
inmate's parole eligibility, stating:
'[W]here justice and fair play require it' estoppel will be applied
against the government, even when the government acts in its
sovereign capacity if the effects of estoppel do not unduly damage
the public interest.

Id. at 871 citing United States v. Lazy Fe Ranch, 481 F.2d 985,
989 (9th Cir.l973). See also United States v. Wharton, 514 F.2d
406 (9th Cir.1975).
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We note that in addition to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
numerous other jurisdictions have allowed estoppel to be applied
against the govemment in its sovereign capacity under limited
circumstances. However, whatever merit there may be in this
argument for application of estoppel against the govemment, we
may not address it here, for Brandt did not present this issue to the
magistrate.

Plaintiffs are raising the issue here and estoppel should be applied to IDFG.
The Idaho Supreme Court has also suggested that equitable estoppel may be applied to
prevent injustice: "This Court has held that the doctrine of estoppel may be used against a
highway district to prevent it from taking a position inconsistent with previous actions, in order
to prevent manifest injustice. Murtaugh Highway Dist. v. Twin Falls Highway Dis!., 65 Idaho
260, 268, 142 P.2d 579-82 (1943)." City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Ind. Hwy. Dis!., 126 Idaho
145, 151,879 P.2d 1078, 1084 (1994).
Here, we have exactly that situation: IDFG is attempting to take a position inconsistent
with its previous actions in promising the Wool Growers certain protections in return for the
Wool Growers withdrawing their opposition to the reintroduction of the bighorns. Now that the
bighorns are back in Idaho, IDFG wishes to conveniently forget its promises. This is the very
definition of manifest injustice, and estoppel should be applied against the IDFG to prevent such
manifest injustice. Accordingly, this would be an appropriate time to apply estoppel against a
State entity.
Equitable estoppel operates to bar the assertion of a defense. Peters v. Gilead Sciences,

Inc., 533 F.3d 594, 599 (7th Cir. 2008). The Wool Growers have pleaded equitable estoppel to
bar the State from asserting a defense to their duty to comply with the clear promises in the 1997
Letter Agreement. Equitable estoppel requires a concealment or misrepresentation of fact; that
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the party asserting estoppel not have knowledge of the true facts; and that the misrepresentation
must be relied on to the party's detriment. Tommerup v. Albertson's, Inc., 101 Idaho 1,5,607
P.2d 1055, 1059 (1980); Ogden v. Griffith, 2010 WL2560045 (June 28,2010). Those elements
are met here: IDFG misrepresented facts to the Wool Growers in 1997. The Wool Growers did
not and could not know the truth - that IDFG would asseli the Agreement was void. The Wool
Growers relied on the misrepresentation by IDFG to their detriment as they withdrew their
opposition to the reintroduction of the bighorns and allowed the reintroduction to occur.
Defendants also suggest that the Wool Growers are attempting to use equitable estoppel
as a "sword" to recover money damages rather than a "shield." Again, Defendants are mistaken
or are trying to distract the Court from the real issue. The Wool Growers are not using equitable
estoppel as an independent basis for a damage claim, they are asserting that Defendants should
be equitably estopped from denying their obligations under the 1997 Letter Agreement. Just as
in Odgen v. Griffith, where the Idaho Supreme Court found equitable estoppel was an
appropriate ground for avoidance of the statute of frauds in a settlement agreement dealing with
a conveyance of an interest in real estate, 2010 WL2J60045 at *6, equitable estoppel is an
appropriate ground in this case for avoidance of any post hoc technical defenses to enforcement
of the Letter Agreement. As in Ogden v. Griffith, IDFG's actions were intended to and did
convey the impression to the Wool Growers that they had an agreement. It is uncontroverted
that the Wool Growers did not know IDFG could not enter into such an agreement (allegedly),
and IDFG concealed this fact. It is also uncontroverted that the Wool Growers reasonably relied
on IDFG's representations to its prejudice.
Accordingly, IDFG should be estopped from raising a defense that it need not comply
with its contractual agreements.
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Quasi estoppel "precludes a party from asserting to another's disadvantage, a right
inconsistent with a position previously taken by him." Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137
Idaho 352, 357, 48 P.3d 1241, 1246 (2002). IDFG previously took the position that the Wool
Growers could rely on IDFG's promise to protect them from economic harm arising from the
reintroduction of bighorn sheep.

IDFG now should be precluded from asserting a contrary

position where it would be unconscionable to do so. Id.
The doctrine of quasi estoppel requires that IDFG must have gained some advantage or
caused a disadvantage to the Wool Growers; induced the Wool Growers to change their position
to their detriment; and, it must be unconscionable to allow IDFG to maintain a position which is
inconsistent from a position from which it has already derived a benefit. See, e.g., Tommerup,

supra; Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 138 P.3d 310 (2006). To prevail on a quasi estoppel
theory, the claimant must show:

(1)

the offending party took a different position than his or her
original position, and
(2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage or caused a
disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was
induced to change positions; or (c) it would be
unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an
inconsistent position from one he or she has already derived a
benefit or acquiesced in.

Terrazas v. Blaine County, 147 Idaho 193, 200 n.3, 207 P.3d 169, 176 n.3 (2009). To prove
quasi estoppel, it is not necessary to show detrimental reliance; instead, there must be evidence
that it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to assert a contrary position.

Arkoosh, supra.

IDFG represented to the Wool Growers that it would protect them against

economic harm in 1997; it is unconscionable for IDFG to take a contrary position now that the
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Wool Growers changed their position on opposing the bighorn reintroduction and economic
harm has occurred.
Finally, Plaintiffs have asserted a promissory estoppel claim against the Defendants.
In order to demonstrate promissory estoppel, three elements must be met "(1) the detriment
suffered in reliance was substantial in an economic sense; (2) substantial loss to the promisee
acting in reliance was or should have been foreseeable by the promisor; and (3) the promisee
must have acted reasonably in justifiable reliance on the promise as made."

Gillespie v.

Mountain Park Estates, LLC, 138 Idaho 27, 29,56 P.3d 1277, 1279 (2002).
In the Gillespie case, the Court upheld a claim for promissory estoppel where the
Complaint contained allegations that (1) sellers had induced the Gillespies to sign a contract by
promising to repurchase the lot without a penalty if the Gillespies decided not to build; (2) sellers
broke this promise to repurchase; and (3) as a result, the Gillespies were forced to sell the lot at a
$5,000 loss.

Gillespie, 138 Idaho at 30, 56 P.3d at 1280. The Court held that these facts

sufficiently alleged the three-part test for promissory estoppel. In our case, the Wool Growers
have alleged that IDFG induced the Wool Growers to withdraw their opposition to the bighorn
reintroduction by promising to protect the Wool Growers from economic harm; IDFG broke this
promise; as a result the Wool Growers have suffered economic damages.
The Wool Growers therefore have asserted that there was an underlying promise between
IDFG and the Wool Growers.

There is thus no claim that promissory estoppel serves as a

substitute for an agreement. Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass 'n, 141 Idaho 362, 367, 109 P .3d
1104, 1109 (2005); Grover v. Wadsworth, 147 Idaho 60, 205 P Jd 1196 (2009).
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F.

The 'Wool Growers Are Entitled to Fees Under Idaho Code § 12-117.

The Wool Growers contend that they are entitled to an award of fees for defending
against the original Motion to Dismiss as that motion and memorandum were not well-grounded
in law or fact.
They recognize that IDFG's new arguments are more legitimate and are not sanctionable.
Similarly, it is beyond cavil that the Wool Growers have a reasonable basis in law and fact for
their Complaint and for their defense against Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The issues raised
by the Wool Growers, even if the Court does not find in their favor, are certainly complicated
and involve close questions of law. In such circumstances, the Idaho Supreme Court has refused
to allow attorney fees under § 12-117. See, e.g., KGF Development, LLC v. City of Ketchum,
2010 WL2927175 (July 28,2010). The Supreme Court has noted that the requirement ofIdaho
Code § 12-117 that the party acted without a reasonable basis is similar to the requirement of
Idaho Code § 12-121 that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably
or without foundation. See Total Success Investments, LLC v. Ada County Highway Dist., 148
Idaho 688, 704, 227 P.3d 942, 949 (Ct.App. 2010) (quoting Ada County Highway Dist. v. Total

Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 372, 179 P.3d 323,335 (2008». The Wool Growers'
suit is not frivolous or without foundation.
III.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court to deny Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. They
request that the Court grant them attorneys' fees under

I.e.

§ 12-117 for time spent defending

against Defendants' original Motion to Dismiss arguments. They also request that, if the Court
determines to grant some or all of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the Court allow them leave to
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amend their Complaint to set out in greater detail any causes of action which the Court believes
need to be modified.

th

DATED this 13 day of September, 2010.

KADING, TURNBOW
, CHARTERED
Ti,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
th

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 13 day of September, 2010, a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing document was served as follows:

f1

State ofIdaho, Office ofthe Attorney General
Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General
Clive J. Strong, Deputy Attorney General,
Chief of Natural Resources Division
Steven W. Strack, Deputy Attorney General
p.o. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile (208) 854-8071
Overnight Mail
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADAMS

IDAHO WOOL GROWERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho corporation,
individually and on behalf of its members;
FRANK SHIRTS, JR., individually and as a
member of the Idaho Wool Growers
Association; RONALD W. SHIRTS, LESLIE
SHIRTS and JOHN T. SHIRTS, individually
and d/b/a! SHIRTS BROTHERS SHEEP and
as members of the Idaho Wool Growers
Association,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO; IDAHO FISH & GAME
COMMISSION; IDAHO DEPARTMENT
OF FISH & GAME; CAL GROEN, Director
ofIdaho Department ofFish and Game,
Defendants.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1997 the Idaho Department ofFish and Game ("IDFG"), along with several other
public and private entities, sent a letter to the Idaho Wool Growers Association ("IWGA"). The
letter was printed on the letterhead of the United States Forest Service ("Forest Service"). The
signatories to the Letter recognized existing domestic sheep operations in or adjacent to Hells
Canyon and accepted the potential risk of disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep. In
addition, the Letter states IDFG and the other state wildlife agencies will "take whatever action is
necessary to reduce further losses of bighorn sheep without adversely impacting existing
domestic sheep operators."
For purposes of the present motion to dismiss, the State ofIdaho, Idaho Fish and Game
Commission, IDFG, and IDFG Director Cal Groen (collectively "IDFG") have assumed the truth
of the Plaintiffs' allegation that the Letter was an agreement. By making such assumption for
purposes of the present motion, however, IDFG does not waive the right "to contest that the 1997
Letter Agreement is a contract." PIs.' Supp. Resp. at 12.1
In its original memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss, IDFG demonstrated, as a

matter oflaw, that if the Letter is an agreement then the Forest Service is an indispensable party
to determination of the Plaintiffs' allegations that: (1) the Forest Service, by modifying certain
grazing permits belonging to Plaintiffs, "reneged on its commitment in the Letter Agreement,"
and (2) that IDFG is legally liable for economic losses arising from such modifications because it
"took no action to block the Forest Service from modifying the grazing allotments ... and took
insufficient action to prevent [the Plaintiffs] from being harmed from these decisions."

1 References to the "Plaintiffs Supplemental Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss" appear herein
as "Pis.' Supp. Resp.," while references to "Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Request for
Attorney Fees" appear herein as "Pis.' Resp."
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Amended Complaint ~~ 24-25. Contrary to the assertions in Plaintiffs' supplemental response,
IDFG has not waived its argument that the Forest Service is an indispensable party. On its face,
the Complaint claims that the Letter is a contract and that Plaintiffs' alleged harm was caused by
the Forest Service's breach of the contract. Given those allegations, IDFG maintains that the
Forest Service is an indispensable party for the resolution of Plaintiffs' claims.
In their response brief, Plaintiffs disavowed any allegation that the "Letter Agreement"
was intended to prohibit the Forest Service from cancelling grazing permits. Rather, Plaintiffs
asserted that the 1997 Letter was an indemnification agreement obligating IDFG to reimburse the
Plaintiffs for economic harm arising from the Forest Service's modification of the grazing
permits, even though such modification was not itself a breach of the 1997 Letter. IDFG replied
that such allegations must be dismissed as a matter of law, since such an agreement would
violate Idaho constitutional and statutory provisions prohibiting the state from assuming
unfunded liabilities.
Plaintiffs now assert that IDFG's reply brief raised "an entirely new argument" and
Plaintiffs have filed a supplemental response. IDFG does not agree that supplemental briefing is
necessary, especially since Plaintiffs' supplemental brief is not confined to the allegedly-new
issues raised in IDFG's reply. Nonetheless, IDFG is compelled to reply to the Plaintiffs'
supplemental brief.
For purposes of this brief, IDFG continues to assume, for purposes of argument only, that
the 1997 Letter is an enforceable agreement, and demonstrates that, even with such assumption
in place, all claims based on the 1997 Letter must be dismissed. Given such assumptions, it is
unnecessary to reply in detail to Plaintiffs' estoppel theories: for the reasons explained in IDFG's
opening brief, all claims based on equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, promissory estoppel, and
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breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing must be dismissed for the same
reasons that claims based on the 1997 "Letter Agreement" must be dismissed. For the reasons
stated herein, claims asserting that Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5) requires IDFG to reimburse
Plaintiffs for economic losses must also be dismissed.
Given the briefing that has already occurred, IDFG will reply as succinctly as possible,
and herein adopts by reference its earlier briefing to clarify that IDFG does not waive any of its
earlier-asserted bases for dismissal.

ARGUMENT
1.

Plaintiffs have failed to identify any contractual provision obligating IDFG to
compensate Plaintiffs for economic losses arising from the independent actions of
the Forest Service.
Plaintiffs make the extraordinary claim that the State ofIdaho, by signing the 1997

Letter, "agreed to indemnify Plaintiffs for any modifications the Forest Service made to
Plaintiffs' allotments," PIs. Resp. at 9, despite the fact that the Forest Service's action was not
prohibited by the terms of the Letter,2 and despite Plaintiffs' concession that the grazing leases
were neither contracts nor property rights, but only grazing privileges revocable at the discretion
of the Forest Service. Swim v. Bergland, 696 F.2d 712, 719 (9th Cir. 1983) (grazing permit may
be withdrawn at any time without payment of compensation).3
Given the extraordinary nature ofthe Plaintiffs' claims, they were obligated to identify
"language imposing indemnity [that is] clear [and] unequivocal." 41 Am Jur 2d Indemnity § 7

See PIs.' Resp. at 7 ("Plaintiffs are not claiming that the Forest Service breached the Agreement").
The nature of the economic damage alleged by Plaintiffs remains elusive for other reasons as well. Prior
to the cancellation of the grazing leases, the Plaintiffs were obliged to purchase their forage from the Forest Service
at fair market value. 36 C.F.R. § 222.50. Yet, Plaintiffs contend that upon cancellation of the grazing leases IDFG
became contractually obligated to "provid( e] feed to the Plaintiffs in lieu of grazing allotments ...." PIs.' Resp. at
11. Plaintiffs fail to explain why IDFG would enter into an agreement obligating IDFG to assume the cost of
providing forage for Plaintiffs' sheep when, prior to cancellation of the grazing permits, such expense was borne by
the Plaintiffs.
2

3
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(2010). Yet, the Amended Complaint does not identify any unequivocal indemnification
language in the 1997 Letter, but instead cites only the following provision: "[IDFG] will also
take whatever action is necessary to reduce further losses of bighorn sheep without adversely
impacting existing domestic sheep operators." Amended Complaint ~ 19. Plaintiffs allege that
the intent of such provision was that IDFG "would take whatever action was necessary so that
domestic sheep operations and operators would not be harmed as a result of the reintroduction of
Bighorn Sheep in Hells Canyon." Amended Complaint ~ 20.
Plaintiffs assert that the above allegation is sufficient because it "sets out the background
of this dispute and the claim that the Letter Agreement is valid and was breached ... Plaintiffs
need do no more." PIs.' Supp. Resp. at 5. While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual
allegations, "it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).4 "[T]he tenet that a court must
accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.
Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice." Id. "[O]n a motion to dismiss, courts 'are not bound to accept as
true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. 550

u.s. 544,555 (2007), quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,286 (1986).
Here, Plaintiffs' assertion that the intent of the "take whatever action is necessary"
language was to require indemnification for economic losses is a bald legal conclusion with no
factual support. It is undisputed that the 1997 Letter does not set forth clear and unequivocal
indemnification language, and the Amended Complaint fails to set forth any facts suggesting the

4 The cited Supreme Court rulings were interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), which is identical to
subparagraph (2) ofIRCP 8(a)(1). In applying the IRCP, Idaho courts may refer to authorities construing identical
federal rules for guidance. Herrera v. Estay, 146 Idaho 674, 678, 201 P.3d 647,651 (2009).
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existence of another agreement that includes indemnification language. "A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1949
(emphasis added). "[W]here the well-pleadedfacts do not pennit the cOUlt to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not 'show[n)'-'that the
pleader is entitled to relief. ,,, Id. at 1950 (emphasis added). Here, the facts set forth in the
Amended Complaint do not support the inference that IDFG agreed to indemnify the Plaintiffs
against economic loss, particularly losses caused solely by the actions of a third party outside the
controlofIDFG. The 1997 Letter's complete lack of indemnification language can be
determined on a motion to dismiss, because "[ w]hen the terms of a contract are unambiguous,
interpretation of the contract and its legal effect are questions oflaw." Iron Eagle Development,
LLC v: Quality Design Systems, Inc., 138 Idaho 487, 491, 65 PJd 509, 513 (2003).

2.

Assuming for purposes of argument only that the 1997 Letter was an
indemnification contract, it would be void as a matteroflaw.
Even if the Court were to conclude that the "whatever action" language applied to

domestic sheep operators, and that such language was intended to obligate IDFG to indemnify
the Plaintiffs' against financial loss, the Court must still dismiss the Amended Complaint
because under Idaho law any contract signed by a state officer that imposes a financial liability in
"excess of the appropriation made by law for the specific purpose or purposes for which such
expenditure is to be made" must be declared void. Idaho Code § 59-1015. An "appropriation"
requires "authority from the legislature expressly given in legal form, to the proper officers, to
pay from the public moneys a specified sum, and no more, for a specified purpose, and no
other." Herrick v. Gallet, 35 Idaho 13, 17,204 P. 477, 478 (1922), quoting Epperson v. Howell,
28 Idaho 338, 343, 154 P. 621, 623 (1916).
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Plaintiffs do not deny that agreements by state officers purporting to create financial
liability without an accompanying appropriation are void pursuant to Idaho Constitution Article
VII, § 13 and Idaho Code §§ 59-1015 and 59-1016. 5 Instead, Plaintiffs seek to create a factual
issue by asserting (1) "there is no proof that the Idaho Legislature in its appropriations to [IDFG]
in 1996 and 1997 did not provide monies to the Department to aid in bighorn sheep restoration,"
and (2) that IDFG may possess "special custodial funds" that are not subject to appropriation.
PIs.' Supp. Resp. at 6-7. Both issues raised by Plaintiffs are easily resolvable as a matter oflaw
without further factual inquiry.6
With few exceptions, money is appropriated by the Legislature only for the immediately
following fiscal year. The IDFG appropriation bill for 1996 appropriated specified amounts to
IDFG "to be expended for the designated programs ... from the listed funds for the period July

1, 1996, through June 30, 1997." 1996 Idaho Sess. L. 473. Likewise, the 1997 appropriation bill
provided that all appropriated funds were to be expended "from the listed funds for the period
July 1, 1997, through June 30, 1998." 1997 Idaho Sess. L. 868. Thus, as a matter oflaw, any
money appropriated in 1996 and 1997 had be expended in the corresponding fiscal years, and
would not be available to pay the current contractual liabilities alleged by Plaintiffs.
As for the various funds available to IDFG, all are subject to annual appropriation; IDFG
does not possess any custodial funds exempt from appropriation. Money from sale of licenses

5 Plaintiffs allege that the Attorney General's failure to prosecute the officer signing the 1997 Letter
suggests that the Attorney General recognizes the Letter as a valid agreement. Quite the contrary: the lack of
prosecution simply means: (1) the Attorney General does not consider the Letter to be a contract, and (2) nothing in
the Letter indicates an intent to assume liability for financial losses by sheep operators.
6 Plaintiffs also assert that the "Legislature need not have appropriated money" in 1997 because "in 1997
there was no way to know whether or not the introduction ofthe bighorn sheep would cause economic damages to
the Shirts or the extent of those damages." Pis. SUpp. Resp. at 7. This assertion is directly contrary to the Supreme
Court's holding that the language in Idaho Code § 59-10 15 requiring liabilities to be covered by an "existing"
appropriation must "apply to the time of incurring the expense of liability rather than to the time the particular bill or
claim is presented for payment." State ex reI. Hansen v. Parsons, 57 Idaho 775, 790, 69 P.2d 788, 794 (1937),
partially overruled on other grounds, State ex reI. Williams v. Margrave, 84 Idaho 77,87,370 P.2d 778, 784 (1962).

\ 5,\
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and permits is deposited in the fish and game account, which is "appropriated in the state
treasury," Idaho Code § 36-107, making it subject to Idaho Constitution Article VII, § 13 ("[ n]o
money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations made by law"). The
same is true for all other accounts in the state treasury held for the benefit of fish and game. See
Idaho Code § 36-108 (money in fish and game expendable trust account "may be appropriated to
carry out the terms or conditions of such donation, bequest, devise, or grant"); § 36-109
(principal from donations, bequests, devises and grants in fish and game nonexpendable" trust
account "are not subject to appropriation" but "[i]nterest earned on investment of moneys in the
account are subject to appropriation"); § 36-110 ("[m]oneys in the fish and game federal account
are subject to appropriation"); § 36-111. ("[m]oneys in the fish and game set-aside account and
the feeding account ... are subject to appropriation"); § 36-112 (moneys in the "animal damage
control fund ... are subj ect to appropriation"); § 36-115 ("principal amount in the
[nonexpendable big game depredation] fund shall not be appropriated, but only the interest
earned on investment of the moneys in the fund shall be available for appropriation").
In sum, at the time IDFG signed the 1997 Letter, there was no corresponding
appropriation of funds to pay the future and inchoate liabilities allegedly assumed by IDFG.
Even if Plaintiffs were successful in proving that the 1997 Letter was intended to function as an
indemnification agreement, the Court could not enforce such agreement since it would be void
under the terms ofIdaho Constitution Article VII, § 13 and Idaho Code §§ 59-1015 and 59-1016.
Thus, there is no set of facts under which Plaintiffs may prevail, and dismissal of all claims
based on the 1997 Letter is warranted.
Such a result does not, as Plaintiffs assert, violate due process or constitutional provisions
prohibiting impairment of contractual obligations. PIs.' Supp. Resp. at 7-8 (citing u.s. Const.

\~o
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art. I, § 10 and Idaho Const. art. I, §§ l3, 16). Plaintiffs cite no authorities in support of this
proposition, and for good reason: constitutional prohibitions against impairment of contracts
protect only those contractual obligations already in existence atthe time the disputed law is
enacted. Lindstrom v. Dist. Bd. of Health, 109 Idaho 956, 961,712 P2d 657, 662 (Ct. App.
1985). Here, the provisions ofIdaho Constitution Article VII, § 13 and Idaho Code §§ 59-1015
and 59-1016 predate the 1997 Letter Agreement by decades and must be enforced by this Court.
3.

Plaintiffs have failed to identify any statutory provision obligating IDFG to
compensate Plaintiffs for economic losses arising from the independent actions of
the Forest Service.
Plaintiffs have failed to identify any Idaho Code provision requiring IDFG to indemnify

Plaintiffs against economic harm arising from the Forest Service's cancellation of grazing
permits. Plaintiffs assert that "[t ]hey have no ob ligation to prove their [statutory] claim on a
motion to dismiss" because they are entitled "to obtain evidence on the intent of the Legislature" .
and "should be allowed to convince the fact finder" of the intent behind § 36-106(e)(5). PIs.'
Supp. Resp. at 10, 11.
Legislative intent is not a question of fact for the jury: the "interpretation and application
of a statute ... are pure questions oflaw." Callies v. O'Neal, 147 Idaho 841, 847, 216 P.3d 130,
136 (2009). Pure questions oflaw are properly raised in a motion to dismiss, since further
factual development is irrelevant to determination of the issue. Statutory interpretation "begins
with the literal words of a statute, which are the best guide to determining legislative intent."
KGF Development, LLC v. City of Ketchum, 236 P.3d 1284,1288 (Idaho 2010). Here,
Plaintiffs have failed to identify any statutory provision explicitly obligating IDFG to indemnify
the Plaintiffs against economic losses. Instead, they allege that the 1997 Letter embodies such
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intent, and that the legislature "gave its stamp of approval" to the 1997 Letter "through
enactment ofIdaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D). PIs.' Supp. Resp. at 2-3.
Nothing in the plain language ofIdaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D) suggests that the
Legislature understood the 1997 Letter to be an agreement indemnifying domestic sheep
operators for economic losses arising from reintroduction of bighorn sheep. First, the original
version of § 36-106(e)(5)(D), as adopted in 1997, provided that agencies desiring to transplant
bighorns must provide a "written letter" recognizing existing domestic sheep operators and
stating that "the potential risk if any, of disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep when the
same invade domestic livestock or sheep operations is accepted." 1997 Idaho Sess. L. 863,865.
If the legislature had intended to require IDFG to reimburse domestic sheep operators for
financial losses, it would have done more then require the sending of a "letter."
Second, § 36-1 06( e)( 5)(D), as adopted in 1997, did not ratify the "whatever action"
language that Plaintiffs allege is the source of the obligation to reimburse Plaintiffs for financial
losses. Rather, it only required that the letter recognize existing sheep operations and accept the
risk of disease transmission to transplanted bighorn sheep. Id. Plaintiffs have not alleged that
the acceptance of risk language in the 1997 Letter created an obligation to reimburse Plaintiffs
for financial loss - indeed, any such allegation would be inconsistent with the Plaintiffs'
assertion that the Forest Service did not breach the 1997 Letter, since the "acceptance of risk"
language applied to all signatories. Any allegation by Plaintiffs that the Legislature's ratification
of the acceptance of risk language "approved IDFG's promise that it would protect the Wool
Growers against economic hann," PIs.' Supp. Resp. at 9, cannot be reconciled with its allegation
that the Forest Service's modification of the grazing pennits was not a breach of this same
proVISIon.
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Third, if the 1997 Letter was an agreement to indemnify Plaintiffs, then such agreement
was void under the terms ofIdaho Code §§ 56-1015 and 56-1016 (see supra and IDFG reply
brief), and the legislative ratification would be ineffective, for Idaho Constitution Article III,
§ 19, prohibits any "local or special laws ... [IJegalizing as against the state the unauthorized act
or invalid act of any officer." See State ex reI. Hansen, 57 Idaho at 788,69 P.2d at 793 (if claim
is incurred in violation of56-1015 or Article VII, § 3 ofthe Constitution, "any subsequent
attempt of the Legislature to pay [the claim] was unconstitutional';).
Fourth, the Statement of Purpose/Fiscal Note for § 36-106(e)(5)(D), as adopted in 1997,
states there would be "[n]o fiscal impact." The statement of no fiscal impact cannot be
reconciled with Plaintiffs' assertions that the Legislature understood itself to be ratifying an
indemnification agreement. 7
Likewise, the fiscal note accompanying Senate Bill 1232, the 2009 amendment of § 36106(e)(5), indicated that there would be "[n]o fiscal impact." Defs.' Reply Mem., Ex. 1. As
Plaintiffs note, the fiscal note for Senate Bill 1175, which proposed that domestic sheep "shall be
held harmless form adverse impacts by the state of Idaho," did indicate unknown fiscal impacts
to IDFG. Defs.' Reply Mem., Ex. 3. 8 The "hold harmless" language, however, was later
removed from Senate Bill 1175 by amendment on the Senate floor, Defs.' Reply Mem., Ex. 4,
and the entire bill was ultimately vetoed. Defs.' Reply Mem., Ex. 3. Given that history,
Plaintiffs are plainly wrong when they assert that the legislative history of Senate Bill 1175
"strongly suggests the Legislature intended the Department to expend monies from its budget to

7 A copy of the Statement of Purpose and Fiscal Note for House Bill 337 (1997) is attached to this
memorandum as Exhibit. 1. Plaintiffs previously cited the Court to this Statement of Purpose for the purpose of
demonstrating that "the contact listed for the bill was Stan Boyd of the Idaho Wool Growers Association.," Pis.'
Resp. at 13, but failed to provide a copy to the Court.
8 References herein to Exhibit 3 are to the Corrected Exhibit 3 that was filed with the Notice of Errata on
August 30,2010.
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· .. protect[] the Plaintiffs from economic harm." PIs.' Supp. Resp. at 11. Rather, the legislative
history of Senate Bills 1175 and 1232 confirm that the Legislature avoided imposing any
obligation upon IDFG to indemnify Plaintiffs.
4.

In interpreting legislative intent in the context of a motion to dismiss, the Court may
take judicial notice of legislative history.
Plaintiffs assert that in considering legislative intent, it would be error for the Court to

consider the copies ofthe relevant legislative history provided by IDFG. While the Idaho
Supreme Court recently confirmed that a court may not take judicial notice of adjudicative facts
from an underlying case in considering a motion to dismiss, Taylor v. McNichols, 2010 WL
3448851, at *4 (Idaho 2010), the Court has employed legislative history in considering motions
to dismiss.
For example, in Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d 757 (1989), the
Court considered an order of the district court dismissing the case for failure to state a claim
pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(6). In interpreting the contested statute, the concurring opinion made a
"careful reading of the legislative history," id. at 650, 778 P.2d at 772 (Bistline, J., concurring).
Likewise, in Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 148 Idaho 427, 224 P.3d 494 (2009), the
trial court had denied a motion to dismiss based on its reading of the legislative history of the
statute establishing the statute of limitations. Id. at 429-30, 224 P.3d at 496-97. On appeal, the
Supreme Court, while reversing the district court, confirmed that in deciding a motion to dismiss
interpretation of a statute is a question of law that can be determined, in part, by reference to "its
legislative history." Id. at 430,224 P.3d at 497.
Federal courts, applying rules of evidence and procedure similar to Idaho, also hold that it
is proper to refer to legislative history in deciding a motion to dismiss. In one particularly apt
quote, the federal court of claims held:
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Contrary to plaintiffs claim, it is well-established that a court need not accept as
true allegations contained in a complaint that are contradicted by matters on
which the court may take judicial notice, such as legislative facts embodied in
legislative history. See SA Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1363, at 464-65 (2d ed.1990) (citing cases). Plaintiff
also is flatly wrong in arguing that judicial notice of such legislative facts is
precluded by Federal Rule of Evidence 201, which instead deals only with
adjudicative facts.
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. U.S., 46 Fed. Cl. 158, 160 n.3 (Fed. Cl. 2000). Here, as in
Commonwealth Edison, Plaintiffs allege that the Court must accept as true their allegations of
legislative intent, despite the fact that the legislative history of Idaho Code § 36-1 06( e)(5),
including its amendment in 2009 and the concurrent rejection ofa proposed "hold harmless"
provision, clearly demonstrates that the legislature did not intend to indemnify domestic sheep
operators against economic harm arising from the transplant of bighorn sheep. Plaintiffs' failure
to refute the clear intent demonstrated by the legislative history compels the dismissal of any
claims based on Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5).

5.

The claims based on equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, promissory estoppel, and
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing must be dismissed.
In its opening brief, IDFG provided points and authorities compelling the conclusion that

Plaintiffs' claims based on the doctrines of equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, promissory
estoppel, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing must be dismissed for
the same reasons compelling dismissal of the claims based on the 1997 Letter. Such arguments
need not be repeated here, other than to state that if the Court concludes that claims based on the
1997 Letter must be dismissed despite the assumption that it is an enforceable agreement, then
the claims based on the various theories of estoppel must also fail.
One point may need clarification, however, and that is the assertion that equitable
estoppel can be applied against the state because, in Plaintiffs' view, IDFG, in managing bighorn
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sheep, is acting in a proprietary capacity, not a sovereign capacity. It has long been the law in
Idaho that the "state's control over fish and game within its limits ... is within the police power
of the Legislature" and that the "'wild game and fish within a state belong to the people in their
collective sovereign capacity.'" Sherwood v. Stephens, 13 Idaho 399,403,90 P. 345, 346
(1907), quoting Ex parte Maier, 37 P. 402 (Ca. 1894). See also Walbridge v. Robinson, 22 Idaho
236,243, 125 P. 812, 814 (1912) ("wild animals [are] subject to the regulation and control ofthe
state in its sovereign capacity").
In short, IDFG gained no proprietary or commercial advantage from the reintroduction of
bighorn sheep, but rather was carrying out its sovereign responsibility to manage wildlife in trust
for the people of Idaho, so any suggestion that the 1997 Letter was a commercial arrangement
with Plaintiffs is unfounded. The Letter was simply an expression ofIDFG's intent to carry out
its sovereign responsibilities to protect and foster wildlife while avoiding adverse impacts on
domestic sheep operators. IDFG has carried out the terms ofthe letter and has fulfilled its
statutory duties toward Plaintiffs by recognizing the rights of domestic sheep operators to
continue grazing sheep in or near Hells Canyon despite the risk of disease transmission to
bighorn sheep. All harm alleged by Plaintiffs results solely from the independent action of the
Forest Service. If Plaintiffs believe they have been harmed by the actions of the Forest Service,
they should seek reimbursement from the federal government in the proper forum, rather than
seek to make IDFG liable based on the thinnest of allegations.

CONCLUSION
IDFG respectfully submits that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed in its
entirety, and IDFG be awarded its attorney fees and other reasonable expenses incurred in
defending this action pursuant to the authority ofIdaho Code § 12-117.

I ~ /p
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DATED this

~ '3 J

day of September 2010.
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN

Attorney General
CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division

STEVEN W. STRACK

Deputy Attorney General
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I hereby certify that on this 2~~ day of September 2010, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing, DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF RE:
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and addressed as
follows:
Samuel A. Diddle
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chtd.
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530
Post Office Box 1368
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Deputy Attorney General
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Procedural HistorY

Before the court is the First Amended Complaint filed by the Plaintiffs Idaho Wool
Growers Association, Inc., Frank Shirts, Jr., Ronald W. Shirts, Leslie Shirts and John Shirts
(IWGA collectively). IWGA asserts claims of Breach of Contract, Breach of Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing, Violation of Statute (Idaho Code 36-105(e)(5)(D), Promissory Estoppel,
Equitable Estoppel and Quasi Estoppel against the Defendants State of Idaho, Idaho Fish &
Game Commission, Idaho Department of Fish & Game, and Cal Groen (IDFG collectively). The
First Amended Complaint was filed on April 20, 2010. On May 19,2010, IDFG filed a Motion
to Dismiss along with supporting memorandum. IWGA's Response was filed on August 17,
2010 with IDFG's Reply being filed on August 30,2010. Plaintiffs' Supplemental Response
was filed on September 14, 2010 and Defendants' Supplemental Reply was filed on September
27,2010.
Oral argument was held on November 9,2010. Steven Strack, Deputy Attorney General,
appeared on behalf of ID FG and Sam Diddle appeared on behalf of IW GA. Plaintiffs Ron Shirts
and Frank Shirts, Jr. were also present.

Analysis
At the heart of this case is the conflict between domestic sheep operations in the Hells
Canyon area and the efforts to reintroduce big hom sheep into the same area. In 1997, domestic
sheep operators were informed that efforts to reintroduce big hom sheep into Hell's Canyon
would be initiated and in response to opposition from the domestic sheep operations,
participating governmental entities and a private support group functioning as the Hell's Canyon
Bighorn Sheep Restoration Committee sent a letter (herein referred to as "the letter") dated
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
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January 16,2007 to the Idaho Woolgrowers Association care ofMr. Stan Boyd, its executive
director. The court has attached a copy of the letter to this memorandum decision to facilitate
easy review. The letter was printed on United States Department of Agriculture letterhead and
was signed by representatives of USDA Forest Service (Willowa-Whitman NF), Idaho
Department of Fish and Game, Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, Washington
Department ofFish and Wildlife, United States Bureau of Land Management, and the
Foundation for North American Wild Sheep. The Plaintiffs have throughout their pleadings and
memoranda referred to this document as the "Letter Agreement" (First Amended Complaint, ~
10-18). The letter states in part, that the Departments of Fish and Game from Idaho, Oregon, and
Washington recognize the risk of disease transmission to bighorn sheep and that the departments
will "assume the responsibility for bighorn losses and further disease transmission," and that the
departments "will also take whatever action is necessary to reduce further losses of bighorn
sheep without adversely impacting existing domestic sheep operators."l
In their amended complaint, IWGA asserts that the intent of the Letter Agreement was to
ensure that the Departments would not only hold the domestic sheep operators harmless from
bighorn sheep losses but that the Departments would "take whatever action was necessary so that
Idaho domestic sheep operations and operators would not be harmed as a result of the
introduction of Bighorn Sheep in Hells Canyon." (First Amended Complaint, ~ 20).
Subsequent to the issuance of the letter by the committee, the Idaho Legislature amended
I.C. 36-106 to include subsection (e)(5)(D) that stated that domestic sheep operators impacted by
the bighorn sheep reintroduction would be provided a written letter indicating that the existing

I The First Amended Complaint references the Letter Agreement as Exhibit A. The Complaint as filed did not
include a copy of the Letter Agreement, however, the parties have supplied a copy to the court and stipulated that
the court shall considered the Letter Agreement to be an attachment to the pleading for purposes of this motion.
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operations would be recognized and the risk of disease transmission would be accepted. I.C.36106( e)(5)(D)(2007 version).2
IWGA further alleges that beginning in April 2007 and continuing to the present, the
United States Forest Service has modified grazing permits impacting domestic sheep operations,
including those of the Shirts Plaintiffs. (First Amended Complaint, ~ 24). IWGA also alleges
that economic losses have been suffered by the Plaintiffs as a result ofIDFG's failure to take
any action to block the modification of the grazing permits. (First Amended Complaint, ~ 25-26).
IWGA asserts that the letter is a contract between IWGA and IDFG and such is the basis for the
Breach of Contract and Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing claims. IWGA
also asserts that IDFG has violated I.C. 36-106(e)(5)(D) by failing to remedy harm to the
Plaintiff's caused by the reintroduction of bighorn sheep. Finally, IWGA alleges that IDFG
should be estopped from repudiating the promises and commitments contained in the letter.
For the purpose of arguing the pending motion to dismiss, the Defendants made the
limited concession that the letter be treated as an agreement, while at the same time preserving
the right to contest the issue of whether the letter actually constitutes an agreement if Plaintiffs'
claims survive this motion to dismiss. This Court likewise questions whether the propounded
letter constitutes an agreement, but based on the Defendants qualified concession and giving the
Plaintiffs the favorable inference of their allegation that the letter along with their alleged
forbearance constitutes an agreement, the court will treat the letter as an agreement for purposes
of this decision.

2

I.e. 36-106(e)(5)(D) was amended in 2009 to change the word "letter" to "agreement."
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Motion to Dismiss
IDFG seeks dismissal of this action pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, and 12(b)(7) for failure to join an indispensible party.

IDFG's Motion to Dismiss on basis that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
this matter pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(l)
The Defendants argue for dismissal of the IWGA complaint on the basis that this court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to IRCP 12 (b)(l). The basis of this
claim is IDFG's assertion that the Complaint should be dismissed on the grounds that IWGA's
claims violate the requirements ofldaho Code 67-5270 et seq. Idaho Code 67-5270 provides
that a party contesting the actions of an agency shall be entitled to judicial review of the action.
However, Idaho Code 67-5271 requires a party to exhaust all administrative remedies prior to
seeking judicial review of an agency's action. A request for judicial review of any agency
action, other than a rule or order, must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the agency
action. Idaho Code 67-5273.
IDFG argues that IWGA's Complaint, if it were to be construed as a petition for judicial
review oflDFG's actions, is time-barred because the claim was not timely filed in accordance
with Idaho Code 67-5273. To the extent that the Complaint could be construed as a petition for
judicial review, the court cannot determine from the Complaint when the actions ofIDFG
occurred. IDFG wants to characterize the actions at issue, as the agency's failure to stop USFS
from modifying grazing permits which allegedly began in 2007 and continued through 20 I O.
IWGA, on the other hand, argues that the action of IDFG at issue here is IDFG's failure to pay
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
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economic damages. IWGA does not provide the court with any information as to claims made
directly to IDFG and the subsequent denial of those claims, thus this court cannot determine if
the claim is timely filed or not pursuant to the requirements ofI.C. 67-5271 and I.C. 67- 5273.
While the

COUli

does not find the Complaint, as filed, to be a petition for judicial review, if it

were to so consider the pleading as such, it is likely that the petition would be untimely filed and
thus, this court would not have jurisdiction to consider the request for judicial review ofIDFG's
actions.
For these reasons, the court does not dismiss the Complaint on the basis the court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(l) because the court does not have the
information necessary to determine whether the claim was timely filed, or if all administrative
remedies have been exhausted.

IDFG'S IRCP 12(B)(6) Motion to Dismiss
The following analysis address's the IDFG's Motion the Dismiss pursuant to IRCP 12
(b)(6). In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the district court applies the same
standards applied to a motion for summary judgment. Lasser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183
P.3d 758 (2008). The court must view all facts and inferences from the pleadings in favor of the
non-moving party and detemline whether a claim for relief has been stated and whether the
plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims before the court. Id. See also
Gallagher v. State, 141 Idaho 665, 115 P.3d 756 (2005). The court may only consider those
facts appearing in the complaint, as well as those facts that the court may properly take judicial
notice. Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273,796 P.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1990). See also Idaho
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Rule of Evidence 201. A court may grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6) only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of the claim which would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535,
835 P.2d 1346 (Ct. App. 1992).

Failure to State a Claim For Damages - Breach of Contract Claim
ID FG also seeks dismissal of all claims in the Complaint pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) because neither the letter nor the facts of this case give rise to a claim for
damages.
In the Complaint, IWGA asserts that the Plaintiffs have suffered economic loss as a result
of IDFG's failure to fulfill certain obligations it assumed pursuant to the letter. IWGA argues
that IDFG agreed to prevent interference with the domestic sheep operations, or in the
alternative, to provide economic damages for losses suffered as a result of such interference.
IWGA is pursuing an award of economic damages on the theory that it suffered financial losses
because the IDFG failed to prevent modification of historic grazing rights afforded by the USFS
or alternatively, mitigate IWGA's loss by other means such as providing alternative sources of
food or grazing opportunities.
In order to form a valid contract, there must be a meeting of the minds between the
parties who intend to be bound by the contract. Evidence of a meeting of the minds is found in
the offer and acceptance that indicate that there is a mutual intent as to the terms of the contract.

Justad v. Ward, 147 Idaho 509, 512, 211 P.3d 118, 121 (2009). A contract must be complete,
definite, and certain in all its material terms, or contain provisions which are capable in
themselves of being reduced to certainty. Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892, 204 P.3d 532
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(Ct. App. 2009). In a dispute over contract formation it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove
a distinct and common understanding between the parties. Id. Generally, so long as some
consideration is provided for in the contract, the court will not inquire as to the adequacy of such
consideration supporting the agreement. Sirius LC v. Erickson, 244 PJd 224 (2010). "To
constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained for. A
performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his
promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise." Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 71 (1981). Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 774, 780 215 P.3d
494, 500 (2009).
In determining whether there is a breach of contract, the court looks to what contractual
duties are required by the agreement and then determines whether there has been a failure to
perform a contractual duty. Independence Lead Mines v. Hecla Mining Co.,143 Idaho 22, 137
PJd 409 (2006). A breach of contract is a failure, without legal excuse, to perforn1 any promise
which forms the whole or part of a contract. Id. A material breach of contract is a breach so
substantial and fundamental that it defeats the object of the parties in entering into the contract.
Tentinger v. McPheters, 132 Idaho 620, 622, 977 P.2d 234, 236 (1999); Ervin Constr. Co. v. Van
Orden, 125 Idaho 695, 699, 874 P.2d 506, 510 (1993). There is no material breach of contract

where substantial performance has been rendered. Tentinger, supra. See also J. CALAMARI &

1. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 11-22 (2d. ed.1977). Substantial performance is
performance which, despite deviation from the contract or some omission, provides the
important and essential benefits of the contract to the promisee. Tentinger, supra; Gilbert v. City
of Caldwell, 112 Idaho 386, 394, 732 P.2d 355,363 (Ct.App.1987).

In interpreting a contract, the court must begin by examining the language of the contract
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES - 8
11 t:z

itself and then must determine if the language of the contract is unambiguous. Cristo Viene

Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 308, 160 P.3d 743, 747 (2007), citing Independence
Lead Mines Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., 143 Idaho 22, 26,137 P.3d 409,413 (2006); Shawver v.
Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 361, 93 P .3d 685, 692 (2004). Idaho law is clear that
when contract language is unambiguous, the interpretation of the language is a question of law
and the language is to be given its plain meaning. Harris v. State, ex rei Kempthorn, 147 Idaho
401,405,210 P.3d 86,90 (2009). Only when a contract is deemed ambiguous is the court to
look beyond the contract to the intent of the parties. Swanson v. Beco Canst. Co., 145 Idaho 59,
63-64, 175 P.3d 748, 752-53 (2007).
The elements of indemnity are as follows: (1) an indemnity relationship, (2) actual
liability of an indemnitee to a third party, and (3) a reasonable settlement amount. R. W Beck and

Associates, Inc. v. Job Line Canst., Inc., 122 Idaho 92, 831 P.2d 560 (Ct. App. 1992).. See also
Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 115 Idaho 281, 284, 766 P.2d 751,754 (1988). The required
indemnity relationship may arise as a result of express or implied agreement and also by
operation oflaw to prevent an unjust result. Mitchell v. Valerio, 124 Idaho 283, 858 P.2d 822
(Ct. App. 1993). When interpreting express contractual indemnity clau'ses, the language
imposing indemnity must be clear, unequivocal, and certain. 41 Am Jur 2d Indemnity §7. That
is the intent to be bound to indemnify must be stated in "clear and unequivocal terms." Id When
a party claims a right to indemnity, absent an express agreement, the court must engage in
contract interpretation looking to the language of the whole agreement, as well as the
circumstances surrounding the agreement. Id
A court determines the parties' intent by looking at the contract as a whole, the language
used in the document, the circumstances under which it was made, the objective and purpose of a
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particular provision, and any construction placed upon it by the contracting parties as shown by
their conduct or dealings. JR. Simp/ot v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 614,167 P.3d 748, 751 (2007).
In this case, the only document before the court is the January 16, 1997 letter to the
IWGA from the committee referred to above. The letter begins with the salutation, "Dear Mr.
Boyd." The following statements are contained within the body of the letter:

•

The Hells Canyon Bighorn Sheep Restoration Committee (the committee) is interested in
having the support of the woolgrowers industry for this effort to repopulate parts of Hells
Canyon with bighorn sheep.

•

[T]he Idaho Department ofFish and Game, the Oregon Department ofFish and Wildlife,
and the Washington Department of Wildlife will assume the responsibility for bighorn
losses and further disease transmission in their respective states.

•

The three Departments will also take whatever action is necessary to reduce further losses
of bighorn sheep without adversely impacting existing domestic sheep operators.

•

[T]he committee recognizes the existing domestic sheep operations in or adjacent to the
Hells Canyon complex ... and accepts the potential risk of disease transmission and loss of
bighorn sheep when bighorns invade domestic sheep operations.
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The Committee will make every effort to keep interested parties informed about actions
being considered by the Committee in its effort to repopulate Hells Canyon with bighorn
sheep.

As indicated above, the letter is signed by a representative from the USFS, IDFG, Oregon
Department ofFish and Wildlife, Washington Department ofFish and Wildlife, Bureau of Land
Management, and the Foundation for N. American Wild Sheep. The letter is not signed or
acknowledged by any representative ofIWGA.
Assuming the letter constitutes an agreement, the plain language of the letter is that the three
fish and game departments will accept the risk of disease transmission between the domestic
sheep and the bighorn sheep. The focus of the language is the acceptance of injury, loss or
impact on the bighorn sheep. The language is couched in the fonn of a waiver or release to the
effect that if the bighorn sheep become sick or die as a result of contracting diseases from
encounters with domestic sheep, the departments will not attempt to hold any members of the
IWGA responsible. The language also indicates the named departments will undertake actions to
reduce further losses ofthe bighorn sheep without adversely impacting existing domestic sheep
operators. This language suggests that any of the actions taken by the department to reduce
bighorn losses will be taken in such manner to minimize any adverse impact on the domestic
sheep operators.
The incorporated phrases that exemplify this interpretation are "will assume the
responsibility for bighorn losses and further disease transmission in their respective states" and
"accepts the potential risk of disease transmission and loss of bighom sheep when bighorns
invade domestic sheep operations". The letter acknowledges that the bighorn are "at risk" to
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become diseased from encounters with domestic sheep and that exposed bighorns may leave an
area and spread disease to other bighorns. The letter also acknowledges the committee's
understanding that domestic sheep operations are present in the Hell's Canyon Complex and
"accepts the potential risk of disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep when bighorns
invade domestic sheep operations."
The language contained in the letter that is identified as being the basis for the Plaintiffs'
articulated position is: "The three Departments will also take whatever action is necessary to
reduce further losses of bighorn sheep without adversely impacting existing domestic sheep
operators." There is no dispute that this is a commitment by the three fish and game
departments only.

There is no factual allegation that the Idaho Department ofFish and Game

caused the U. S. Forest Service to reduce the federal grazing allotments or could control the
USFS decision to modify the grazing permits in any manner. There is no factual allegation that
the Idaho Department of Fish and Game did not attempt to reduce losses of bighorn sheep
without adversely impacting existing domestic sheep operators. In fact, other than specifying
that it has been impacted by the USFS modification of the grazing allotments, the Plaintiff's
acknowledge that IDFG has fulfilled its commitments to the IWGA. The Plaintiff's allegations
based on this language are: 1. IDFG failed to prevent the USFS from modifying the existing
grazing allotments; 2. IDFG failed to mitigate the impact on IWGA by performing some
affirmative act such as making other state land under its control available for domestic sheep
grazing or perhaps terminating or removing the bighorn herds; 3. IDFG should pay money
damages to the Plaintiffs for their losses because the USFS modified their grazing permits.
In its arguments, IWGA has acknowledged that IDFG could not prevent USFS from
modifying the grazing permits. That is the crux of their argument that the USFS is not an
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indispensible party to this action. IWGA also concedes that they are not pursuing an action for
specific performance of some alternative means of mitigating the alleged damage caused to
IWGA by the USFS actions. IWGA simply seeks an award of money damages for their
economic loss. The claim is essentially an action for monetary indemnification from the IDFG
for the act of the USFS reducing the Plaintiffs grazing allotment.
Considering the cited relevant language from the letter standing alone or within the context
of the whole document the plain meaning of the sentence does not suggest that the IDFG ever
agreed to be responsible for the acts of the USFS or any loss to the IWGA caused by the acts of
the USFS. The language only states that Department will be responsible for their own acts. This
language also does not specifically state or imply that the Departments will pay money damages
to the IWGA for any loss of grazing rights caused by the USFS or for any other act of the
Departments. There are no clear and unequivocal temlS of indemnification.
Based upon this court's reading of the plain meaning of the language cited by the IWGA
from the letter, IWGA's count one for breach of contract fails and must be dismissed.
Further, the court agrees with the IDFG position that if the cited language of the letter was to
be is to be construed to create the liability claimed by the IWGA, then the agreement would be
void as a matter of law because it would be an attempt to create indebtedness without proper
appropriations pursuant to

I.e. 59-1015, I.C. 59-1016 and Article VII § 13 of the Idaho

Constitution. Also, Slate ex reI. Hanson v. Parsons, 57 Idaho 775,69 P.2d 788 (1937).
Idaho Code 59-1015 provides that:
59-l0I5.DEFICIENCIES -- CREATION PROHIBITED -- EXCEPTION. No
officer, employee or state board of the state ofldaho, or board of regents or board of
trustees of any state institution, or any member, employee or agent thereof, shall
enter, or attempt to offer to enter into any contract or agreement creating any
expense, or incurring any liability, moral, legal or otherwise, or at all, in excess of
the appropriation made by law for the specific purpose or purposes for which such
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expenditure is to be made, or liability incurred, except in the case of insurrection,
epidemic, invasion, riots, floods or fires.

Idaho Code 59-1016 provides that:
59-1016.DEFICIENCIES -- CONTRACTS IN CREATION OF, VOID. Any
indebtedness attempted to be created against the state in violation of the provisions
of this chapter, or any indebtedness attempted to be created against the state in
excess of the appropriation provided for in any act, shall be void. The income
accruing to any state institution, after the same has been certified quarterly to the
board of trustees of any such institution by the auditor, shall be deemed an
appropriation to such institution, and shall be governed by the provisions of this
chapter regarding appropriations, and regarding the creation of indebtedness in
excess of such appropriation.

The Plaintiffs' complaint does not allege a specific legislative appropriation for the asserted
liability and the unrefuted legislative history recited by the Defendants confirms that no such
specific appropriation has been made. If the letter were anagreement to indemnify the Plaintiffs
for economic loss as alleged, said agreement would be void as a matter of law because it was not
a liability authorized by appropriation.
The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Breach of Contract Claim is granted.

IWGA's Second Cause of Action based on Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing
The Plaintiffs allege a second cause of action based on a breach of a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires parties to a contract
to perform their obligations in good faith. Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co.,
149 Idaho 299, 233 P.3d 1221 (2010). The covenant is violated when a party violates, qualifies,
or significantly impairs any benefit or right of the other party under the contract-whether express
or implied. Van v. PortneufiVledical Center, 147 Idaho 552, 212 PJd 982(2009). However the
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covenant only extends to those agreed upon terms. Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho
764,203 P.3d 694 (2009). In Bushi, the Idaho Supreme COUli affirmed a trial court's entry of
summary judgment because "[t]he implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing arises only
regarding terms agreed to by the parties." Citing, Taylor v. Brownhzg, 129 Idaho 483, 491,927
P.2d 873, 881 (1996) (citing Idaho First Natl. Bank, 121 Idaho 266, 288.824 P.2d 841, 863
(1991)).
Since the Plaintiffs' claim based on breach of contract does not survive the Defendants'
motion to dismiss, the cause of action based on a breach of a covenant of good faith and fair
dealing likewise does not survive and will be dismissed ..

IWGA Claim For Damages pursuant to I.e. 36-106(e)(5)(D)
In its third cause of action, the IWGA alleges that I.e. 36-1 06(e)(5)(D) requires IDFG to
protect domestic sheep operators from economic harm caused by the reintroduction of Bighorn
Sheep. In response, IDFG argues that I.C. 36-106(e)(5)(D), was enacted after the letter from the
Hells Canyon Bighom Sheep Restoration Committee was issued and that nothing in the statute
indicates that it was to be applied retroactively. In addition, IDFG argues that IWGA has failed
to show how IDFG has not complied with its duties pursuant to I.C. 36-106(e)(5)(D), and thus,
the related cause of action should be dismissed. IDFG argues that at best, IWGA would only be
entitled to a remedy of "preparation and implementation of best management practices," under
the statute and nothing in the statute authorizes or suggests payment for economic damages.
IWGA argue their claim under this code section is suppOited by the legislative history,
the context of the enactment, and the plain language of the statute and that the legislature made it
clear that it was the policy of Idaho that domestic sheep operations shall not be harmed by the
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bighorn sheep reintroduction. IWGA also argue that IDFG has obligations to domestic sheep
operations and it has failed to protect and fulfill those obligations.
The basic rules of statutory construction as summarized by the Idaho Supreme Comi are
set forth below:
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which we exercise
free review. It must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be
given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a
whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply
follows the law as written. A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of
more than one reasonable construction. If the statute is ambiguous, then it must be
construed to mean what the legislature intended for it to mean. To determine that
intent, we examine not only the literal words ofthe statute, but also the
reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and
its legislative history. Statu[t]es that are in pari materia must be construed together to
effect legislative intent. Statutes are in pari materia if they relate to the same subject.
State, ex reI. Wasden v. Maybee, 148 Idaho 520, 224 P.3d 1109 (2010) citing City of
Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway District, 139 Idaho 65, 69, 72 P.3d
905, 909 (2003) (internal citations omitted).

Idaho Code 36-106(e)(5)(D), as enacted in 1997 stated:
(e) Duties and Powers of Director.
5. (D) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 36-408, Idaho Code, to the
contrary, on and after the effective date of this act, the director shall not expend
any funds, or take any action, or authorize any employee or agent of the
department or other person to take any action, to undertake actual transplants of
bighorn sheep into areas they do not now inhabit or to augment the number of
bighorn sheep in existing herds until:
(i) The boards of county commissioners of the counties in which the
release is proposed to take place have been given reasonable notice of the
proposed release.
(ii) The affected federal and state land grazing permittees and owners or
leaseholders of private land in or contiguous to the proposed release site
have been given reasonable notice of the proposed release.
(iii) The president pro tempore of the senate and the speaker of the house
of representatives have received from the director a plan for the
forthcoming year that details, to the best of the department's ability, the
proposed transplants which shall include the estimated numbers of bighorn
sheep to be transplanted and a description of the areas the proposed
transplant or transplants are planned for.
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Upon request, the department shall grant one (1) hearing per transplant if
any affected individual or entity expresses written concern within ten (l0) days of
notification regarding any transplants of bighorn sheep and shall take into
consideration these concerns in approving, modifying or canceling any proposed
bighorn sheep transplant. Any such hearing shall be held within thirty (30) days of
the request. Upon any transplant of bighorn sheep into areas they do not now
inhabit or a transplant to augment existing populations, the department shall
provide for any affected federal or state land grazing permittees or owners or
leaseholders of private land a written letter signed by all federal, state and private
entities responsible for the transplant stating that the existing sheep or livestock
operations in the area of any such bighorn sheep transplant are recognized and
that the potential risk, if any, of disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep
when the same invade domestic livestock or sheep operations is accepted.
I.C. 36-106(e)(5)(D) (1997) (emphasis added).

The statute is unambiguous. This court agrees that nothing in this statute or the
legislative history offered by the parties suggest that it was the legislature's intent that the statute
be applied retroactively. There is no allegation in the complaint that IDFG failed to comply with
the notice and hearing requirements or the best management practices provided for in the statute
in relation to the introduction of bighorn sheep as described in the January 16, 1997 letter.
Finally, nothing in the words of the statute suggests that the legislature intended to
obligate the State or the IDFG to pay damages or indemnify the Plaintiffs for any economic loss
related to the described activities, let alone an economic loss occasioned by the act of a Federal
agency.
In addition, the language "shall provide ... a written letter" evinces the three fish and
game departments intent that the 1997 letter was their expression of accepting the risk of bighorn
sheep loss. In reaching this conclusion, the court has applied the principles of statutory
construction cited above. The Plaintiffs designated third cause of action based on statutory
violation is dismissed on the basis that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
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IDJi'G's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join Indispcnsible Party pursuant to
IRCP12{b )(7)
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) allows for a motion regarding a party's failure to
join an indispensible paI1y as defined by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a)(1) which states:

IRCP 19(a)(l). Persons to be joined if feasible.
A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action
if (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already
parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is
so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a
practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii)
leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed
interest. If the person has not been so joined, the court shall order that the person be
made a party. If the person should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person
may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff.
IRCP 19(a)(I).
Once a party has been determined to be an indispensible party, the court is then guided by
IRCP 19(a)(2) in the decision to proceed with or dismiss an action. That rule states:

IRCP 19(a)(2). Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible.
If a person as described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the
court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being
thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include:
first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial
to the person or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective
provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice
can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's
absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy
if the action is dismissed for nonj oinder.
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The burden of proving a party is indispensible is placed on the moving party. Ada
County Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 179 P.3d 323 (2008).

A district court's determination that a party was not indispensable is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard and the well-known three- factor test. The inquiry focuses upon: (1) whether
the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted
within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the legal standards applicable to the
. specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise
ofreason. Utter v. Gibbins, 137 Idaho 361, 48 P.3d 1250 (2002).
IDFG has asserted that IWGA's Amended Complaint should be dismissed because the
United State Forest Service is an indispensible party because the claims are based on the USFS's
modification of grazing rights. IDFG argues that the case will require a determination of
whether or not USFS breached a binding obligation by modifying the grazing rights and what
impact that has on any duties owed by IDFG. In addition, IDFG argues that USFS is a necessary
party because the rights ofUSFS may be impacted and without USFS in the case, IDFG faces the
risk of inconsistent obligations and outcomes.
IWGA argues that USFS is not an indispensible party as that agency is not even listed in
the letter and because the plaintiffs are not asserting that USFS has violated the agreement, rather
IWGA notes that the Complaint is driven by IDFG's failure to protect IWGA from economic
losses.
Based on the current record and state of the case, the court agrees with the IWGA's
position on this issue. The complaint is limited to a claim for damages against the IDFG based
upon the Plaintiffs assertion that IDFG breached an agreement to pay damages set forth in
covenants made by the three participating fish and game departments. IWGA acknowledges that
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IDFG cannot control the USFS's decision on the grazing allotments and that the USFS did not
enter into the specific covenants cited from the letter that are the basis of its action. The
Defendants have failed to meet the burden of demonstrating the USFS is an indispensible party
to this action at this point in the action and based upon the respective claims asserted by the
parties.
The IWGA acknowledged that IDFG has no ability to prevent the USFS from modifying
the grazing permits. IWGA action for damages does not seek damages from the USFS. IWGA
action does seek to modify or alter USFS's administration of the grazing permits at issue.
IWGA's claim is based on the language in the letter which refers to commitments made only by
the three named state fish and game departments. It appears that in the absence of the USFS as a
party, complete relief can be afforded the parties on the claims asserted by the IWGA. The
USFS has not indicated that it claims an interest in this proceeding and both parties acknowledge
that neither this court nor the IDFG can cause the USFS to modify its decision to modify the
grazing privileges at issue.
IWGA complaint will not be dismissed at this time on the basis ofIDFG's argument that
the IWGA has failed to join an indispensible party pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(7) and 19(a)(l). This
court recognizes that this is a matter of discretion and so exercises its discretion in issuing its
decision on this issue. Because of the court's other rulings, this defense propounded by the
IDFG is not dispositive of the Motion to Dismiss.

IWGA's Estoppel Theories set forth in Causes of Action Four, Five and Six.
In the Complaint, IWGA has asserted claims based on Equitable Estoppel, QuasiEstoppel, and Promissory Estoppel. While recognizing that the estoppel doctrines generally
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES - 20
I~D

cannot be applied to a govcnmlcntal agency acting in its sovereign capacity, in some instances,
the notions of justice and fair play will require estoppel to be applied against a government, even
when acting in its sovereign capacity when the effects of the estoppel would not unduly damage
the public interest. Brandt v. State, 126 Idaho 101, 878 P.2d 800 (et. App. 1994). IWGA asselis
that estoppel shall be applied in this action to prevent IDFG from taking an inconsistent position
from the position taken at the time that the reintroduction committee was working to enact the
reintroduction of the bighorn sheep. IWGA asserts that it would be manifest injustice to allow
IDFG to now claim that it did not contemplate monetary damages would be sought by the
Plaintiffs, or to claim that it cannot now fulfill the obligations agreed to in the Letter Agreement.
In its fourth cause of action, IWGA asserts a claim of promissory estoppel.
A claim for promissory estoppel must meet the following elements:
(1) the detriment suffered in reliance was substantial in an economic sense; (2)
substantial loss to the promisee acting in reliance was or should have been
foreseeable by the promisor; and (3) the promisee must have acted reasonably in
justifiable reliance on the promise as made.

Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 229 P .3d 1164 (2010).

IWGA asserts that it detrimentally relied on the express and/or implied representations of
the IDFG found in the Letter Agreement, that IWGA (and Shirts) have suffered economic harm
that was foreseeable to IDFG, and that such reliance by IWGA was reasonable and justified.
This court has found that the letter does not contain a promise obligating IDFG to indemnify
IWGA. Without such a promise or other representation by IDFG, IWGA's claim for promissory
estoppel fails, first because there is no promise upon which IWGA could rely. Without that
crucial element, IWGA cannot succeed on its claim for promissory estoppel.
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In its fifth cause of action, IWGA asserts a claim for equitable estoppel.
A claim for equitable estoppel must meet the following elements:

(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or
constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting estoppel did not
know or could not discover the truth; (3) that the false representation or
concealment was made with the intent that it be relied UpOll; and (4) that the
person to whom the representation was made, or from whom the facts were
concealed, relied and acted upon the representation or concealment to his
prejudice.

Ogden v. Griffith, 149 Idaho 489, 236 P.3d 1249 (2010).

In the equitable estoppel claim, IWGA asserts that IDFG made express and/or implied
representations to IWGA and its members (including the Shirts Plaintiffs) which were false or
concealed a material fact, IDFG knew the representations in the Letter Agreement were false,
that IWGA could not discover the truth or falsity of the representations but did rely on the
representations and were damaged. The court cannot find that IWGA's claim for equitable
estoppel can succeed. This court has explained its interpretation of the letter above, and having
found that it does not contain a representation or promise to indemnify, the court cannot now
find that the facts alleged in the Complaint support that the language of the letter contains false
or misleading representations. Thus, IWGA cannot meet the first element required of a claim for
equitable estoppel. IWGA's claim for equitable estoppel fails.
In its sixth cause of action, IWGA asserts a claim for quasi estoppel.
A claim for quasi-estoppel includes the following elements:

(1) the offending party took a different position than his or her original position,
and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage or caused a
disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced to change
positions; or (c) it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to
maintain an inconsistent position from one he or she has already derived a benefit
or acquiesced in.
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Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 437,235 P.3d 387 (2010).

In the claim for quasi-estoppel, IWGA asserts that IDFG made express representations in
the letter when it agreed to "take whatever action is necessary" and that IWGA believes that
IDFG was representing that the domestic sheep operators would not be held responsible for
losses of bighorn sheep, and that domestic sheep operators would not be harmed by the
reintroduction. IWGA asserts that IDFG is now asserting a contrary position after IWGA was
induced to change positions and did, in fact, change positions to their detriment. Thus, IWGA
asserts that IDFG cannot repudiate the promises and commitments found in the letter. IWGA
has failed to show how IDFG has taken a contrary position from the original position asserted in
the letter. As decided above, the term of the letter "take whatever action is necessary" does not
apply to the protection ofIWGA's interests, rather to the interests of the Departments committed
to the reintroduction of the bighorn sheep. Without some kind of commitment from IDFG,
IWGA cannot succeed on a claim of quasi-estoppel because the court does not find that IDFG
can be estopped from disclaiming a duty that does not exist either through contract or statute.
IWGA's claim for quasi-estoppel also fails.
The Plaintiffs' fourth, fifth and sixth causes of action based on the three estoppel theories
enumerated fail for the same reason the breach of contract action fails (see analysis above).
There is nothing set forth in the letter to suggest that the IDFG was representing or committing to
indemnify the Plaintiff or otherwise pay damages to the Plaintiff for the loss of grazing
privileges as a result of the independent acts of the USFS. There is also no specific allegation of
acts of undisclosed deception, collusion or misrepresentation, falsity, inconsistent representations
or positions taken by IDFG.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES - 23
\ q3

Further, equitable estoppel may not ordinarily be invoked against a government or public
agency functioning in its sovereign or governmental capacity. Young Elec. Sign Co. v. State ex
ref. Winder, 135 Idaho 804, 810, 25 P.3d 117,123 (2001). The court concludes that in managing

bighorn sheep, the IDFG is acting in a sovereign capacity not a proprietary capacity. In signing
the letter and fulfilling any obligations under the letter, the IDFG was carrying out its sovereign
responsibility of managing the state's wildlife and not engaging in a proprietary or commercial
enterprise. Even in light of Plaintiffs citation to Brandt v. State of Idaho, 126 Idaho 101,878
P.2d 800 (Ct. App. 1994) arguing that estoppel may be applied against the government even in
its sovereign capacity when 'justice and fair play require it" this cOUli cannot conclude that the
doctrine should apply when it does not interpret the letter in issue as making any kind of
representation that IDFG would assume any responsibility for economic loss to IWGA based on
the USFS's decision to deny or modify grazing privileges.

Attorney fees
IDFG seeks an award of attorney fees and other reasonable expenses pursuant to Idaho
Code 12-117. The current version of that code section states:

12-117. Attorney's fees, witness fees and expenses awarded in certain
instances.
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding or civil
judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or political
subdivision and a person, the state agency or political subdivision or the court, as the
case may be, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees
and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law.
The Defendants are the prevailing parties in this action. If the state intends to pursue a
claim for attorney fees, the requisite memorandum will have to be timely submitted and the court
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will require additional argument on the issue of whether the complaint was filed with or without
a reasonable basis in fact or law.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER
The court is sympathetic with the Plaintiffs for the problems and economic loss they have
experienced as a result of the USFS modification of their grazing allotments. However, this
court is bound to follow the law in considering the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs'
complaint. For the reasons set forth above, the Plaintiffs' first amended complaint filed in this
case on April 20, 2010 is dismissed. In entering this memorandum decision and order the court
has considered only the content of the amended complaint and the legislative histories cited by
both parties in their respective memoranda. To that extent, the court takes judicial notice of the
legislative history cited by the parties in their respective memoranda. Doe v. Boy Scouts of

America, 148 Idaho 427 224 P.3d 494 (2009).

The attorney for the Defendants' shall submit a

proposed jUdgment in compliance with IRCP 54(a) within ten days of this order. Any request for
an award of costs and attorney fees shall be submitted pursuant to applicable Idaho rule, statute
or precedent.
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I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION were
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Attorney at Law
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P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720

SHERR Y WARD, Clerk of the Court
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by all of the Commi.ttes entities. This means tha t the Committee recognizes
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complex, on both National Forest and privata lands, and accepts the
potellttal risk of disease transmiSsion arid 10s8 .of bighorn sheep' when

bighorns 'invade domestic sheep operations.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADAMS

IDAHO WOOL GROWERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho corporation,
indi vidually and on behalf of its members;
FRANK SHIRTS, JR., individually and as a
member of the Idaho Wool Growers
Association; RONALD W, SHIRTS, LESLIE
SHIRTS and JOHN T. SHIRTS, individually
and d/b/a! SHIRTS BROTHERS SHEEP and
as members ofthe Idaho Wool Growers
Association,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO; IDAHO FISH & GAME
COMMISSION; IDAHO DEPARTMENT
OF FISH & GAME; CAL GROEN, Director
of Idaho Department ofFish and Game,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2010-2567

JUDGMENT

---------------)
For the reasons set forth in this Court's Memorandum Decision and Order on
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Request for Attorney Fees, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that

\ <) ~
1

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss all Counts in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint pursuant to Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 12(b)(7) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part. The Motion is GRANTED as to Defendants' motion to dismiss all Counts in Plaintiffs'
amended complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), and DENIED as to Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to
join an indispensable party pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7).

-r-..,q--\'V'_
day
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Of~20

11.
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I hereby certify that on this
day of Fe:b1:!:ITfl'y 2011, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy ofthe foregoing JUDGMENT by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and addressed as
follows:
Samuel A. Diddle
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chtd.
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530
Post Office Box 1368
Boise,ID 83701-1368
Steven W. Strack·
Deputy Attorney General
PO Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
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Samuel A. Diddle, ISB No. 4967
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
MCKLVEEN, CHTD.
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530
Post Office Box 1368
Boise, ID 83701-1368
Telephone: (208) 344~8535
Facsimile: (208) 344-8542
sdiddle@eberle.com
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADAMS

IDAHO WOOL GROWERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho corporation,
individually and on behalf of its members;
FRANK SHIRTS, JR., individually and as a
member of the Idaho Wool Growers
Association; RONALD W. SHIRTS,
LESLIE SHIRTS and JOHN T. SHIRTS,
individually and d/b!a SHIRTS BROTHERS
SHEEP and as members of the Idaho Wool
Growen; Association,
Plaintiffs!Appellants,

VS.

STATE OF IDAHO; IDAHO FISH &
GAME CON1MISSION; IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF FISH & GAME; CAL
GROEN, Director of Idaho Department of
Fish and Game.
Defendants/Respondents.
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NOTICE OF APPEAL
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TO:

......
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THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO FISH &
GAME COMMISSION, IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF FISH & GAME AND CAt
GROEN, AND THE PARTIES' ATTORl~EYS OF RECORD, STEVEN \V.
STRACK, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, PO BOX 83720, BOISE, IDAHO
83720 AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

1.

The above named Appellants, Idaho Wool Growers Association, Tnc., Frank

Shirts, Jr., Ronald W. Shirts, Leslie Shirts, John T. Shirts, and Shirts Brothers Sheep, appeal
against the above named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final judgment
entered in the above-entitled action on the 4th day of March, 2011, Honorable Bradly S. Ford
presiding.
2.

The parties have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

Judgment described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rule
11(a)(l), LAR.

3.

The issues on appeal whieh the Appellants intend to assert in the appeal:
Did the Court err in granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss all counts i.n

a)

Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6)?
b)

Does the 1997 Letter Agreement constitute a contract by or representation
of the Idaho Department ofFish & Game'?

c)

Did the State of Idaho agree to indemnify domestic sheep operators from
damages arising out of the reintroduction of Bighorn Sheep in Hells
Canyon?

d)

Was there an appropriation by the State ofIdaho sufficient to support the
Idaho Fish & Game Commission's promise to indemnify domestic sheep
operators?
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Does Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D) oblig:lte Idaho Department ofFish &

e)

Game to protect domestic sheep operators?
f)

Can the Respondents be estopped?

4.

No order has been entered scaling any and all portion of the record.

5.

a)

A reporter) s n-anscript is requested.

b)

The Appellants request the preparation oftne reporter's standard transcript
as defined in Rule 25(c), l.A.R., supplemented by the followl11g:
i)

6.

Transcript of the hearing of November 9,2010.

The Appellants request the following documents to be included ln the clerk's

record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.:
a)

All briefing and affidavits subm:itted in support of or opposition to
Respondents' Motion to Dismiss.

7.

I certify:

a)

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set
out below:
Sherry Ward
Adams County Clerk of the Court
POBox 48
Council, ID 83612

b)

That the Clerk of the Court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation

of the reporter's transcript.
c)

That the estimated fec for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

d)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
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e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant
to Rule 20, and the Idaho Attorney General pursuant to § 67-1401(1),

Idaho Code.
DATED this

/5

day of April, 2011.

EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& MeKLVEEN,
TERED

cJ~

By:

S uel . Diddle, of the Finn
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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I

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
S day of April, 2011, a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing document was served as follows:
State of Idaho, Office of the Attorney General
Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General
Clive J. Strong~ Deputy Attorney General)
Chief of Natural Resources Division
Steven W. Strack) Depu.ty Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ill 83720-0010
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icial District Court - Adams County

ROA Report
Case: CV-2010-0002567 Current Judge: Bradly S Ford
Idaho Wool Growers Association, Inc, etal. vs. Idaho, State Of, etal.

Other Claims
Date

4/1/2010

4/2/2010

4/5/2010

Plaintiff: Idaho Wool Growers Association, Inc Appearance Samuel A
Diddle

Bradly S Ford

New Case Filed - Other Claims

Bradly S Ford

Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not listed in categories B-H, Bradly S Ford
or the other A listings below Paid by: Diddle, Samuel A (attorney for Idaho
Wool Growers Association, Inc) Receipt number: 0012418 Dated:
04/02/2010 Amount: $88.00 (Cashiers Check) For: Idaho Wool Growers
Association, Inc (plaintiff), Shirts Brothers Sheep (plaintiff), Shirts, Frank Jr
(plaintiff), Shirts, John T (plaintiff), Shirts, Leslie (plaintiff) and Shirts,
Ronald W (plaintiff)
Plaintiff: Shirts, Frank Jr Appearance Samuel A Diddle

Bradly S Ford

Plaintiff: Shirts, Ronald W Appearance Samuel A Diddle

Bradly S Ford

Plaintiff: Shirts, Leslie Appearance Samuel A Diddle

Bradly S Ford

Plaintiff: Shirts, John T Appearance Samuel A Diddle

Bradly S Ford

Plaintiff: Shirts Brothers Sheep Appearance Samuel A Diddle

Bradly S Ford

Complaint Filed and Demand for Jury Trial

Bradly S Ford

Summons: Document Service Issued: on 04/05/2010 to Idaho, State Of;
returned to attorney for service

Bradly S Ford

Summons: Document Service Issued: on 04/05/2010 to Idaho Fish &&
Game Commission; returned to attorney for service

Bradly S Ford

Summons: Document Service Issued: on 04/05/2010 to Idaho Department Bradly S Ford
Of Fish And Game; returned to attorney for service
Summons: Document Service Issued: on 04/05/2010 to Cal Groen;
returned to attorney for service

Bradly S Ford

4/20/2010

First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial Filed

Bradly S Ford

5/612010

Summons: Document Returned Served on 04/28/2010 to Idaho, State Of;
ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE BY ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT STATE
OF IDAHO (Clive Strong)

Bradly S Ford

Summons: Document Returned Served on 04/28/2010 to Idaho Fish &
Game Commission; ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE BY ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT IDAHO FISH & GAME COMMISSION

Bradly S Ford

Bradly S Ford
Summons: Document Returned Served on 04/28/2010 to Idaho
Department Of Fish And Game; ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE BY
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF FISH & GAME

5/19/2010

Summons: Document Returned Served on 04/28/2010 to Cal Groen;
ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE BY ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT CAL
GROEN

Bradly S Ford

Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),
12(b)(6), and 12(b)(7), and Request for Attorney Fees

Bradly S Ford

Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss

Bradly S Ford

Defendant: Idaho, State Of Appearance Steven W Strack

Bradly S Ford

Defendant: Idaho Fish & Game Commission Appearance Steven W Strack Bradly S Ford

Qo~

Defendant: Idaho Department Of Fish And Game Appearance Steven W
Strack

Bradly S Ford

Defendant: Groen, Cal Appearance Steven W Strack

Bradly S Ford
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Case: CV-2010-0002567 Current Judge: Bradly S Ford
Idaho Wool Growers Association, Inc, etal. vs. Idaho, State Of, etal.

Other Claims
Date

7/23/2010

Notice Of Hearing (9-3-10)

Bradly S Ford

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss 09/03/201009:31 AM) & Attorney Bradly S Ford
Fees

8/10/2010

Notice Of Hearing (Order) (8-18-10) Canyon County (Status)

Bradly S Ford

Hearing Scheduled (Status 08/18/2010 11 :00 AM) Canyon County

Bradly S Ford

8/17/2010

Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Request for
Attorneys Fees

Bradly S Ford

8/18/2010

Hearing result for Status held on 08/18/2010 11 :00 AM: Hearing Held
Canyon County

Bradly S Ford

8/30/2010

Defendants' Notice of Errata and Substitute Exhibit

Bradly S Ford

Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss

Bradly S Ford

Stipulation to Vacate Hearing on September 3, 2010

Bradly S Ford

Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss held on 09/03/201009:31 AM:
Hearing Vacated & Attorney Fees

Bradly S Ford

9/14/2010

Plaintiffs' Supplemental Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

Bradly S Ford

9/27/2010

Defendants' Supplemental Reply Brief Re: Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

Bradly S Ford

10/8/2010

Joint Notice Of Hearing Re Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (11-9-2010
Canyon County)

Bradly S Ford

10/13/2010

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss 11/09/201009:00 AM)
Defendants' - Canyon County

Bradly S Ford

11/912010

Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss held on 11/09/201009:00 AM: Case
Taken Under Advisement Defendants'

Bradly S Ford

21412011

Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and
Request for Attorney Fees

Bradly S Ford

3/4/2011

Submission of Proposed Judgment

Bradly S Ford

9/212010

Civil Disposition entered for: Groen, Cal, Defendant; Idaho Department Of Bradly S Ford
Fish And Game, Defendant; Idaho Fish & Game Commission, Defendant;
Idaho, State Of, Defendant; Idaho Wool Growers Association, Inc, Plaintiff;
Shirts Brothers Sheep, Plaintiff; Shirts, Frank Jr, Plaintiff; Shirts, John T,
Plaintiff; Shirts, Leslie, Plaintiff; Shirts, Ronald W, Plaintiff. Filing date:
3/4/2011

4/15/2011

4/22/2011

STATUS CHANGED: Closed

Bradly S Ford

Judgment

Bradly S Ford

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Bradly S Ford

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid
by: Diddle, Samuel A (attorney for Idaho Wool Growers Association, Inc)
Receipt number: 0015549 Dated: 4/15/2011 Amount: $101.00 (Credit
card) For: Idaho Wool Growers Association, Inc (plaintiff)

Bradly S Ford

Filing: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Diddle, Samuel A (attorney for
Idaho Wool Growers Association, Inc) Receipt number: 0015549 Dated:
4/15/2011 Amount: $3.00 (Credit card) For: Idaho Wool Growers
Association, Inc (plaintiff)

Bradly S Ford

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Bradly S Ford

STATUS CHANGED: Inactive

Bradly S Ford

Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal

Bradly S Ford

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADAMS

IDAHO WOOL GROWERS ASSOCIATION
FRANK SHIRTS JR; RONALD W SHIRTS;
LESLIE SHIRTS and JOHN T SHIRTS;
Dba SHIRTS BROTHERS SHEEP,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs

SUPREME COURT #38743-2011
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

STATE OF IDAHO; IDAHO FISH &
GAME COMMISSION; IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF FISH & GAME; CAL
GROEN, Director,
Defendants/Res ondents.

I, Sherry Ward, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District ofthe State ofIdaho,

in and for Adams County, do hereby certify that the foregoing Record in this cause was compiled and
bound under my direction as, and is a true, correct and complete Record of the pleadings and
documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.

I do further certify that there were no exhibits which were marked for identification or
admitted into evidence during the course of this action.

IN WITNES S WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at
Council, Idaho, this

day of

_ _-=~_ _ _, 2011.
Sherry Ward
Clerk of the District Court
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IDAHO WOOL GROWERS ASSOCIATION,
FRANK SHIRTS JR; RONALD W SHIRTS;
LESLIE SHIRTS and JOHN T SHIRTS;
Dba SHIRTS BROTHERS SHEEP,
Plaintiff/Appellants,

SUPREME COURT #38743-2011
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

vs
STATE OF IDAHO; IDAHO FISH & GAME
COMMISSION; IDAHO DEP ARTMENT OF
FISH & GAME; CAL GROEN, Director,
Defendant/Res ondents.
I, Sherry Ward, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District ofthe State ofIdaho,
in and for the County of Adams, do hereby certify that I have personally served or mailed, by United
States Mail, one copy of the

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT AND CLERK'S RECORD
TO each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:

SAMUEL A DIDDLE
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow &
McKlveen Chtd
PO Box 1368
Boise,ID 83701-1368

this

STEVEN W STRACK
Deputy Attorney General
Statehouse PO Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court
July
,2011.
day of

Sherry Ward
Clerk of the District Court

Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

